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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
In this thesis I have tried to establish a theory of
justice which would be plausible and acceptable in
contemporary Korean society. The basic idea of justice I
espouse is based on the notion of teleological desert. This
is a liberal-communitarian conception of justice which is
a amalgam between liberal individualism and traditional
communitarian values. I have argued that the achievement of
this kind of synthesis between two seemingly inconsistent
and incompatible principles can be made possible only
through the approach of a liberal perfectionist virtue
ethics: for each member of society to become a more
excellent human being in an autonomous way is a most viable
way of realizing justice not only in personal relations but
also in society at large.
In order to nurture perfectionist virtue I have
advocated a creative reconstruction of traditional
Confucian ethics in a way that can suit any contemporary
industrialized and capitalist society. The essential
elements worth drawing from traditional Confucian
philosophy seem to be a kind of work-ethic that stresses
self-fulfilment and human perfection through hard work and
the nurturing of virtue, rendering a person due reward and
punishment according to his or her desert, and the priority
of righteousness and harmonious common good over social
utility understood in purely hedonistic terms.
However, I have put equal stress on the right to
individual autonomy and self-determination which is an
essential element to establish and identify a person's
desert and responsibility. The notions of human dignity and
worth and the individual right to freedom and equality
which were transplanted to the East from the West have
under rigorous pressure taken root in the Korean political
culture as can be seen in the Korean constitutional history
of the recent past. I suppose that the protection of the
individual right to autonomy and privacy is an inviolable
principle in Korean political morality. I believe that the
theory of justice I have espoused in this thesis which
comprises the three principles of desert, needs, and legal
rights may find its justification in the prevailing
political morality of the great majority of contemporary
Korean people. This is also reflected in the principle of
the liberal welfare state to be drawn from the present
Korean Constitution.
Although the principle of justice is essential and
pivotal to building and maintaining a good society, it
should not be regarded as an absolutely superior or all-
encompassing notion to be applied to resolve any social
issues. The principle of utility has a complementary or
auxiliary part to play, and sometimes qualifies justice in
a way which is necessary for securing the common good.
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When we face the vast disparities in wealth and resources
between apparently equally hard-working people in the same
society, we may be often puzzled. If a not insubstantial
number of people are barely able to meet even their minimum
nutritional needs, or to secure a basic shelter, while
others spend a huge amount of money importing luxurious
foreign furniture, or heating their private swimming pools,
then, it is natural to ask, is this society running justly
or faily? Perhaps even more striking than this would be the
fact that so many people tend to regard this state of
affairs not as abnormal but even as a legitimate result of
personal talent and industriousness, since they live in
such a highly competitive and efficient society as a
contemporary industrialized capitalist society. Yet, in
other contexts, we may notice that the fairness of
society's economic arrangements is an issue about which
people feel strongly. Individuals argue, campaign, lobby,
and fight over the justice of the allocation of economic
goods. Are taxes fair? What about agricultural subsidies?
Do corporations deserve their huge profits, or their
executives and owners such large salaries and other
benefits?
Arguments about distributive justice as well as
commutative justice feature centrally in current political
debates concerning law, social policy and economic
organization. Inequalities of income, employment
opportunities and property ownership, if not having a
proper justification, are liable to generate suspicion or
the sense of injustice on the part of poorer people.
Furthermore, deprivations which arise from unemployment,
disablement and old age, uncompensated injuries sustained
through accident or as a result of the criminal behaviour
of others and the sufferings of the victims of state
repression - all these, much more, are routinely denounced
as not simply wrong, but unacceptably wrong because they
are unjust.
Like the matter of economic justice with regard to just
reward, the matter of penal justice with regard to just
punishment is certainly a subject which must at some time
have touched all of us closely, at least in our childhood,
and the latter at any rate is one of those topics which may
at times move to philosophical thought even the least
speculatively inclined. For discussion as to the value of
punishment is forced upon all who think either of the
state's treatment of those who have offended against its
laws or of the problems of the educator, topics which even
the daily newspaper is continually bringing home to us.
Criminal punishment, or retributive justice, particularly
presents a perplexing set of problems. Often when people
break the law they are punished. The punishment may involve
the loss of property or the loss of freedom. In the case of
serious offences, the penalty can be imprisonment, and for
some crimes the punishment can even be death. These
practices are so familiar that we may accept them without
question. Yet, upon reflection, they require justification.
In taking away the money, the freedom, and the lives of
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convicted persons, the state is doing them great harm; and
whenever harm is done, some justification is required. When
the state inflicts harm on criminals, it is required, in
addition to the justification of punishment itself, to
render a just or fair amount of punishment. There are
traditionally two rival answers to this question, the
retributivist answer and the utilitarian answer. However,
in detail, each approach has a very complicated web of
justifications and carries a wide variety of practical
implications.
It is with the conflicting ideas of justice which emerge
in argument about such contentious political issues of
economic distribution and criminal punishment that this
thesis is concerned. What is justice? Why does it really
matter?
Justice governs our dealings with others. The very word
' justice' has associations with equality or equilibrium; To
adjust something is to make it equal or equivalent to some
standard, and to be an equal footing with or to be
equitable to someone is thus a fundamental notion of
justice. Justice is regarded as one of the cardinal human
virtues attainment of which would make a human being
perfect. And to be a perfect human being is our ideal. As
an approach to a perfect state of human existence we need
to know at least what justice is and how we can achieve
justice.
The maxim of justice, 'to give to each one's due',
requires us to ask what one's due is and how we can decide
to give one his or her due. Since in the 'circumstances of
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justice' we find it necessary to compare and discern each
person from others to give each his or her own due, we
should look after all at the qualities or attributes of
each person. As to the discernment of personal
characteristics for the sake of justice I shall propose
that three criteria - moral desert, institutional desert
(legal right or entitlement), and basic needs are relevant.
The question to be answered is how, or in what manner, we
can assess and rank, if feasible, the relative value of
each person's moral or institutional desert, or basic
needs. Furthermore, if there arises a conflict among those
three seemingly competing criteria, how can we solve the
problem of priority-setting among those three?
However, in this thesis I shall take a desert-based
theory as the most important and pivotal criterion of
justice and for that purpose my research will be mainly
focused on the concept of desert, its application to the
issues of reward and punishment. My argument of the notion
of desert here is essentially teleological and thus differs
both from deontological retributivism and from utilitarian
consequentialism. Yet, in addition to the notion of desert
as an essential criterion of just distribution, an equally
important but competing notion of needs will be briefly
dealt with for a better understanding of the location of
desert in the conceptual structure of justice proposed in
this thesis.
In the first chapter, the problem how the notion of
desert can be applied as a criterion for just distribution
will be examined. Valuable personal effort and labour
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rather than contribution will be stressed as the essential
basis of desert. In order to ascribe praise or blame to a
person for his action or work, it is necessary to ask
whether free will of the agent is presupposed or not. I
shall contend that the notion of desert presupposes the
free will of human beings as self-determining moral
agents, though every person is in his thought and conduct
influenced by his social, psychological, and physiological
conditions.
In the second and following two chapters, as to the
problem of punishment as a consequence of negative desert,
its definition and competing theories of its justification
will be examined. After backward-looking ideas of
retributivism, forward-looking ideas of utilitarianism and
quite a different kind of expressive theories will be
examined.
In the fifth chapter, after an examination of compromise
theories of teleological retributivism, my own
'teleological desert theory of punishment' will be proposed
as a model account of just punishment. Also the principle
of proportionality as the means of measuring and delimiting
desert will be examined.
In the sixth chapter, the meaning of teleological desert,
its relation to justice and the common good will be
discussed. The notion of the common good will be shown to
achieve completeness by comprising two seemingly rival
principles, justice and utility.
In the seventh chapter, as the political and moral
justification of my desert-based theory of justice, the
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principle of liberal-communitarian value will be proposed.
As the ground of endorsing personal autonomy and freedom I
shall take perfectionist idea, namely the attainment of
fundamental human goods though they are plural in nature.
In the eighth chapter, a complete picture of my theory of
justice and the common good will be proposed in the form of
two-stage justification. The schematic framework of
two-stage justification will consist of seven
sub-principles: 'the thesis of self-fulfilment', 'the
thesis of free will and autonomous action', 'the thesis of
equal opportunity for desert', 'the thesis of equal
satisfaction of basic needs', 'the thesis of desert and
justice discourse as teleological communication', 'the
thesis of dynamic equilibrium and harmony' and finally 'the
thesis of institutional natural law.
In the ninth chapter, I shall investigate the basic ideas
of justice and law in the tradition of Confucian Philosophy
in order to compare the differences and similarities
between the East and the West. The basic findings of
research in this thesis will be supposed to be applied to
Eastern society, such a contemporary industrialized
capitalistic country as Korea. For that purpose the
underlying leitmotiv of my comparative study between the
East and the West is to find the most viable and easily
applicable theory of justice and law for Eastern society.
As a practical verification of that applicability of
syncretic ideas, I shall examine an actual Korean case of
constitutional adjudication in regard to the matters of
sexual morality and legal moralism. The case to be dealt
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with in light of this synthesized idea of justice and law
is a controversial area between traditionalists and
liberalists, namely the issue of criminal punishment of
adultery.
In the conclusion, I shall summarize the basic findings
in the preceding discussions and conclude my contentions in
favour of a desert-based theory of justice. In addition to
that, I shall remind readers of the limits of justice as a
moral or legal principle which is supposed to solve the
social issues. And finally the wider and higher principle
of the common good will be stressed; nonetheless, the
principle of justice should be still essential, if
subservient, to the principle of the common good.
(In this thesis with no intention of preference I may from
time to time follow the convention of using forms of the
masculine pronoun when referring indifferently to men and
women.)
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1 CHAPTER 1. DESERT AND JUST REWARD
I. Desert-based Justice.
1.1. Resurgence of desert.
Justice, in its primary meaning, characterizes states of
affairs, situations. Just acts and just human beings are
those that tend to bring just situations into being. The
situation with which justice is concerned consists in an
ensemble of possessive relations. Justice, then, may be
defined as situations of rightful possession. (See Galston,
1980: 5)
To possess something rightfully is to hold it in
accordance with one's entitlement or other valid claims.
Rights, deserts and needs are considered to be three
fundamental bases for valid claims.(For example, see
Miller, 1976: part I) Among competing criteria for the just
distribution of benefits and burdens in society, there has
recently been a return to the idea that desert is a central
criterion of justice.
In historical terms the idea that justice is a matter of
people getting what they deserve is perhaps the most common
and tenacious conception of justice.(Campbell, 1988: 150)
Indeed the connection between justice and desert has been
frequently cited as part of the very concept of justice
itself. But in certain leading contribution to the
contemporary debate over justice, desert has been almost
completely excluded from justice. Rawls rejects desert in
his seminal book 'A Theory Of Justice' (See 1971: 103), and
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many other writers have followed suit, for example Michael
Walzer (Spheres of Justice, 1983: 23-5) Ronald Dworkin
(Taking Rights Seriously, 2nd ed., 1978), and Bruce
Ackerman (Social Justice and the Liberal State, 1980). The
disappearance of desert is all the more remarkable in view
of the prominence it has enjoyed in the tradition of
Western political theory since Plato.(See Plato, The
Republic, Book I, p.66; Plato, The Laws, Book VI,
pp.229-30; Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Ch.3,
pp.177-9; and Aristotle, The Politics, Book III, Ch.9,
pp.195-8) To emphasize the importance of desert, some of
that tradition will be reviewed here.(See Jackson, 1986:
62)
It was St. Paul who said, "Master give unto your servants
that which is just and equal" [to their deserts].(The
Letter of St. Paul to the Colossians, Ch.4, verse 1; see
also Revelation, Ch.22, verse 12, "My reward is with me,
and I will give to everyone according to what he has
done.") In the modern world Edmund Burke pined for a
society in which it is an invariable law that a man's
acquisitions are in proportion to his labours, while John
Locke based his political theory on owning the fruits of
one's labour. (The Second Treatise on Government, Two
Treatises of Government, Ch.5, section 27, p.329)
Note that Karl Marx once wrote that, "the right of the
producers is proportional to the labour they supply"(See
The Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Marx and Engels:
Basic Writings, L. S. Feuer, ed., 1969: 159) . Marx's
contemporary J. S. Mill argued that, "it is universally
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considered just that each person should obtain that
(whether good or evil) which he deserves". (Utilitarianism,
M. Warnock, ed., 1962: 44)
Later Henry Sidgwick likened desert to the divine when he
wrote that, "when we speak of the world as justly governed
by God, we seem to mean that, if we could know the whole of
human existence, we should find that happiness is
distributed among men according to their deserts".(The
Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., 1907: 280) In the twentieth
century W. D. Ross advocated the apportionment of happiness
to merit.(The Right and the Good, 1930: 21 and 138)
Recently several theorists have appeared to espouse
desert-based theories of justice. Among them Joel Feinberg
(Doing and Deserving, 1970), David Miller (Social Justice,
1976), William A. Galston (Justice and the Human Good,
1980) , Alasdair Maclntyre (After Virtue, 1981), and
Wojciech Sadurski (Giving Desert its Due: Social Justice
and Legal Theory, 1985) are appealing and worthy of
attention. Though they share some common ground in their
arguments in favour of espousing a desert-based theory of
justice, however, upon scrutiny, they have each a different
idea of values relevant for its justification: their ideas
of the political principle and value underlying the desert-
based justice may be roughly classified into two groups,
namely liberalism and communitarianism. Feinberg, Galston
and Sadurski espouse a liberal idea of desert and justice;
Maclntyre and Miller advocate a communitarian type of
desert and justice, though within the same group the latter
particularly shows strong favour toward the idea of justice
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applicable to a socialist-type market economy. My idea of
justice which I shall propose in this thesis is basically
a desert-based theory but derives its justification from
both liberalism and communitarianism. Thus, those works
representing different approaches of desert-based theory of
justice are taken to serve as the reference point for the
issues raised in this thesis.
1.2. Why desert-based justice?
The idea of due deserts has the advantage of explaining
the centrality of human agency in the idea of justice. This
is because the general underlying aim of this conception of
desert is to screen out all those factors that are
unearned, that are beyond human control. Under the general
conception of justice as equilibrium of benefits and
burdens, desert is relevant to justice in distribution only
where it expresses an actual burden, that is, when it
involves some effort, sacrifice, work, risk,
responsibility, inconvenience and so forth. It is only this
sort of desert which should be in justice compensated by
social benefits. This notion of desert is consistent with
justice considered as an introduction of a conscious moral
order into human affairs.(Sadurski, 1985: 116)
Hence here is the close association of justice with such
notions as respect for persons, autonomy,
self-determination and human dignity. Justice is important
in human society not simply because we care about who gets
what, but also because we wish to be treated as human
beings whose actions and choices are to be taken seriously
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and given respect.(Campbell, 1988: 155-6)
What does it mean here that desert-based justice involves
maintaining an equilibrium between benefits and burdens?
Desert-based theory holds that a society is just when the
distribution of benefits and burdens is in accordance with
the distribution of good (that is 'positive') and ill (that
is 'negative') desert. Just actions are those which seek to
maintain, achieve or restore this proportionality,
particularly through the administration of appropriate
rewards, punishment and compensations. Justice requires
that, other things being equal, people ought to get (or be
given) what they deserve.
Thus the general principle of social justice is that
whenever an ideal, hypothetical balance of social benefits
and burdens is upset, social justice calls for restoring
it. An example of the application of justice as equilibrium
is offered by Joel Feinberg:
The principle that unpleasant, onerous, and hazardous
jobs deserve economic compensation, unlike the claim
that superior ability deserves economic reward, is an
equalitarian one, for it says only that deprivations
for which there is no good reason should be compensated
to the point where the deprived one is again brought
back to a position of equality with his fellows. It is
not that compensation gives him more than others
(considering everything) but only that it allows him to
catch up. (1970: 93)
Thus, this account of justice as restoring equilibrium is
essentially in line with Aristotle's account of justice as
equality which comprises notions both of distributive
justice and of commutative justice. I shall discuss later
in more detail the meanings of equality and
equilibrium.(See Chapter 8, II.3 and II.6)
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1.3. Characteristics of desert.
Recent scholarship has considerably clarified the concept
of desert. We may summarize the major points among those
which are notable as follows:
(i) Desert does not arise out of public institutions and
rules. It is prior to and independent of them and may in
certain circumstances be used as a criterion for judging
them.(See Galston, 1980: 170)
(ii) Desert requires a basis, which must be some fact about
the individual alleged to be deserving.
(iii) Not all facts about individuals are relevant to the
question of desert. Every simple desert-claim is of the
form: A deserves X in virtue of F. In general, then, there
must be some relation between X and F, and the range of
relevant F's will vary in accordance with the
characteristics of the X under consideration.
(iv) Desert-related facts need not be moral
characteristics.
(v) A desert-related fact has to be an action or effort of
an individual.(See Barry, 1965: 106)
(vi) Desert judgments are justified on the basis of past
and present facts about individuals, never on the basis of
states of affairs to be created in the future. (See Miller,
1976: 93)
(vii) Deserved treatment may be divided into a number of
distinct classes. Reward and punishment, praise and blame,
etc.
Arguments about the concept of desert have been mostly
centered on the above characteristics and showed divergent
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views. First, we may distinguish, following Joel Feinberg,
three kinds of conditions in respect to modes of treatment
which persons can deserve. According to Feinberg's
analysis, there are those whose satisfaction confers
eligibility ('eligibility conditions'), those whose
satisfaction confers entitlement ('qualification
conditions'), and those conditions not specified in any
regulatory or procedural rules whose satisfaction confers
worthiness or desert ('desert bases'). (1970: 58) Then, we
may argue that if a person is deserving of some sort of
treatment, he must, necessarily, be so in virtue of some
possessed characteristic or prior activity.
Truly here in the analysis of justice, what we are
concerned with is desert bases, in other words, 'moral
desert'. What does one mean here by this meritorian?
conception of moral desert? This notion of desert is
normally taken to mean moral desert in two senses of
'moral'.(See Campbell, 1988: 151)
First because its preferred idea of moral desert is
contrasted with 'conventional', or 'institutional' desert,
which is acquired merely by satisfying established
requirements. By contrast, the meritorian's moral desert is
'natural' or 'raw' in that it does not presuppose
pre-existing social norms or distributional rules.
Take an example: we may say that a person 'deserves' a
scholarship solely because he has met the criteria set for
the award, whether or not this reflects his choices and
efforts, but conventional or institutional desert of this
sort is more a matter of entitlement than desert. Certainly
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it is not the sort of desert with which the meritorian is
principally concerned. In contrast to mere entitlement,
moral, natural or raw desert features as a reason for
establishing such conventional rules so as to ensure that
scholarships and other benefits are distributed in
accordance with what is antecedently thought of as
deserving.
Desert may also be taken to be 'moral' in a second sense
of that term in which it is now contrasted with 'natural'
when this is equated with what happens 'naturally', that
is, without human choice or intervention. Desert is then
analytically tied to the notion of making choices and
acting knowingly or intentionally, in contrast to 'natural'
events which happen according to the normal processes of
cause and effect. Thus responsibility, in the sense of
accountability and liability to praise, blame, reward and
punishment, is said to be attributable solely to agents,
that is, to persons who can intentionally alter the course
of 'natural' events through their own deliberate actions
and according to their own purposes. Thus we can say that
only the actions of such moral agents are said to be
deserving or undeserving in the meritorian sense.
Meanwhile Sadurski points out that desert is (a)
'person-oriented', in that it is always attributed to
persons on account of their conduct, (b) 'value-laden', in
that it involves an assessment of this conduct as good or
bad, and (c) 'past-oriented' in that when talking about
desert, we are evaluating certain actions which have
already happened.(Sadurski, 1985: 118) I agree with
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Sadurski on first two points. However, I shall contend
later that the last point raised by Sadurski is deficient
for its being too narrow in scope. (See II.2 in this
Chapter)
1.4. Deserved treatment.
No philosophical analysis of the concept of desert can go
any further without paying separate attention to each of
the major kinds of treatment which persons can be said to
deserve. Then what are the various kinds of treatment that
persons deserve from other persons? They may be varied, but
they have at least one thing in common: they are generally
'affective' in character,that is, favoured or disfavoured,
pursued or avoided, pleasant or unpleasant.
Feinberg argues persuasively that deserved treatment may
be divided into a number of distinct classes. With no claim
to taxonomic precision or completeness, he has divided them
into five major classes as follows. (Feinberg, 1970: 62)
(a) Awards of prizes.
(b) Assignments of grades.
(c) Rewards and punishments.
(d) Praise, blame, and other informal responses.
(e) Reparation, liability, and other modes of
compensation.
He has not included positions of honour and economic
benefits on above basic list because they are usually
subsumed under one or another or some combination of the
other headings.
Useful though this classification may be, however, there
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is one difficulty. Feinberg notices, but does not
sufficiently emphasize, the extent to which these
categories are distributed along the same continua and thus
tend to overlap one another. For example, it is a mistake
to contend that all prize competitions are directed toward
recognizing the single victor. It is possible to imagine,
for example, a footrace in which the first across the
finish line receives a predetermined sum while the others
receive that sum minus an amount proportional to the
difference between their elapsed time and that of the
fastest. (For this point, see Galston, 1980: 175)
Nonetheless, Feinberg's analysis has two important
consequences. First, it reveals that the contexts within
which desert-claims are made differ from one another in two
sorts of ways: the contexts may be different in kind, or
contexts of the same kind may differ in the content of the
human characteristics or activities with which they are
particularly concerned. Second, our consideration of
particular situations in which desert seems to be a
relevant allocative criterion will be made more precise by
asking, under what kind or kinds of desert contexts should
this situation be subsumed? For example, we may ask, as
Feinberg does, whether income is best regarded as prize,
reward, or compensation, and our decision is likely to have
a substantive effect on our theory of distribution. (1970 :
88-94) Again, as Feinberg points out, similar difficulties
arise in determining the distribution of positions of
leadership and responsibility. (1970 : 78-80)
However, I suppose that it will be convenient to approach
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the matters by roughly classifying all the desert-claims
according to their nature in three aspects of justice,
though they are interrelated and overlapping. They are
distributive justice (reward), retributive justice
(punishment), and commutative justice (compensation). I
shall hereafter mainly deal with the matters of reward and
punishment.
II. Economic Desert and Reward.
II. 1. Basis of economic desert.
One of the most important, and yet most difficult,
problems which arises in an inquiry into desert and its
relation to social justice is that of the basis upon which
judgments of economic desert should be made. By economic
desert I mean desert of monetary and other rewards for
socially useful work - for doing one's job, in a society
which has a division of labour.(See Miller, 1976: 102)
Which features of a person's work activity should be
taken into account when we judge that he deserves
such-and-such a reward? The principles which have seriously
been put forward as determinants of economic desert can be
reduced to three:
(a) Contribution: A man's reward should depend on the
value of the contribution which he makes to social welfare
in his work activity.
(b) Effort: A man's reward should depend on the effort
which he expends in his work activity.
(c) Compensation: A man's reward should depend on the
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costs which he incurs in his work activity.
But as David Miller has argued, (c) is not a genuine
alternative to the first two principles. It is a refinement
which may be used in conjunction with either (a) or
(b) . (1976: 103) Reward based either on contribution or on
effort may carry a meaningful public approval of the value
in that work in addition to compensation while compensation
alone usally denotes mere restoration of previous
equilibrium or restitution in human relations or business
transactions. Thus the problem here is to adjudicate
between (a) and (b) .
For practical reasons of identifying and measuring
desert, rewarding according to results or social
contribution may be sometimes more productive and certainly
easier than rewarding according to efforts. But it is only
the bearing of actual burdens which calls for compensation
when we are aiming at bringing about the equilibrium of
advantages and burdens in society.
Then, what kind of efforts? Not every burden is relevant
here. What counts, is a conscientious effort which has
socially beneficial effects. It will be argued that effort
is the only legitimate basis and measure of desert.
Considerations of effects are important in so far as only
socially valuable efforts count in considerations of
desert. This social value cannot be ascertained in
isolation from effects. Socially valuable effect is,
therefore, a conditio sine qua non of taking a particular
effort into account in consideration of desert. But only
effort constitutes its basis and measure since it is
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effort, and not effect, which can be meaningfully regarded
as a burden imposed (or self-imposed) upon an individual.
II.2. Application of desert to income distribution and job
placement.
When applying the notion of desert to the cases of income
distribution and job placement, Sadurski suggests that an
indiscriminate approach is not adequate. He espouses the
view that, while justice based on desert (and desert
understood essentially as based on effort) should be
applied to the distribution of rewards for work done, for
sacrifice, effort, time, etc., it does not apply to a
distribution of jobs themselves.(Sadurski, 1985: 153)
The adoption of standards of distributive justice with
respect to the former (i.e., distribution of rewards) does
not imply necessarily the adoption of these same standards
with respect to the latter(i.e., distribution of positions)
The reason why he distinguishes distributive principles
between income distribution and job placement is that in
his opinion desert considerations are always past-oriented.
When talking about desert, he is evaluating certain
actions which have already happened. He argues that this is
why it is a confusion to base desert upon utilitarian
grounds; for example, to say: "He deserves this job because
he is most likely to do it well". He interprets this phrase
as really meaning that the candidate will be useful but not
necessarily that he ^deserves' it. Even if this utilitarian
assessment is based upon past achievement of the person
hired or promoted, this past achievement is taken as an
indication of probable future usefulness, not as a 'desert'
to be rewarded. In practice, those two types of assessment,
utility and desert, will often coincide because the demands
of the job dictate that those most likely to do it well
would have displayed this in past effort of some kind or
other. Sadurski argues that conceptually there are two
distinct types of evaluation and there is no necessary link
between them. He takes as an example a situation in which
these two types of considerations yield opposite results.
Let us imagine that there are two candidates for a
recently vacated chair in a university: A is an old scholar
with great academic achievements (gained through
considerable personal sacrifices) and who has made a great
contribution to the development of this particular branch
of learning; B is young and a very talented lecturer who
has not yet had an opportunity to fulfil his capabilities.
According to Sadurski's interpretation, a selection
committee might well appoint B, arguing that it prefers
someone with great energy and promise for the future rather
than someone who is 'over the hill'. In this case, the
appointment will be based clearly upon utilitarian criteria
which conflict, in this particular situation, with those of
desert. (See 1985: 118)
I think this misinterprets the evaluation process
involved in the assessment of desert, no matter what the
final decision should be after all relevant conditions are
considered in the above case. When we consider the
distribution of reward and evaluate a person's
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characteristics as bearing on the question whether he
deserves something desirable, we essentially examine not
only the person's past effort and performance but also his
present state of potentiality. When we evaluate a person's
desert, we consider the person as a going-concern. Hence,
past effort and contribution plus present state of
potentiality will often be taken as an indication of
immediate probable future effort and contribution.
Immediately anticipated effort and achievement is not
necessarily linked to the notion of utility for which a
future-oriented utilitarian might argue. (For this point,
see Honorfe, 1970: 73-4) At the time of evaluation, when the
reward for the desert is at issue, the assessor normally
considers the past conduct, present state and sometimes,
when it is relevant, potential future effort and
contribution which can be reasonably anticipated by
ordinary persons.
Justice is a matter for the present and the future.
Justice is only meaningful for life in the present and the
future since it is concerned with securing now a just state
of affairs, even when this involves maintaining or
establishing a just order by correcting past injustice.
To better understand the nature of matters of justice,
let us consider a case of libel against a dead person who
was innocent. The libel in this case can be described as a
writing which tends to vilify the dead person and bring him
or her into hatred, contempt and ridicule. We may raise the
question of what is the matter with slandering a dead
person. There is no actionable wrong against an existing
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person, but a serious libel of a dead person may be held to
be indictable on the ground that it is likely to provoke a
breach of the peace or to disturb the peace of the present
and future community. Since the libel of a dead person
tends to bring the surviving relations of the deceased into
hatred or contempt - in which case it seems to be a libel
on them - it will be a matter of society's grave concern
for the sake of criminal justice. The point is that the
business of doing justice is seen to have a teleological
nature in a sense that it will mend broken hearts of the
persons concerned and their disrupted order of life, and
through this it will restore the harmonious relation of all
persons concerned. But this is not a matter of utilitarian
consequentialism. My notion of teleological desert and
justice is fundamentally different from utilitarian ideas,
though both theories share the common characteristic of a
forward-looking element. I shall discuss this point more
in detail later.(See Chapter 5. 'Teleological Desert and
Just Punishment')
The upshot of above arguments is that our assessment of
a person's conduct and quality, past, present plus
immediate potential, for the sake of justice, is an
on-going project. Like the fundamentally teleological and
developmental nature of human beings, the business of
justice is an on-going project.
Thus reward in advance for the immediate probable future
effort and contribution estimated on and combined with past
effort and contribution (unlike a simple incentive system
which is mainly aimed at encouraging future contribution)
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can be built into the notion of desert. In every kind of
job placement or selection procedure, we are considering
whether this particular applicant or candidate is fit for
this job or post basing on his past, present and potential
value. Justice, in this sense as Leibniz observed, is a
continuum: there is an unbroken continuity, with no 'gaps'
between life and death, between rest and motion, between
the lowest substance and God, just as there is a continuum
between abstaining from injury and doing good.(See Leibniz,
1972: 21)
II.3. Effort or contribution.
(1) Contribution. One type of action-oriented meritorian
might cite contribution as a relevant desert basis for
pecuniary rewards, so that departures from equality in
income are to be justified only by distinguished
achievements in science, technology, art, philosophy,
athletics, industry, and other basic areas of human
activity. When the achievements under consideration are
themselves contributions to our social wealth, this
principle of distributive justice seems plausible. But not
all persons enjoy fair equality of opportunity to achieve
great things, and particularly economic rewards seem
inappropriate as vehicles for expressing recognition and
admiration of non-economic achievements. We should express
general skepticism concerning such facile generalizations
about the comparative degrees to which various individuals
have contributed to our social wealth.(See Feinberg, 1973:
114-5)
24
If we examine the utilitarian arguments, it is probably
true that the most convincing reasons which can be given
for taking contribution, rather than effort, as a basis for
reward are utilitarian in character. By rewarding people
according to the value of their different contributions, we
encourage them to develop the skills and abilities which
produce a superior contribution, and this result is
socially useful. But as David Miller has argued, to use
such utilitarian arguments to establish a principle of
desert seems inconsistent. If one starts from utilitarian
premisses, and regards rewards as incentives to acquire
useful skills, etc., then the correct principle is to
reward only those contributions which would not be made in
the absence of such reward, the contributions, in other
words, which have to be called forth by material
incentives.(Miller, 1976: 103-4) A reward can only act
as an incentive if it is capable of modifying the conduct
of those to whom it is given, and this generates cases in
which our judgments of desert will not correspond to the
proposed utilitarian principle. Suppose that a certain
community wants to increase its blood reserve in blood
banks and therefore institutes a system of charity
benefits, giving donors special medical service privileges
for each donation they make. These could be understood
either as straightforward incentives to make donations, or
as rewards for the performance of socially valuable
actions. The difference will emerge if we examine within
the community a religious group whose blood donations are
generally governed by their religious beliefs, with the
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result that the amount of blood donations from members of
the religious group is unaffected by the introduction of
the system of benefits. If the benefits are pure
incentives, they will not be given to donors who belong to
the religious group. If they are rewards, however, the
religious group must be given what they deserve, for they
have performed the required socially valuable actions.
When contribution is employed as a criterion of desert,
it is often conjoined with an economic theory that purports
to determine exactly what percentage of our total economic
product a given worker or class has produced. Justice,
according to this principle, requires that each worker get
back exactly that proportion of the national wealth that he
has himself created. This sounds very much like a principle
of 'commutative justice' directing us to give back to
every worker what is really his own property, that is, the
product of his own labour. (Feinberg, 1973: 114) This
argument apparently sounds plausible since its two
justifying reasons - labour theory of property right and
the principle of commutative justice, respectively command
a strong persuasive power. However, this argument will lose
ground when we challenge its assumption that all the
personal contributions are the individual's own products as
he or she may claim. Thus, it is worthwhile examining the
possibility of challenging these assumptions.
As a classic example of this kind of theorist, let us
take Pierre J. Proudhon, the French socialist writer and
precursor of Karl Marx. In his book, What is Property?
(1840), Proudhon rejected the standard socialist slogan,
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'From each according to his ability, to each according to
his needs', in favor of a principle of distributive justice
based on contribution, as interpreted by an economic theory
that employed a pre-Marxist 'theory of surplus value'. He
argued that the afore-quoted famous standard socialist
slogan was not intended, in any case, to express a
principle of distributive justice. It was understood to be
a rejection of all considerations of 'mere' justice for an
ethic of human brotherhood. The early socialists contended
that it is unfair, in a way, to give the great contributors
to our wealth a disproportionately small share of the
product. Thus, in the new socialist society espoused by
Karl Marx and his followers, love of neighbour, community
spirit, and absence of avarice would overwhelm such
bourgeois notions and put them in their proper
(subordinate) place.
Proudhon, on the other hand, based his whole social
philosophy not on brotherhood (an ideal he found suitable
only for small groups such as families) but on a kind of
distributive justice, namely, the 'return of contribution'
principle. His celebrated dictum that 'property is theft'
did not imply that all possession of goods is illicit, but
rather that the system of rules that permitted the owner of
a factory to hire workers and draw profits ('surplus
value' ) from their labour robs the workers of what is
rightly theirs. "This profit, consisting of a portion of
the proceeds of labour that rightly belonged to the
labourer himself, was theft". The injustice of capitalism,
according to Proudhon, consists in the fact that those who
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create the wealth (through their labour) get only a small
part of what they create, whereas those who exploit their
labour, like voracious parasites, gather in a greatly
disproportionate share. The 'return of contribution'
principle of distributive justice, then, cannot work in a
capitalist system, but requires a ' f&d&ration mutualiste'
of autonomous producer-cooperatives in which those who
create wealth by their work share it in proportion to their
real contributions. (See Feinberg, 1973: 114-5)
Other theorists, employing different notions of what
produces or 'creates' economic wealth, have used the
'return of contribution' principle to support quite
opposite conclusions. The contribution principle has even
been used to uphold the justice of existing property
holdings under capitalistic systems, for it is said that
capital as well as labour creates wealth, as do ingenious
ideas, inventions, and adventurous risk-taking. The
capitalist who provided the money, the inventor who
designed a product to be manufactured, the innovator who
thought of a new mode of production and marketing, the
advertiser who persuaded millions of customers to buy the
finished product, the investor who risked his savings on
the success of the enterprise - these are the ones, it is
said, who did the most to produce the wealth created by a
business, not the workers who contributed only their
labour, and of course, these are the ones who tend, on the
whole, to receive the largest personal incomes.(See
Feinberg, 1973: 115)
These arguments seem hard to answer at first sight, yet
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their force is lost when we see that a question-begging
assumption has been made at the outset. In comparing the
remuneration of each individual's work at the time of an
exchange between individual and society, we take it for
granted that each person has a complete right to the object
which enters into the exchange. But not only are there
impossibly difficult problems of measurement of individual
contribution involved, there are also conceptual problems
that appear beyond all nonarbitrary solution. We can refer
to the elements of luck and chance, the social factors not
attributable to any assignable individuals, and the
contributions of population trends, uncreated natural
resources, and the efforts of people now dead, which are
often central to the explanation of a given increment of
social wealth.
As L. T. Hobhouse pointed out, any individual
contribution would be very small relative to the
immeasurably greater contribution made by political,
social, fortuitous, natural, and inherited factors.
(Hobhouse, 1922: 161-3) Thus, strict application of the
'return of contribution' principle, no matter in whose
name, industrialists or labourers, would tend to support a
larger claim for the community to its own 'due return',
through taxation and other devices.
(2) Rewarding according to effort rather than
contribution. Up to now, two main alternative measures of
desert are considered: conscientious effort or objective
contribution. It should be clear from the preceding
arguments that effort should be the principal criterion of
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desert, mainly because 'contribution' or 'success' reflect,
among other things, factors which are beyond our control
and thus for which we cannot claim any credit. For example,
when an airline reservation clerk mistakenly cancels my
booking and the plane on which I wanted to fly has an
accident, there is no reason why the clerk should feel that
he or she deserves my gratitude, let alone reward, although
my life was saved.(See Sadurski, 1985: 135)
In the distribution of salaries according to productive
effects we are indirectly rewarding people for factors
which are independent of their own will and effort.
Although we often have to assess an objective contribution,
we should not take it into account in its own right but
rather only in so far as it is the best available measure
of actual effort. Consequently, it is a distribution
according to contribution only in a derivative sense, for
want of any better measure of socially valuable effort. (See
ibid.)
So far, the argument in favour of effort is based on the
idea that a man can only deserve reward for what it is
within his power to do. This argument depends upon the more
basic claim that a man's desert depends wholly upon his
voluntary actions. With regard to the voluntariness of a
man's effort, the question has arisen whether ability can
be accepted as a product of voluntary action and effort.
Take an example: if two men try equally hard, and work for
an equally long time, then it may be assumed according to
the principle of effort that they deserve equal
remuneration even if one of them, by virtue of superior
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ability, manages to produce more goods, or goods of a
better quality.
Again, according to the same view it may be expedient to
remunerate superior skill, etc., but it would not be
thought always just, because some man with inherited
superior skill does not deserve more than the less-skilled,
assuming that each does the best he can. Take another
example: consider the case of the drowning man. Suppose
that two men jump in to save him, and that one manages to
reach him while the other, who has tried just as hard but
by nature is physically weak, fails and has to turn back.
We would say that the first man deserves more gratitude
(and reward, perhaps) than the second, yet the second
deserves some thanks for having tried to help. But if we go
further and understand that moral desert should depend
entirely upon what is within a man's control, that is on
his efforts and the choices he makes, then we would say
that two men deserve equal gratitude and reward.
In the above examples, surely native skills and inherited
aptitudes will not be appropriate bases of desert, since
they are forms of merit ruled out by the fair opportunity
principle. The fair opportunity principle (or the fair
equality of opportunity principle) is here the principle
that a personal characteristic can be a fair basis for
discrimination between persons only if those persons had a
fair equality of opportunity to develop or avoid them.(For
this point, see Feinberg, 1973: 108; see and compare with
Rawls's view of fair equality of opportunity, 1971: 73) No
one deserves credit or blame for his genetic inheritance,
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since no one has the opportunity to select his own genes.
Then what about acquired skills? Feinberg has argued that
acquired skills are, though they may seem more plausible
candidates at first, upon scrutiny little better. All
acquired skills depend to a large degree on native skills.
Nobody is born knowing how to read, so reading is an
acquired skill, but actual differences in reading skill are
to a large degree accounted for by genetic differences that
are beyond anyone's control. (1973: 112-3) But here we may
still have some differences in acquired skills that are to
be accounted for solely or primarily by differences in the
degree of practice, drill, and perseverance expended by
persons with roughly equal opportunities. In this respect,
the acquired skill can be a relevant basis of desert only
to the extent that it is a product of one's own effort and
the requirement of fair equality of opportunity can be met.
James C. Dick has also argued that if two persons have an
equal opportunity to develop a particular innate talent
they share equally at the outset and one does so more
successfully than the other by dint of great effort, then
there is a ground for discrimination, but on the basis of
effort, not ability.(1975: 259)
Surely certain of the skills and abilities which a man
uses in his work are products of previous voluntary actions
- for example, the decision to attend training courses -
and there is no reason to tie desert to present voluntary
actions at the expense of earlier ones.(Barry, 1965: 108)
Thus it would be safe to argue that the voluntary decision
to acquire a useful skill should be rewarded in the future
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when the skill is exercised.
The logical consequence of adopting the principle that
desert depends on voluntary action is not that effort alone
should be taken as a desert basis at the expense of all
differences in ability and skill, but rather that effort
and voluntarily acquired abilities should be separated from
innate abilities and abilities implanted by other people.
This principle of composite effort, namely, effort and
acquired ability can entail subsuming the general
character of the contribution principle in contrast to the
much more egalitarian principle of effort alone. (See
Miller, 1976: 108) This is because the former principle of
composite effort can easily accept the differences of
outcome in competition between two persons with an
equivalent effort-making opportunity but with a different
ability acquired previously from a valuable effort; the
latter principle of simple effort tends to disregard the
acquired ability before the competition starts, accepting
only the differences of outcome brought forth from equal
effort-making opportunity but differing effort expended
between competitors who are presumed to have equal ability
and quality.
But here a problem arises. As David Miller has argued,
the resulting principle of composite effort may be almost
impossible to apply, since any useful piece of work will
require a combination of effort, innate ability, and
acquired ability, and one cannot usually say how much of
the result should be put down to the voluntary acts of the
person concerned. This is one of the weakest points of
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desert-cum-effort theory and precisely is a point of
departure in the main argument against desert. Because of
this weak point in the justice as desert approach the
positive desert claim is liable to be negated.(See Goodin,
1985; he claims that the notion of desert can be only
meaningfully used in the context of institutional desert,
where a person is called to deserve some treatment when he
or she meets a certain requirement) The most profound
theoretical argument against the concept of desert in
general and effort in particular is that they are
involuntarily determined. Whereas one's basic ability
(natural endowments in John Rawls's parlance) is determined
by nature, effort is said to be determined by social
environment.
II.4. Natural abilities and anti-desert argument.
In social philosophy a familiar argument about justice is
that because no one deserves either his native talents or
his ability to exert effort, no one can be said to deserve
any advantages made possible by his talents or abilities.
The premises of this argument are perhaps most clearly
stated in the following well-known passage from John
Rawls's A Theory of Justice:
It seems to be one of the fixed points of our
considered judgments that no one deserves his place in
the distribution of native endowments, any more than
one deserves one's initial starting place in society.
The assertion that a man deserves the superior
character that enables him to make the effort to
cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his
character depends in large part upon fortunate family
and social circumstances for which he can claim no
credit. The notion of desert seems not to apply to
these cases. (1971: 104; see also 1971: 15, 75-6, 310-5,
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and passim.)
If these contentions are correct, and if Rawls is also
correct in concluding from them that no one deserves "the
greater advantages he could achieve with (his natural
endowments)", (1971: 104) then personal desert will play no
role at all in determining which system of distributing
goods is just.
Before we can begin any evaluation of Rawls' argument
against personal desert, we must get somewhat clearer about
what that argument says. We have seen that Rawls wants to
move from the premise that people do not deserve their
character or abilities to the conclusion that people do not
deserve the advantages which these 'natural assets' make
possible. But why, exactly, does Rawls believe that people
do not deserve their character and abilities in the first
place?
Because Rawls mentions the social causes of our
effort-making abilities, and because our other abilities
seem obviously to be caused as well, he may be interpreted
as claiming that our natural assets are undeserved simply
because they are caused, or rather, he can be interpreted
as claiming that our natural assets are undeserved because
they are brought into existence by events independent of
anything we ourselves have done. Let us go one step further
in his explanation. A person may indeed take steps to
develop his talents and increase his effort-making
capacity; but his ability to take such steps must itself
depend on some earlier complement of talents and
effort-making abilities which are not the result of any
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such actions. Because of this, he may indeed be held
unable to 'claim credit' for any of these earlier talents
or abilities.
Rawls's argument so far seems to fulfil the conditions of
determinism, though it is not the complete genetic
determinism of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. It holds
that the individual is not responsible for the quality
(effort-making ability, that is, character) that makes
possible the deserving deed (effort expended). The
individual is not responsible because character (which
determines effort) is a product of the natural and social
environment.
The proposition that natural assets should be considered
as irrelevant for a distribution of goods can be derived
from Rawls's argument that "the distributive shares that
result do not correlate with moral worth, since the initial
endowments of natural assets and the contingencies of their
growth and nurture in early life are arbitrary from a moral
point of view". (1971: 311-2) About this Sadurski points
out that it is a misleading formulation of the problem. He
argues that the distribution of natural assets and
endowments is neither in itself arbitrary nor non-arbitrary
(in particular, when the adjective 'arbitrary' has negative
connotations) (Sadurski,1985: 124) According to him, there
is nothing good or bad about it; it is simply a natural
fact which cannot be assessed from the moral point of view
because it is totally beyond human control. What may be
evaluated as arbitrary or not here is the way in which
social institutions and practices treat this distribution
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of natural endowments. The natural distribution is morally
neutral but its social use is not. Therefore what is here
a matter of concern is not the distribution of natural
assets, but the distribution of social benefits and burdens
on the basis of, or in relation to, the natural
distribution which may be called arbitrary.(Ibid.)
What does the above argument precisely mean? It is
essentially related to a task of a theory of justice. Let's
examine a social phenomenon concerning a distributive
matter. A person born more intelligent, more skilful or
more beautiful will usually have a better chance than less
favoured people of an interesting and satisfying life. It
would be silly to ruin these chances in the name of
abstract justice; however there is no reason to claim that
the person deserves those good things of life uniquely on
the basis of inborn intelligence, skills or beauty. It
would be more convincing when we approach the issue from
the other side: a person born less intelligent, less
skilful and less able cannot be said to deserve his or her
unhappier or less fortunate life solely on the basis of
absence of skill or capacities etc. It is precisely a task
of a theory of justice to reflect about what a society can
do to compensate this person for undeserved and unearned
suffering.(See Sadurski, 1985: 123)
Then there might be raised an objection that positive
social obligations of compensation do not follow from the
natural disadvantages which are of a negative character,
that is, an absence of skill or capacities etc. To the
question in this case we might answer that society's duty
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of rectification follows not from purely natural
deprivations but from the fact that those deprivations are
turned by a society into social disadvantages and
penalties.
These social disadvantages are themselves, as Sadurski
observes, considered to be culturally-shaped consequences
of the existing system of rating, rather than something
inevitable in the nature of physical or mental handicaps.
Thus it would be a matter of social institutions, values
and practices that a less gifted person bears additional
burdens through no fault of his own.(Ibid.)
A conclusion to be drawn from the above arguments is that
one of the functions of justice is to rectify, at least in
part, or at least to minimize, consequences of the natural
and social lottery which are beyond human control. It has
nothing to do with an attempt to make all people alike but
it is rather an attempt to put justice on a firm,
deliberately determined moral basis. The moral idea is that
of making a person the master of his or her place in the
social distribution.
II.5. Acquired abilities and desert.
Notwithstanding arguments against the principle of
desert-cum-effort, there remains a possibility of
vindicating it by reference to the argument that persons of
equivalent basic ability may use that ability in different
ways; one may procrastinate while the other is diligent,
and so on. As George Sher has argued, there is obviously
room for a distinction between the possession of an ability
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to exert effort and the exercise of that ability; and given
this distinction, it is easy to understand the difference
between one man's efforts and another's without supposing
that they differ in effort-making ability.(Sher, 1979: 368)
To do this, we need only view the difference in their
efforts as stemming from the different degrees to which
they have exercised their common effort-making
ability.(Ibid.)
Also P. H. Nowell-Smith argued that the discovery of a
cause of something has no necessary bearing on a verdict
about that thing. He gave his explanation as follows:
We know that a man has come to be what he is because
of three main types of cause, heredity, education, and
his own past actions. These three factors are not
independent of each other and it is not the business of
a philosopher to say exactly what is the effect of each
or which is the most important for moral training...
But it is the business of a philosopher to show in what
ways these 'causes' are related to responsibility. Now
these three factors also play a part in situations in
which non-moral verdicts are given...
Leopold Mozart was a competent musician; his son
Wolfgang was given a good musical education and
practised his art assiduously. Each of these factors
helps to explain how he was able to compose and play
well. There is plenty of evidence that musical ability
runs in families and still more of the effects of
teaching and practice. But, having learnt these facts,
we do not have the slightest tendency to say that,
because Mozart's abilities were 'due' to heredity,
teaching, and practice, his compositions were not
'really' his own, or to abate one jot of our
admiration. (1954: 298)
The important points to be drawn from the above
discussions are three: Firstly, it seems to be, to a
certain degree, inevitable in human society that inherited
talents and social environment play a role in making a
person able to perform some kind of work or to be some kind
of person. Secondly, when we evaluate a person's qualities,
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however, the most important element to be taken into
account of human value is, after differences of natural
endowment and social background of each person are
considered, the distinctive characteristics of each
individual person enabling him to exert voluntarily and
intentionally worthy effort resulting in some valuable
social contributions. Thirdly, the value or virtue of a
person will be most conspicuously manifested and then
praised when a person assiduously overcomes disadvantages
or handicaps which might have been caused by nature or
social environment and thereby voluntarily makes a valuable
contribution to the society as well as himself or herself.
III. Determinism, Free Will and Desert.
III.l. Controversy over free will.
(1) Controversy. Recalling the structure of Rawls's
argument against desert, his claim is that persons in the
original position would not choose desert as a fundamental
principle of justice, bacause the bases for desert
judgments (character and effort) are determined. But our
arguments for the principles of justice-as-desert and
desert-cum-effort shows that those are justified only in so
far as people can freely control their actions. Then the
troublesome question arises: is there anything that we can
influence and that is under our control? Is there anything
in this world that we can claim credit for and, therefore,
can we deserve anything? If the grounds which are proposed
in our argument as a legitimate basis of desert (namely,
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effort and acquired ability) are as much beyond our control
as our natural endowments, then the principle of justice
based on desert is untenable.
In the context of the controversy over free will,
determinism is equated with the concepts of causation and
predictability. Determinism, in this sense, is the view
that every event has a cause and is in principle
predictable or unavoidable. This statement means that for
every event in the universe there is a set of conditions
such that, if the conditions C are fulfilled, the event E
invariably occurs; if the same antecedent conditions
should be present in the future, the same event would
occur. No other event will occur, given these exact
conditions.
If everything is thus determined by antecedent
conditions, how can we consider man's actions to be free
and hold him morally responsible for his acts? Is the
belief that everything is determined incompatible with the
concept of freedom? These are some of the quintessential
questions we should tackle when examining the problem of
free will and desert for human effort.
Since there are a vast amount of writings on this
controversial topic of determinism and free will, it is
difficult to add much that is new on this within a short
section of this Chapter. Thus, I shall better summarize the
various positions on this topic aiming at locating my own
view within the existing controversies, rather than making
any radically new argument about it.
There are four possible positions that can be taken with
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respect to the relation between determinism and free will.
First, the belief that determinism is false and freedom is
true. This position is sometimes known as ' libertarianism'
or 'indeterminism'. Second, the belief that both
determinism and freedom are true; determinism is compatible
with the notion of freedom ('the compatibility thesis').
This position is usually known as 'soft determinism'.
Third, the belief that determinism is true and freedom is
false ('the incompatibility thesis'). This is the position
of the 'hard determinism'. Fourth, the belief that both
determinism and freedom are false. In the history of the
controversy over free will no attempt has been made to
justify this last position. (See D'Angelo, 1968: 2)
My position here is a kind of compatibilism or a weaker
version of libertarianism, with the belief that not only
within causation but because of it, human beings are free
to plan and choose their actions. Before elaborating and
defending my position, I shall discuss the main ideas of
each position. Since the above four positions either accept
or reject the notion of determinism, let us first examine
the arguments of determinism.
(2) Determinism. The usual model on which a definition of
determinism is constituted is the kind of knowledge gained
by the physical sciences. The main arguments for
determinism can be formulated as follows: For any event E,
(a) The occurrence of E was causally necessitated, (b) The
occurrence of E has a sufficient explanation in causal
terms, (c) E had sufficient antecedent conditions, (d) The
occurrence of E was in principle predictable, (e) There
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exist a set of events, C, and a true law of nature, L,
which asserts that if C were to occur then E would
occur.(See Gerald Dworkin, 1970: 4)
(3) Soft determinism. For the soft determinist, determinism
and freedom are compatible. According to this compatibility
thesis, determinism must be accepted because it is
certainly true that every event has a cause. On the other
hand, the idea of freedom must also be accepted because
there is a valid distinction between action which is free
or voluntary and action which is compelled or involuntary.
The two views are compatible, however, it is alleged,
because the distinction between the voluntary and the
involuntary is not a distinction between the uncaused and
the caused. All actions are caused, but some have internal
causes and others have external causes.
D. D. Raphael gives an example for an understanding:
If you stay in your study because you want to do so,
you stay of your own free will; you act voluntarily. If
you stay in your study because somebody has locked the
door and taken away the key, you stay under compulsion;
you act involuntarily.(Raphael, 1981: 96)
That seems to be a proper distinction. But according to
the soft determinists, it does not affect the truth of the
statement that in either case your action has a cause. When
the cause is internal, a desire of the agent, we say that
he acts voluntarily, of his own free will or wish. When the
cause is external and happens to clash with what the agent
wants to do, we say that he acts involuntarily or is
compelled. It is perfectly possible to act voluntarily and
yet from a necessitating cause. The proper distinction to
be drawn, according to this soft determinism, is a
distinction between freedom and compulsion, not between
freedom and necessity.(See ibid.)
According to the soft determinists, determinism is not
only compatible with freedom, but also compatible with
moral responsibility and punishment. They claim that
determinism is compatible with a corrective view of blame
and punishment. They argue that we blame and punish people
because we believe that blame and punishment function as
causal or determining factors in modifying the behaviour of
certain individuals. In this perspective, the soft
determinists may reject a retributive justification for
blame and punishment and accept a deterrent and reformative
basis for blaming and punishing certain individuals.(For
this point, see D'Angelo, 1968: 36)
Let us take P. H. Nowell-Smith's view for an example.
Nowell-Smith has argued that an individual is morally
responsible if his behaviour can be altered in the future
by means of praise and blame. Only those acts that can be
altered by means of praise and blame or reward and
punishment are considered moral. Rewards and punishments
are distributed, not because they are deserved, but
because they are useful in altering the behaviour of some
individuals.(See Nowell-Smith, 1954: 294 and 299)
When Nowell-Smith contends that we hold a thief morally
responsible but do not hold a kleptomaniac morally
responsible, the reason is that we believe that the fear of
punishment will affect the future behaviour of the thief
but not that of a kleptomaniac. (See Nowell-Smith, 1948: 59)
Then a question arises; can blame and punishment be
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justified solely by their effects and not by other factors
as Nowell-Smith has contended? I doubt this. As M.
Mandelbaum has argued, praise and blame are not merely
justified by their effects, but rather we praise someone
because we think his action is right and we blame someone
because we think his action is wrong. (See Mandelbaum,
1960: 210) But I cannot agree with Mandelbaum when he
contends that the future conduct of those we praise and
blame is purely coincidental.(See ibid.) I think that the
future conduct of those we praise and blame should be
regarded as relevant to our acts of praise and blame, not
decisive. We attach a greater degree of praise to the
person who not only has done a good deed but also has a
potential of that in a foreseeable future than to the
person who merely has done a good deed. The same kind of
different degree of blame can be given to the person
according to the different degrees of value attaching to
his past deeds and the present attributes.
However, soft determinism has been attacked from both
sides by the hard determinists and the indeterminists. The
libertarian indeterminists attack soft determinism on
following points. First, it fails to acknowledge that human
beings have a special capacity of free will which no other
animal has. Secondly, it does not allow for freedom of
choice, that is, freedom from restraint by physical or
psychological causes upon choosing between options; it
allows only for freedom of action, that is, freedom from
restraint by the action of other persons. (See Raphael,
1981: 82 and 96-7) These criticisms have some force but are
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not all convincing since human beings are not completely
free from restraint by physical or psychological
conditions. I shall discuss these points later in more
detail.
(4) Hard determinism. The hard determinists contend that
determinism is incompatible with the concepts of free
choice and moral responsibility. The hard determinists
criticize the soft determinists for not pursuing their
analysis far enough. The soft determinists arbitrarily stop
their analysis of the problem at the desires or choices
that are the cause of some of our actions. The hard
determinists assert that this is a shortsighted view of the
entire problem; we must continue our analysis and inquire
as to the causes of our desires and choices. The hard
determinists do not make the claim that human beings never
cause anything to happen, but they do maintain that if we
trace the chain of causes back far enough, we will discover
that ultimately our desires and choices are caused by
factors outside of our control.
John Hospers has argued that the soft determinist' s
conception of freedom and responsibility is inadequate
because it defines freedom and responsibility solely in
relation to the conscious acts of individuals. Hospers has
contended that if we were aware of the effect that
unconscious motivation had upon our conscious and
deliberate acts, we would not consider man to be free or
morally responsible. (Hospers, 1952: 563)
According to the thoroughgoing determinists, a really
full explanation of any human action would show that what
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happened really was inevitable; so responsibility and
choice are excluded. But the hard determinist's contention
that no one is morally responsible or blameworthy does not
imply that no one should be punished. The deterrent and
reformative theories of punishment are compatible with the
hard determinist's contention that no one is blameworthy.
No blame does not imply no prisons for the hard
determinist. Prisons are places to confine certain people
whose behaviour is detrimental to society. In this sense,
according to the hard determinist, we can evaluate the acts
of people as being good or bad and can place them in
prisons if necessary.(See D'Angelo, 1968: 90-1)
(5) Indeterminism or Libertarianism. The libertarian
believes that the concept of freedom is incompatible with
the concept of determinism. Since man is sometimes
considered free to act in alternative ways, libertarians
deny the validity of determinism. J. R. Lucas asserts of
reasons for actions when vindicating free will: "If men
have free will, then no complete explanation of their
actions can be given, except by reference to themselves. We
can give their reasons. But we cannot explain why their
reasons were reasons for them."(Lucas, 1970: 171) This
account of free will seems to be a far-flung
libertarianism.
A more modest but thoroughgoing version of libertarianism
was argued by Charles A. Campbell. C. A. Campbell is
perhaps a representative libertarian of this century.
Campbell agrees that the causal principle operates
throughout most of nature, but he contends that certain
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types of human actions are not subject to causal laws. For
Campbell, an act is free in the sense required for moral
responsibility if the person is the sole cause of the act
and if he could have acted in alternative ways.(See
Campbell, 1970: 110)
Furthermore, C. A. Campbell denies the belief that all
human actions and decisions are caused by an individual's
heredity and environment. He points out that a free act is
not an uncaused act, but rather an act caused by the 'self'
as distinct from the 'character' of an individual. Campbell
uses the phrase 'contra-causal freedom' in order to express
what he means by a free act. What he espouses is that a
contra-causal freedom posits a breach of causal continuity
between a man's character and his conduct. (See Campbell,
1951: 459-60)
Why do human beings believe in an indissoluble core of
purely self-originated activity which even heredity and
environment are powerless to affect? Campbell claims that
introspection reveals that in situations of moral
temptation the self decides whether to follow its
inclinations or to exert the effort needed to act in
accordance with the sense of duty.
Is Campbell's concept of the self empirically verifiable?
Since some beliefs derived from introspection have been
found to be illusory or false, as many determinists have
pointed out, it is reasonable for them to request some
evidence that the belief in contra-causal freedom is not
an illusion. Campbell agrees that from the standpoint of an
external observer the concept of self is unintelligible and
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has no meaning. He asserts that there is no reason to
accept this limitation when we are considering a subjective
activity. Campbell claims that from an inner standpoint it
is meaningful to say an act is caused by a person's self
and not by his character.(See 1970: 110)
Campbell maintains that the self is distinct from man's
character. The self comprehends a man's character and has
the creative power to change man's character. Campbell
argues that since the self is aware of its evaluation of
the character, it cannot be derived or caused by the
character. Why not? He answers that the self is the act of
deciding whether to accept one's character or to change it
in a situation of moral temptation.
However, I doubt that there can be any clear-cut
demarcation between the deciding self and the changed
character within the human mind. I suspect that it does not
necessarily follow that because a man is capable of
evaluating his character, the decision he makes is not
caused by some aspect of his character. The fact that an
individual can decide whether or not to evaluate all his
character does not mean that this decision is never caused
by some decision-making character he has made within
himself in the past.
A compatibilist or a weak libertarian would argue that a
man's character is composed of all his beliefs, values, and
attitudes, as well as many other factors. All mental
processes, including the decision to change his character,
are part of a man's character. In this sense, the self is
part of a man's character and is caused by an aspect of the
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character. Thus, I think that the decision-making self
which evaluates one's character in a situation of moral
temptation would be perfectly compatible with the notion
of universal causation.
III.2. Free will, moral sense and desert.
Recently Agnes Heller has asserted on the notion of
'moral sense' that, 'moral sense must be tantamount to the
ability to discriminate between good and evil as well as
between right and wrong... Everyone is born with moral
sense, because the imperative that everyone should
discriminate properly between good and evil, implies that
everyone can do it.' (See Heller, 1987: 128) According to
her, 'The statement "Every human being is born with moral
sense" implies that every healthy specimen of our species
has the ability to discriminate between good and evil (or,
right and wrong).'(Ibid.)
I agree on the idea that moral sense or moral
consciousness which can govern human conduct and create
human experience should be given the most important role in
ascribing moral responsiblity. However, it is in the area
of consciousness, or in the human mind and reasoning on
which most soft determinists and libertarians base their
arguments for human freedom. I support the weak version of
libertarianism that there exists a limited determinism in
that people cannot help that they are born, how they are
born, to which parents they are born; but I believe that
people can help determine how they live.
We may have been born crippled or blind, and we were not
50
free to choose otherwise, but we are free in how we choose
to live with our infirmity. We are determined in our
physical limitations, we are even determined by the
culture, economic level, and family in which we are born,
but we are not completely determined, unless we voluntarily
choose to be, in how we live out our life, even though it
has been influenced, in part, by all of these things.
Likewise, Jacques Maritain has contended that: "Free will
in man does not exclude but rather presupposes the vast and
complex dynamism of instincts, tendencies, psycho-physical
dispositions, acquired habits and hereditary charges, and
it is at the top point where this dynamism emerges into the
world of spirit that freedom of choice is exercised, to
give or not to give decisive efficacy to the inclinations
and thrusts of nature; it follows from this that [we have]
freedom of choice, as well as responsibility..." (See Evans
and Ward, 1956: 30)
However, it is here worthwhile asking whether this idea
of free will and moral sense has any incompatibility to the
counterpart idea of the traditional Confucian Philosophy
where I shall also draw essential sources of value and
moral idea for constructing my philosophical view.
Surely, like the accounts of C. A. Campbell and A.
Heller, the idea that from introspection a man can derive
a sense of duty is nothing novel in Chinese Confucianism.
Confucianists believe that since all men are equal as to
their intrinsic ethical value and the potentiality for
their ethical growth, they are equally responsible for
their moral effort. Such an idea of man as a moral agent
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gives rise to the concept of moral responsibility. (See Kim,
1981: 128)
In the Confucian ethical tradition, moral responsibility
presupposes that a person can make a difference in his own
character by what he himself does. It presupposes that a
person can build his own character by cultivating virtuous
interests. Thus the conditioning of a person's own conduct
by his character is implied in the concept of moral
responsibility. Moral responsibility also implies a
person's selecting a way of life, or rules of conduct,
which he himself may acknowledge as worthy of his efforts
to conform to it.(Ibid.)
We can find a source of such an idea from Mencius's
assertion that if one submits oneself to the authority of
the mind, one has the innate ability to discover what is
right for oneself because one's nature is perfect or
complete from one's birth.(Chang, 1962: 86)
Roberto M. Unger's account of Confucianism gives us
further evidence that: 'the moral sense exists in man
either as a general disposition toward humanity (jen) and
righteousness (i), from which standards might be drawn, or
as a tacit code of conduct. Under proper conditions of
upbringing and of government, this moral sense could
develop so as to ensure harmony in the individual, in
society... The aim was to elicit latent, pre-existing
notions of propriety.' (1976: 107)
Now, based on our examination of determinism, free will
and desert so far, we can draw some conclusions. With the
acceptance of a kind of compatibility between determinism
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and free will, or a weak libertarian viewpoint, then, it
does make sense to assign moral responsibility to human
beings when they voluntarily choose something to do, or
someone to be; it also makes sense to praise, blame,
reward, and punish them for their voluntary choices and
actions. We certainly should be careful to ascertain that
people are not acting from uncontrollable compulsions or
constraints before we assign praise or blame to them.
Having ascertained that they have acted in freedom, then,
it does make sense to talk of moral responsibility and its
attendant rewards and punishments.
IV. Summary.
In the preceding discussions, we have found that,
although desert cannot be the only standard governing a
just distribution, it is an extremely important criterion,
indeed, an essential one. It is the only basis of just
distribution which is necessarily and inherently connected
with, and justified by, moral praise for the action of a
particular person.
A valid conception of desert must assume the view of a
person as an autonomous moral individual, and rewarding
according to effort rather than contribution can eliminate
or reduce the impact of uncontrollable natural endowments
or the social elements of luck and chance. We reward for
desert-for-effort because we believe that what a person has
done was under his or her control and that it was socially
valuable.
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This theory of justice as desert appeals to the view of
human freedom since only a free moral agent can bear a
moral responsibility. J. R. Lucas has asserted likewise.
Only if people are free, are they responsible for their
actions, and their actions are the chief constituent of
their deserts. Although there are other bases than desert
for determining how people ought to be treated, desert is
preeminent. People ought to be done by according to how
they deserve, and how they deserve depends on how they have
done, which in turn presupposes responsibility and
freedom.(See Lucas, 1980: 197)
But meanwhile we must be ready to acknowledge a severe
criticism that distribution according to desert involves an
enormous difficulty in practical application because the
grounds of desert are not always easily to be measured,
weighed, and balanced one against the other. There is also
a perplexing problem to isolate particular parts of human
characteristics and find out to what degree a person's
actual conduct and possessed quality is a result of his
conscious effort rather than of innate endowments or
environmental impact. This problem is quite a complicated
one because those different factors that shape human
characteristics are not distinct and unchanging but rather
they mutually interact and influence each other.
However, notwithstanding the deficiencies in measurement
and knowledge with regard to the principle of desert, we
should not over-estimate these problems. When an appraisal
based on moral judgment is made, there is some room for
uncertainty and doubt but it does not follow that the
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actions based on such an appraisal are always unjustified.
In distributive justice based on desert, one has to compare
efforts of different types, rank them and compare them with
the corresponding rank of standardized rewards. Most of
these moral judgments would incorporate appraisals both of
kind and of degree.
Hitherto, we have examined only the basic concept of
desert, criteria of desert, and relationship between free
will and desert. The remaining questions which require
further pursuit in order to build a comprehensive idea of
desert and justice are as follows:
First, why do we select a notion of desert as a most
essential criterion of justice? On what basis can we
legitimately defend the substantive principle of
desert-for-effort as a theory of social justice? And
furthermore what are the proper grounds for deriving
principles of just distribution of benefits and burdens?
These are the questions of justification of the idea of
justice as desert. I will examine the relevant theories of
moral and legal reasoning and justification for the answer
to these issues.
Secondly, as we have acknowledged that a notion of desert
is not the sole criterion of justice though it is the
principal one, we should explore other relevant criteria
such as utility and needs and examine what are the
relationship among those different, sometimes conflicting,
criteria.
Thirdly, it will be explored how far the principle of
desert, and the principle of equilibrium of benefits and
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burdens are also useful in the analysis of just
punishment.
Finally, another important issue to be investigated more
deeply is what are the general principles of justice and
moral justification in traditional Korean thoughts in light
of the development of Confucianism. The aim of this
investigation is to bridge the gap between the
Western-implanted ideas of justice and law and the
traditional Eastern counter-ideas of justice and law. An
approach to synthesize both ideas in a harmonious way is,
I have come to see, a crucial task for the students of
jurisprudence.
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CHAPTER 2. DESERT AND TRADITIONAL RETRIBUTIVISM
I. Overview and definition.
1.1 Overview.
If, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, the
balance of benefits and burdens is to constitute an
essential framework for social justice, this may be applied
not only to the distribution of goods (in order to balance
the increased amount of burdens) but also to the
distribution of punishments (to balance the undeserved
benefits gained by a criminal). Here the problem of
criminal justice can be seen as the converse case of that
of economic justice since there is a general symmetry
between the justification of reward (that is, based on good
desert) and that of punishment (that is, based on bad
desert), though this symmetry is not a perfect one. (See
Fuller, 1969: 30)
Hence in this and next three chapters I shall deal with
the problem of punishment as a consequence of bad desert,
its definition and competing theories of its justification.
Backward-looking theories of retributivism, forward-looking
theories of utilitarianism, and compromising theories of
teleological retributivism will be compared and examined,
thereafter, my own version of a 'teleological desert theory
of punishment' will be proposed.
A vast amount has been written on the aims and
justification of criminal punishment probably because, as
a political institution devoted to the infliction of pain
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on human-beings, it has never sat easily on the conscience
of civilized people. Insofar as blame can be construed as
a 'kind of verbally mediated punishment', (Stevenson, 1944:
307) the various traditional theories of the nature and
justification of punishment find their counterparts in
discussions of blame.
As Philip Bean points out, justifications have to be
found in the quality of the argument, which in this case is
a moral one. The position adopted depends therefore on the
type of questions to be asked. "How can punishment be
justified?" is a moral question. "How effective are
punishments?" is a different question. (See Bean, 1981: 2)
Here I shall be concerned primarily with the moral
question.
The traditional debate among philosophers over the
justification of punishment has been between partisans of
'retributive' and 'utilitarian' theories. Neither the term
'retributive' nor the term 'utilitarian' has been used with
perfect harmony and precision, but some variations to them
and even compromising attempts between them have been made.
Theories of punishment can be classified very roughly as
follows.(See Feinberg 1978: 418; Ezorsky, 1972b: xi)
(i) Retributive theories. Retributivists claim that the
primary justification of punishment is always to be found
in the fact that an offense has been committed which
deserves punishment, not in any future advantage to be
gained by its infliction. Two versions of the theory should
be distinguished: a moralist version (classical
retributivism), which maintains that the proper function of
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punishment is to inflict on the offender the pain 'called
for' or deserved by the moral gravity of his offense; and
a legalistic version (Mabbott), which holds that the
justification of punishment is always to be found in the
fact that a rule has been broken, for the violation of
which a certain penalty is specified - whether or not the
offender incurs any moral guilt. This retributive theory is
not to be confused with the vindictive theories that
vindictive satisfaction in the mind of the beholder is the
ultimate justification of punishment, for retributivism's
proponents have been among the leading enemies of
vengeance.
(ii) Utilitarian theories. These theories espoused by
consequentialists hold that punishment is at best a
necessary evil, justifiable if and only if the good of its
consequences (its 'social utility') outweighs its own
immediate and intrinsic evil. Punishment is pain or
deprivation inflicted on a person, presumably a wrongdoer,
for the sake of such future goods as correction or reform
of the offender, protection of society against other
offences by the same offender, and especially deterrence of
other would-be offenders through the threat of penal
sanction.
(iii) Vindictive theories. Vindictive theories make much
of the unhappy fact that, when harmful wrongs are
committed, there is among men a widespread and natural
desire for vengeance. Such theories are of three different
kinds. Firstly, the escape-valve version, associated with
the names of James Fitzjames Stephen and Oliver Wendell
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Holmes,Jr., and currently in favour with some
psychoanalytic writers, holds that legal punishment is an
orderly outlet for aggressive feelings, which would
otherwise demand satisfaction in socially disruptive ways.
The prevention of private vendettas through a state
monopoly on vengeance is one of the chief ways in which
legal punishment has social utility. The escape-valve
theory is thus easily assimilated by the utilitarian theory
of punishment. Secondly, the hedonistic version finds the
justification of punishment in the pleasure it gives
people, particularly the victim of the crime and his loved
ones, to see the criminal suffer for his crime. This
version of the vindictive theory is subsumable under the
utilitarian rubric. Finally, the emotional version of the
theory, very popular among the uneducated, holds that the
justification of punishment is to be found in the emotions
of hate and anger it expresses, these emotions being those
allegedly felt by all normal or right-thinking people. This
theory holds that certain emotions and the actions they
inspire are self-certifying, needing no further
justification. It is therefore not a kind of utilitarian
theory and might even be classified as a variety of
retributivism, although in its emphasis on feeling it is in
marked contrast to more typical retributive theories that
eschew emotion and emphasize proportion and desert. (See
Feinberg and Gross, 1986: 593)
A similar kind of 'sentimentalist' theory can be found in
Adam Smith's contention that the practice of punishment
develops from feelings of resentment and the desire to
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retaliate. The justification of punishment from feelings of
resentment, according to Smith, depends on the sympathetic
approval of an impartial spectator. (See Raphael, 1980 : 167)
Punishment is in effect defined in terms of and limited to
the extent of, victim's reasonable resentment (judged via
the ideal spectator test); this reasonable resentment is
publicly endorsed and fulfilled by the act of punishment
(note the implied communicative force of punishment).
(iv) Expressive theories. Similarly to vindictive
theories but with a greater emphasis on expressive
functions, expressive theories hold that the justification
for punishing an offender is that doing so expresses an
important statement about the offence. Typically, Feinberg
points out four ways in which punishments function
expressively: (a) Authoritative disavowal: it is common
international practice for a country which believes that
its rights have been violated by an agent of another
country to ask that country to punish him. By doing so that
country disavows the violation. (b) Symbolic
non-acquiescence: "Speaking in the name of the people."
This symbolic function of punishment explains why even
those sophisticated persons who abjure resentment of
criminals and look with small favour generally on the penal
law are likely to demand that certain kinds of conduct be
punished when or if the government with some purpose of
legal policy in regard of those conducts tends to treat
them in a lenient or a permissive way. (c) Vindication of
the law: if the criminal law forbids something, then to
leave unpunished a person who has infringed it gives rise
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to doubts that the law really means what it says.
Feinberg's example is the refusal of juries in Mississippi
to convict white men who kill blacks, (d) Absolution of
others: when something scandalous has occurred and it is
clear that the wrongdoer must be one of a small number of
suspects, then the state, by punishing one of these parties
therby relieves the others of suspicion and informally
absolves them of blame.(See Feinberg, "The Expressive
Function of Punishment," in 1970: 101-5)
(v) Teleological retributive theories. Teleological
retributivists make recourse to a plurality of
principles.(See Ezorsky, 1972b; this term 'teleological
retributivism' is also used by Robert Nozick. See 1981:
371-4) Thus they share with utilitarians the notion that
penal laws should yield some demonstrable beneficial
consequences. Justice is not served by the infliction of
deserved suffering for its own sake. But they derive the
following view from retributivism: justice is served if
teleological aims are held in check by principles of
justice, e.g. that the suffering of punishment should not
exceed the offender's desert.
I shall consider the merits and the demerits of these
five perspectives on punishment. Here my purpose is to
espouse a 'teleological desert theory of punishment' which
belongs to the composite theories of teleological
retributivism but is distinct from other conventional
theories in that group. I shall try to propose an
integrative approach to punishment which strikes a
compromise between differing theories, bringing elements of
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them together into a complete account. My claim will be
that in the practice of punishment we should take into
consideration both the notion of wrongdoer's desert and the
goals to be served by punishing him. Since the person as a
moral agent is perceived as an on-going, changeable being
in the flow of time from past over to future, any attempt
to ascribe his moral responsibility to his moral character
will not be properly done without having a whole-life-view
of his self. Thus the particularistic approaches - the
backward-looking only retributive theories and the
forward-looking only utilitarian theories - will not be
taken as defining a proper approach to punishment.
Here, about the problem before us as about any or almost
any ethical problem, there are two questions to be asked:
(i) What good is done by punishment and reward? (ii) When
and how ought punishment to be inflicted and reward
bestowed? The two are, however, so connected that the
answer to the first provides at least the most important
datum required if the second is to be answered
satisfactorily. It is indeed natural and common to go
further and say that the answer to the second is totally
dependent on the answer to the first, that the amount of
good produced ought to be the sole and sufficient premise
and criterion in determining what it is right to do. (For
this point, Ewing, 1929: 2) My two-stage justification of
reward and punishment will comprise two questions, namely
the question of justice and the question of the common
good. The notion of the good which is central to the full
justification, I shall consider later in due course.(See
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Chapter 6, V. and Chapter 8, I.)
1.2. A Working Definition of Punishment.
Before entering into the great debate it is worth
examining definitions of punishment. As Philip Bean points
out, definitions provide a boundary and shape to the
subject matter. They do not provide arguments about
justifications, for these involve normative relationships
which require separate analysis. (Bean, 1981: 7) None the
less, some philosophers have wanted to show that the
justification for punishment rests on its definition. For
example, some retributivists suggest that definitions of
punishments imply deserts. (See Mabbot, 1939: 152-3)
Retributivists are not alone in arguing that definitions of
punishment relate to its justification. Rule-utilitarians
such as Rawls in his earlier writings have argued on
similar lines. (See Rawls, 1955: 12)
The word 'punishment' is used in many different contexts
juridical, religious, moral, pedagogical, natural
(excessive eating brings its own punishment) - with
shifting meanings, but nevertheless in such a way that
there always appears to be some 'family resemblance'
(Wittgenstein's parlance) between the various senses.
Therefore it will be useful, following Antony Flew to
establish (more or less arbitrarily) a central meaning,
defined by means of a number of characteristics, and then
locate other meanings as variants or derivatives in
relation to it, as particular characteristics drop out as
unnecessary, or have to be added.
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Punishment in Flew's terms has five defining elements.
(See Flew, 1974: 291)
(i) It must involve an evil, an unpleasantness to the
victim. This is self-explanatory, although Flew, following
Hobbes, prefers terms like 'evil' and 'unpleasantness' to
the more stark words such as 'pain'; the former avoids
suggestion of flogging or forms of torture.
(ii) It must be for an offense, actual or supposed. This
too is self-explanatory, although Flew is careful to tie
down his definition by emphasizing the offence. So, for
example, he says that a term spent in an old-fashioned
public school, although doubtless far less agreeable than
a spell in a modern prison, is not punishment - unless, of
course, the child was sent there as a result of his
offending behaviour.
(iii) It must be of an offender, actual or supposed. By
insisting that punishment is directed to an offender, Flew
makes a logical connection between the evil, the offence
and the sufferer. In his view we cannot then logically
punish the innocent.
(iv) It must be the work of personal agencies. Put
another way, punishment must not be the natural
consequences of an action, for Flew wants to argue that
evils occuring to people as the result of misbehaviour but
not by human actions are not punishments but penalties.
Thus unwanted children and venereal disease (or, nowadays,
AIDS) are penalties of, but not the punishment for, sexual
promiscuity.
(v) It must be imposed by authority conferred through or
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by the institutions against the rules of which the offence
has been committed. Here Flew is following Hobbes, who
argues that evil inflicted by anyone, even a public
authority acting without preceding condemnation, is not to
be styled by the name of punishment but as a hostile act
(See Hobbes, 1904: 225-6). Similarly, direct action by an
aggrieved person with no pretentions to special authority
is not properly called punishment. It may be revenge, as in
vendetta, or it may, in Hobbes's terms, be an act of
hostility, but it is not punishment.
Following mainly Flew, H. L. A. Hart, however, uses five
modified elements to fix the word's central meaning.
Punishment must: (i) involve pain or other consequences
normally considered unpleasant; (ii) be for an offence
against legal rules; (iii) be of an actual or supposed
offender for his offence; (iv) be intentionally
administered by human beings other than the offender; and
(v) be imposed and administered by an authority
constituted by the legal system against which the offence
is committed.(See Hart, 1968: 4-5; see also Loftsgordon,
1966: 341 et seq.)
A number of criticisms have been directed at Hart's
modified definition. One relatively minor point is that it
seems arbitrary to treat punishments inflicted for breaches
of nonlegal rules as 'sub-standard', in the way that Hart
does.(See Sverdlik, 1988: 180) A punishment inflicted by a
parent or school principal seems to be fully and
unequivocally an instance of punishment.(See Wasserstrom,
1980: 147, n.4)
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There are much more serious criticisms that can be
directed at Hart's definition. The first comes from Joel
Feinberg. Feinberg asserts that Hart's definition cannot
distinguish between what he calls (mere) 'penalties' and
punishment properly so called. Penalties like parking
fines, or yardage granted to a football team by a referee,
satisfy Hart's five conditions but would not normally be
considered punishment, according to Feinberg. (See
Feinberg, 1970: 95-118, esp. 95-101) There is a further
feature characteristic of punishment proper that Feinberg
calls its 'condemnatory' aspect.(Ibid.) Precisely with this
aspect of punishment as condemnation, Neil MacCormick
argues that "it is a mode of attaching conventionally
understood degrees of reprobation to offences, judged both
by the flagrancy of the offence and the importance of the
values attacked." (1981: 141)
Alf Ross also argues, that the punitive measure must be
an expression of disapproval of the violation of the rule,
and consequently of censure or reproach directed at the
violator.(See Ross, 1975: 36; For an 'expressive' character
of punishment, see also Skillen, 1980: 509-23) According to
Ross's account, it is simply a logical impossibility to
enforce a normative system, that is, give effect to its
normative requirements, without at the same time giving
expression to disapproval. Disapproval is an act of thought
which in itself need not be communicated to others. When it
is communicated to a violator it is called censure or
reproach. In that case it is not an act of thought alone,
but act of communication with a certain typical effect, in
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this case precisely that of conveying feelings of
disapproval and attitudes of a generally dissociative,
unbenevolent, and even positively hostile character.(Ibid.,
p.37) Reproach is, as Alf Ross asserts, therefore not
merely a moral judgment that is passed on someone, it is at
the same time itself a sanction; reproach brings suffering,
or at least a measure of unpleasantness, to the person at
whom it is directed. When further suffering is inflicted
upon the violator in the form of punishment in the legal
sense, this additional suffering may be understood as being
experienced by the members of the community as much as by
the violator himself, as an amplification of the hostility
already conveyed in the expression of disapproval.(See
ibid., 37-38)
Then what is a practical advantage in admitting
disapproval and reproach along with suffering as part of
the definition of punishment? For it is precisely by means
of these characteristics that punishment is to be
distinguished from other social responses to law violators,
that is from what goes by the generic name of 'treatment'.
Punishment is of course a form of treatment too, in the
everyday sense of the word. As a term in criminology
'treatment' is used in a narrower sense for something that
is to be distinguished from 'imposition of penalties', and
this distinction consists precisely in treatment in this
sense of the term being intended neither as the infliction
of suffering nor as the expression of disapproval, but only
- just as in treating a case of pneumonia - as an attempt
to bring about a desirable change in the state of the
individual's psycho-physical organism. As an example of
pure treatment we may think of the imaginary case where a
person who feels criminal tendencies of some kind welling
up inside him reports to a clinic in order to have the
appropriate pills prescribed for their removal.
If it is difficult in practice to keep this distinction
between penalty and treatment clear, this is due to the
fact that the forms of treatment available today involve
restrictions upon the "patient's" freedom or other kinds of
interference, and are therefore experienced as suffering or
unpleasantness - which, as we know, may assume proportions
in excess of that of regular punishment. In practice,
therefore, the distinction between punishment and treatment
must be based on whether or not an element of disapproval
with condemnation is involved.(See Ross, 1975: 38)
In accordance with the above considerations and
modifications, the concept of punishment could be defined
in terms of six criteria for the use of the word in its
primary sense, i.e. six conditions satisfied by an ordinary
or standard case to which the word would be applied: (i) it
must be for an offence, actual or supposed; (ii) it must
be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence;
(iii) it must be the work of personal agencies (i.e. not
merely the natural consequences of an action); (iv) it must
involve suffering or at least other consequences normally
considered unpleasant; (v) it must be imposed by authority
(real or supposed) , conferred by the system of rules
against which the offence has been committed; and (vi) it
must be an expression of condemnation and disapproval of
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the offender.
This should not be regarded as a comprehensive and
satisfactory definition. The proposed definition is,
however, adequate for the problem we are posing, despite
any inability to account for distinctions which might be
significant in another context. Based on the above
definition of punishment, I shall proceed to discuss the
issues of its justification.
II. Traditional Retributive Theory and Desert.
II.1. Retributivism.
There is no complete agreement about what sorts of
theories are retributive except that all such theories try
to establish an essential link between punishment and moral
wrongdoing. Here I shall focus on the different retributive
reasons for punishment. Although I take retributive
theories to be essential to any account of just punishment,
upon examining the various versions of those theories I
shall conclude that they are all deficient in one way or
another. Even the most plausible of them underdetermines
the case for punishment and requires support from
non-retributive considerations.
Typically the retributive theory of punishment involves
two main conceptions: (i) that it is an end-in-itself that
the guilty should suffer pain; (ii) that the primary
justification of punishment is always to be found in the
fact that an offence has been committed by virtue of which
the offender 'deserves' the punishment, not in any future
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advantages to be gained by its infliction, whether for
society or for the offender as an individual. The second
conception, it is argued, involves the first, for, if
punishment is not an end-in-itself, it is justifiable only
as a means to other ends, and therefore, cannot be defended
by simply referring to a past act, since the ends to be
attained cannot now be attained in the past but only in the
future. It is admitted by all parties that in general any
future ends which a punishment may have can only be
achieved if it is inflicted on 'the guilty', i.e. on those
who deserve it, but this is not what the retributive
theory essentially means. It means that the punishment of
the guilty is in itself something of value quite apart from
the fact that it is a method of attaining other ends, like
the deterrence or reformation of offenders.
This theory seems to be supported by the authority of
some of the greatest philosophers of modern times,
especially Immanuel Kant, and in a less extreme form F. H.
Bradley and probably G. W. F. Hegel.(Not, however,
according to the interpretation given by, e.g., J. E.
McTaggart in his Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, 1918:
24-5) Bradley insists that there is a necessary connection
between punishment and guilt. No person is to be punished
unless he deserves it, and he deserves punishment because
he has been guilty of doing wrong. "Punishment is the
denial of wrong by the assertion of right," says Bradley
(1927: 27); or "Punishment is the complement of criminal
desert; it is justifiable only so far as deserved and
further is an end in itself."(Ibid.) Bradley's position
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contrasts with that of the utilitarians, who see punishment
as a means to an end and not an end in itself. John Stuart
Mill, for example, said, "there are two ends of punishment:
the benefit of the offender himself, and the protection of
others." Bradley would not agree, for Mill would be seen as
using punishment to secure another ethical end, namely
social utility, whereby the offender becomes a means to
attaining that.
Now when Bradley insists on a necessary connection
between punishment and guilt, he is stating one of the
strongest arguments in favour of retribution, because he is
arguing that only the guilty are to be punished and that
guilt is a necessary condition of punishment.
II.2 Kant's theory.
With this background we can now turn to a positive
account and examination of the doctrine of Immanuel Kant,
who is the paragon of classical retributivists. Many
writers in fact identify retributivism with his view. Thus,
it is essential to clarify Kant's employment of the notion
of desert and its rationale before we understand the demand
of retributivism and the significance of desert in
contemporary debates of criminal justice. Kant maintained
both the position that there is a duty to punish someone
who is culpably guilty of having committed a crime (Golding
names this position as 'maximal retributivism', see
Golding, 1975: 90) and the position that the punishment
should equal the gravity of the offence. The following two
well-known quotations give the flavor of his theory:
Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself
with the consent of all its members - as might be
supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island
resolving to separate and scatter themselves through
the whole world - the last murderer lying in the prison
ought to be executed before the resolution was carried
out. This ought to be done in order that every one may
realise the desert of his deeds, and the
bloodguiltiness may not remain upon the people; for
otherwise they might all be regarded as participators
in the murder as a public violation of justice.
(Philosophy of Law, trans., W. Hastie, 1887: 198, Part
Second)
. . .Punishment can never be administered merely as a
means for promoting another good, either with regard to
the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in
all cases be imposed only because the individual on
whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one man
ought never to be dealt with merely as a means
subservient to the purpose of another, nor be mixed up
with the subjects of real right [i.e., goods or
property]. Against such treatment his inborn
personality has a right to protect him, even although
he may be condemned to lose his civil personality. He
must first be found guilty and punishable, before there
can be any thought of drawing from his punishment any
benefit for himself or his fellow citizens.(Ibid. 195)
These passages make it quite clear that forward-looking
considerations, such as deterrence and reform, are quite
irrelevant to whether and how much punishment ought to be
inflicted on a lawbreaker. There are two main points in
above passages to which we should give particular
attention: (i) The only acceptable reason for punishing a
man is that he has committed a crime; (ii) Whoever commits
a crime must be punished in accordance with his desert.
What makes Kant hold this position? Why does he think it
apparent that consequences should have nothing to do with
the decision whether, and how, and how much, to punish?
There are two directions an answer to this question might
follow.(See Pincoffs, 1966: 5-6)
One would lead us into an extensive excursus on the
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philosophical position of Kant, the relation of this to his
ethical theory, and the relation of his general theory of
ethics to his philosophy of law. It would, in short, take
our question as one about the consistency of Kant's
position concerning the justification of punishment with
the whole of the Kantian philosophy. This would involve
discussion of Kant's reasons for believing that moral laws
must be universal and categorical in virtue of their form
alone, and divorced from any empirical content; of his
attempt to make out a moral decision-procedure based upon
an 'empty' categorical imperative; and, above all, of the
concept of freedom as a postulate of practical reason, and
as the central concept of the philosophy of law. This kind
of answer, however, we must forego here; for while it would
have considerable interest in its own right, it would lead
us astray from our purpose, which is to understand as well
as we can the retributivist position.
We want to take another direction, then, in our answer.
Is there any general reason why Kant rejects consequences
in the justification of punishment? Kant dislikes
paternalism above all else and sees in the utilitarian
position a method of treating people as means to an end
rather than as ends in themselves. Kant sees crime as an
intentional transgression - that is an act accompanied with
the consciousness that it is a transgression. (See
Prolegomena, General Devisions of the Metaphysic of
Morals, IV., in W. Hastie, 1887: 38-9)
In another passage that is again worth quoting, he makes
a related point:
74
Now the notion of punishment, as such, cannot be united
with that of becoming a partaker of happiness; for
although he who inflicts the punishment may at the same
time have the benevolent purpose of directing this
punishment to this end, yet it must be justified in
itself as punishment, that is, as mere harm, so that if
it stopped there, and the person punished could get no
glimpse of kindness hidden behind this harshness, he
must yet admit that justice was done him, and that his
reward was perfectly suitable to his conduct. In every
punishment as such there must first be justice, and
this constitutes the essence of the notion. Benevolence
may, indeed, be united with it, but the man who has
deserved punishment has not the least reason to reckon
upon this.{Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W.
Beck, 1956: 149)
This passage is remarkable in many respects, not the
least in the link with justice. The phrase "get no glimpse
of kindness hidden behind the harshness" may have
contributed to the belief that retribution was vindictive,
but to Kant it is a way of restating the point that
punishment is deserved. It is also a way of stating that
the criminal is not being punished for his own good. If he
does not deserve it we have no right to inflict it and,
according to Kant, no right to inflict it in the name of
some good of which the criminal may or may not approve. The
criminal must be treated as a rational being, and
rationality bestows dignity. We cannot force our judgements
upon him or appeal to good consequences, for among other
things the criminal may reject the means and the ends of
those judgements.(See Bean, 1981: 27)
We can now see why Kant maintains that it is unjust to
punish the innocent and just to punish the criminal. These
are not mere matters of moral intuition but are consequent
upon his theory of rights, justice, and law. The keynote of
Kant's thought is the idea of freedom and the conditions
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under which coercion is justified. Men, as free beings,
have the right to realize their freedom in action. This in
turn requires that each should in his actions respect the
rights of others, for no one can in fairness claim a right
to act on the basis of his own free choice unless he
concedes a similar right to others. Rights, we may say, are
persons' legitimate freedoms. Meanwhile punishment is in
fact characterized as a one-sided use of coercion and
involves a deprivation of at least some rights. Now, we owe
it to a person to respect his rights in our actions as he
owes it to us in his. But punishing an innocent person -
that is, a person who stayed within the bounds of
legitimate freedom - is manifestly a violation of this
reciprocal debt: it is a violation of justice and unfair to
him. Justice requires that persons be treated equally in
regard to their rights unless there are morally relevant
differences between them.(See Golding, 1975: 90-2)
On the other side, a crime exceeds the perpetrator's
legitimate freedom and infringes on the rights of others,
thus exhibiting disrespect for them and their rights. In
knowingly breaking the law, the criminal in effect declares
that he has a licence to steal, for example, and he puts
everyone who would respect property rights at a
disadvantage. The criminal weakens the fabric of justice.
He must be punished as a matter of re-asserting the laws of
freedom he has transgressed. He should not be allowed to
profit from his wrongdoing. Condemnation, by itself, is
insufficient. Failure to punish is not only condonation of
unjust acts - in effect, a declaration of their
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permissibility - but is also unfair to those who practise
self-restraint and respect the rights of others in their
actions. Crimes are moral wrongs and they deserve
punishment.(See Ibid., 92-3)
The above account, I think, embodies the main lines of
the theory behind Kant's retributivism. Crucial to it is
the conception of crime as a violation of rights. Coherent
and persuasive though an appeal Kant's retributive theory
may be, I believe some of his arguments, particularly the
abstract claim of primacy of freedom and justice, are too
rigorous to be applicable in practical matters. For
example, Kant's argument that punishment for the offender's
own good is treating him as a means is less persuasive even
from the viewpoint of teleological retributivism. Thus, I
shall take Kant's idea of desert only in a limited value.
II.3. Hegel's Theory.
There is another retributive theory espoused by Hegel.
Hegel's version of this rationale has attracted more
attention, and disagreement, in recent literature. It is
the Hegelian metaphysical terminology which is in part
responsible for the disagreement, and which has stood in
the way of an understanding of the retributivist position.
The difficulty turns around the notions of 'annulment of
crime', and of punishment as the 'right' of the criminal.
Let us consider 'annulment' first. We find Hegel's
contention quoted as follows:
If crime and its annulment... are treated as if they
were unqualified evils, it must, of course, seem quite
unreasonable to will an evil merely because "another
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evil is there already." ... But it is not merely a
question of an evil or of this, that, or the other
good; the precise point at issue is wrong, and the
righting of it... The various considerations which are
relevant to punishment as a phenomenon and to the
bearing it has on the particular consciousness, and
which concern its effects (deterrent, reformative,
etc.) on the imagination, are an essential topic for
examination in their place, especially in connection
with modes of punishment, but all these considerations
presuppose as their foundation the fact that
punishment is inherently and actually just.In
discussing this matter the only important things are,
first, that crime is to be annulled, not because it is
the producing of an evil, but because it is the
infringing of the right as right, and secondly, the
question of what that positive existence is which
crime possesses and which must be annulled; it is this
existence which is the real evil to be removed, and the
essential point is the question of where it lies. So
long as the concepts here at issue are not clearly
apprehended, confusion must continue to reign in the
theory of punishment.(See Hegel, Philosophy of Right,
trans., Knox, 1942: 69-70)
All this, of course, is obscure. Marriages, considered as
contract, can be annulled, but crimes cannot be, in any
ordinary sense. My death or imprisonment, after I have
killed a man, does not make things what they were before.
In what way can my death or imprisonment be seen as an
annulment? Hegel's argument begins from a conception of
moral principles, such as the principle against taking
another's life except, as we say, in certain circumstances.
An act of murder is not merely a contravention of this
principle but also a denial of its rightness. Such a denial
is said to 'infringe' the principle. We must 'restore' it
and this can be done only by punishing the offender. (See
Honderich, 1984: 45)
Thus it would be unjust, says Hegel, to allow crime,
which is the invasion of a right, to go unrequited. For to
allow this is to admit that crime is 'valid': and this is
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to attack the right itself. The system of justice in which
there are rights must be respected. Punishment not only
keeps the system in balance, it vindicates the system
itself. This argument seems to bring us closer to the
basically Kantian heart of Hegel's theory.(See Pincoffs,
1966: 11)
To reproduce this doctrine more faithfully and
intelligibly would require a considerable and tedious
excursus into the philosophy of Absolute Idealism. The
doctrine, incidentally, has found a home elsewhere as well,
in a tradition of English judicial thought. James Fitzjames
Stephen, the Victorian judge and law historian, finds a
justification of punishment in its 'ratification' of a
morality which has been violated. (See Stephen, A History of
the Criminal Law of England, 1883: Vol.11, Chap. XVII, 'Of
Crimes in General and of Punishments', reprinted in
Feinberg and Gross, 1975: 45) Lord Denning has observed
that "the ultimate justification of any punishment is not
that it is a deterrent but that it is the emphatic
denunciation by the community of a crime." (HMSO, Report of
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, s.53, quoted in
Hart, 1968: 170)
A second part of Hegel's account of punishment concerns
the 'rights' of offenders to be punished. One line of
argument proceeds from the assumption that men are in some
part of themselves rational. They recognized the supposed
obligation to punish offenders, presumably the supposed
obligation based on the need to restore a principle of
right. They recognize this obligation even if they are
offenders. They have a right, furthermore, to be enabled to
fulfil this obligation. So we must punish them.(See
Honderich, 1984: 47) The obvious reaction to this would be
that it is a strange justification of punishment which
makes it someone's right, for it is at best a strange kind
of right which no one would ever want to claim. However,
this part of Hegel's doctrine, incidentally, like the first
part, continues to find supporters. For an example: "If we
respect personality," we are told, "we must respect
responsibility. If we respect responsibility, we must
respect the right of offenders to be punished for their
offences."(See Barker, 1951: 179)
III. Summary.
Before moving to contemporary discussions, let us sum up
traditional retributivism as we have found it expressed in
the paradigmatic passages we have examined.
(i) The only acceptable reason for punishing a man is
that he has voluntarily committed a crime.
(ii) The only acceptable reason for punishing a man in a
given manner and degree is that the punishment is 'equal'
or 'equivalent' to the crime.
(iii) Whoever commits a crime must be punished in
accordance with his desert.
To these propositions should be added two underlying
assumptions:
(i) An assumption about the direction of justification:
to the criminal.
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(ii) An assumption about the nature of justification: to
show the criminal that it is he who has willed what he now
suffers.
Although traditional retributivists insist on treating
the offender as a moral agent, it can be argued that there
is no proof that treatment of a person as a moral agent
does necessarily lead to retributive punishment. To say
that punishment is an end or a good in itself can only be
established by the argument of intuition, or be seen as
self-evident. But the very claims to such intuition or to
self-evidence are weakened by the fact that they are so
strongly contested.
And the key concept of 'desert' in above discussions
appears intolerably vague. What does it mean to say that
punishment must be proportionate to what a man deserves?
This seems to imply, in the theory of the traditional
retributivists, that there is some way of measuring desert,
or at least of balancing punishment against it. How this
measuring or balancing is supposed to be done, I shall
discuss later. What we must recognize here is that there
are alternative ways to understand criteria of 'desert', as
can be found in contemporary retributivism, and that it is
not always clear which of these the traditional
retributivist means to imply.
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CHAPTER 3. DESERT AND CONTEMPORARY RETRIBUTIVISM
Contemporary retributivists treat the notion of desert as
central to the retributive theory, punishment being
justified in terms of the desert of the offender.
Retributivists base their assessments of desert both on the
harm done by the act, and on the mental state of the
offender which determines his culpability. To be deserving
of punishment the offender must be morally culpable in that
his act was done in the absence of one of the accepted
excuses. These excuses usually include duress, accident,
reasonable mistake, and some forms of mental illness. For
convenience we shall use the term 'voluntary' conduct to
refer to all those acts for which no excuse was available,
and for which therefore a normal agent can be held morally
culpable. We can then formulate retributive theories of
punishment as those theories which maintain that punishment
is justified because the offender has voluntarily committed
a morally wrong act. Is this claim to be accepted as
self-evident, or can it be supported by other
considerations? How can punishment, which involves the
deliberate infliction of suffering or deprivation, be
justified even when it produces no good consequences such
as the deterrent, reformative, and incapacitative effects
which utilitarians stress? (For an interesting discussion of
some recent versions of retributivism, see Honderich, 1984:
212-44, Postscript)
In defending the claim, retributivists divide sharply
into two groups, namely, those with a non-comparative
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notion of desert and those who espouse a comparative notion
of desert.(See Ten, 1987: 47) The former group have tried
to justify punishment on the ground that wrongdoers deserve
to suffer. This appeals to a non-comparative notion of
desert in which what a person deserves depends solely on
what he or she has done. But the latter group relies on
comparative notions of desert, connecting punishments with
more general principles of distributive justice or justice
in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social
life. The offender's interests are compared respectively
with those of other groups in society: The victims of
crime, other offenders, and the law-abiding citizens. From
now on I shall examine the contemporary arguments for
retributivism by considering first the view that wrongdoers
deserve to suffer. My aim is to discern the most plausible
reasonings for a deserved punishment from the various
arguments.
I. Intrinsic Retributivism.
A contemporary definition of retributive punishment
reads, for example, as "punishment meted out because it is
deserved."(See Golding, 1975: 89) Similarly, Honderich
points out that to give as a reason for the rightness of
punishment that it is deserved by offenders is
retributivism.(See Honderich, 1984: 9) John Kleinig also
suggests that, "The principle that wrongdoers deserve to
suffer seems to accord with our deepest intuitions
concerning justice."(Kleinig, 1973: 67) To support this
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claim, Kleinig cites the example of a Nazi war criminal who
escapes to an uninhabited island where 30 years later he is
found leading 'an idyllic existence'. While he is still
unrepentant for what he has done, he has no desire to cause
further harm.(Let us also assume that his punishment would
have no general deterrent effect on the behaviour of
others.) Kleinig thinks that the Nazi would not be
justified in complaining if suffering were imposed on him
for his past misdeeds, although he concedes that it is
another question as to whether it would be proper for the
state to inflict the suffering on him.
Kleinig's view of the Nazi can be widely shared, but it
is unclear what the source of the shared belief that the
Nazi ought to suffer is. In many people it may be based on
the desire for revenge rather than on the claim of
justice. But even when it is based on considerations of
justice, it may well rest, as C. L. Ten rightly points out,
on a notion of comparative justice rather than on the
non-comparative judgement that wrongdoers deserve to
suffer.(See Ten, 1987: 47)
Intrinsic Retributivism in assertion of its peculiar
intrinsic good is strongly reminiscent of the doctrine of
moral intuitionism, to the effect that there are moral
properties which are open to some kind of moral perception.
From this viewpoint, then, it remains possible or anyway
conceivable that it will be maintained that anyone who does
not somehow see the intrinsic goodness of the suffering of
the guilty is failing in moral perception, is a victim of
moral blindness. Presumably it will also be maintained that
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some other people who claim the existence of different
intrinsic goods are in the grips of moral hallucination.
Then it will be necessary for the proponents of this view
to maintain, incidentally, that those of us who are blind
in the given way are not blind to one thing, but to a host
of them.
What is to be said briefly in reply to any supposition of
the moral blindness of many of us is that there are great
difficulties in any theory or account of moral perception
or intuition, and hence of moral blindness, hallucination
and so on. Thus I can conclude that intrinsic
retributivism, notwithstanding its prima facie probative
force deriving from intuition, might as a result of further
thought come to provide an insubstantial and obscure reason
for punishment.(See Honderich, 1984: 214; see also L. H.
Davis, 1972: 140. Davis makes it clear that he does not
think that this intuition can provide, by itself, a
sufficient justification for a system of punishment.)
II. Satisfaction Theory.
Another reason why some people think that the Nazi war
criminal should be punished is that his punishment brings
satisfaction to others. This view has been called the
'satisfaction theory', (The label is given by John
Cottingham, see his article "Varieties of Retribution",
1979: 241-2) and it is said to be a view that has given
force to retributivism.(See Honderich, 1984: 28) The idea
behind the claim seems to be that there should be some kind
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of reciprocity between the sense of grievance felt by the
victim of an offence and the satisfaction he gets from the
suffering of the offender. What connection, if any, does
this theory have with our 'basic' sense of retribution? The
answer, according to John Cottingham's account, hinges on
which of two possible interpretations is given to the
theory.(Cottingham, 1979: 242)
(i) On the first interpretation, the claim put forward is
that it is intrinsically desirable or appropriate that
grievances of victims should be matched by suffering of
offenders. There is a close link here with retribution as
repayment. If child A hits child B causing him pain and a
sense of grievance, child B will frequently be heard to
say, "I will make you pay for that!" The payment is felt to
have been exacted once B has inflicted a similar hurt on
A.(Such beliefs are by no means confined to children, but
children tend to make them more explicit.)
Unfortunately for this version of the satisfaction
theory, it is far from clear how the indubitable
psychological facts just cited are capable of providing a
satisfactory moral justification for the practice of
punishment. We can see a useful distinction made by Nozick
between the typical case of retributive punishment and a
desire of revenge with which it is sometimes confused.(See
Nozick, 1981: 363-97) (a) "Retribution is done for a wrong,
while revenge may be done for an injury or harm or slight
and need not be for a wrong." (Ibid., 366) He gives an
example of the distinction between a wrong and a harm by
pointing out that even if the rejected suitor is harmed, no
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wrong has been done because the rejector had a right to
reject. (Ibid., 388) (b) "Retribution sets an internal limit
to the amount of punishment, according to the seriousness
of the wrong, whereas revenge internally need set no
limits(Ibid., 367) This is certainly true as often the
person seeking revenge harms his victim until he is
satisfied, and he may not be satisfied until he has
inflicted much greater harm on the victim than had been
inflicted by the victim on him or his loved ones, (c)
"Revenge is personal." (Ibid.) It is in the sense that the
revenger is the very person on whom the harm to be avenged
has been inflicted, or he has a personal relationship with
the person harmed. On the other hand, the dispenser of
retributive punishment need not have any such personal tie
with the victim of the wrongful conduct. (d) "Revenge
involves a particular emotional tone, pleasure in the
suffering of another",(Ibid.) which is missing in the case
of typical retribution. This, according to Nozick, explains
why the revenger often wishes to witness the suffering of
the revengee.
(ii) A second, and more sophisticated, version of the
satisfaction theory is put forward by the Victorian judge
James Fitzjames Stephen: "The criminal law regulates,
sanctions and provides a satisfaction for the passion of
revenge".(See Stephen, 1890: 99) If the underlying idea
here is that the penal system provides a substitute for
private revenge, then it turns out that the focus of
justification does not centre on the notion of retribution
at all. Rather, we seem to be dealing with a utilitarian
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approach, where the penal system is justified as a
mechanism for the prevention of vendettas, which furthers
the goal of social stability - making society better
ordered and more secure.
But as C. L. Ten points out, this is clearly not all that
Stephen had in mind. (See Ten, 1987: 52) If the
satisfaction theory is to count as a retributive theory,
then, it has to be given a different interpretation.
Stephen gave a hint of an alternative interpretation when
he said that the feeling of hatred is aroused in 'healthily
constituted minds'. He did not therefore seem to treat the
desires in question as brute facts whose presence called
for satisfaction, but rather as desires of which he
approved. This kind of interpretation is strongly
reminiscent of the Humean proposition that moral
distinctions, such as the distinction between the deserved
and the undeserved, are founded not on reason but on
feeling or sentiment. What is in question with
retributivism is fundamentally 'retributive emotion'.
The truth of this view of retributivism is that it seeks
to justify punishment partly or wholly on the ground that
it satisfies the grievances created by offences, through
causing distress to offenders, and that it takes penalties
to be unsatisfactory if they do less than satisfy
grievances or do more than that, and satisfactory if they
just satisfy it. Here, the sense of saying that penalty P
is deserved for A's offence 0 is that P will just satisfy
the grievance to which A has given rise by 0. The
requirement of an equivalent penalty, in this sense, is a
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direct consequence of the fundamental contention: that
punishment is justified partly or wholly by
grievance-satisfaction. To do less than satisfy it would
simply conflict with the fundamental contention. To do more
would be to cause distress which would fail to have the
given justification.
The fact that it is reasonably imaginable from our
'healthily constituted minds' not to disregard the
existence of such desires and their possible satisfaction
gives this view some force in the retributive justification
of punishment. But how do we then judge them justly? If we
interpret the satisfaction theory in this manner of
retributive emotion or sentiment, namely, the basis for
satisfying the desire to punish the offender resting on the
feeling that the offender deserves to be punished, the
question returns to the basic notion of desert. So the
satisfaction theory cannot be used sufficiently to explain
the basis of the claim that the offender deserves
punishment because it itself presupposes that claim.(See
Ten, 1987: 52)
III. Ideal Sympathetic Spectator Theory.
A similar line of thought to the retributive emotion
theory, but a more improved one can be found in Adam
Smith's view about the justice of retributive punishment.
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith, like David Hume,
made sympathy basic to his ethical theory. But the concept
of sympathy which he used is different from Hume's, indeed
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more subtle and having a greater explanatory power. The
right resentment for injuries suffered, for example, Smith
held to be:
the indignation they would call forth in [the breast]
of the impartial spectator; which allows no word, no
gesture, to escape it beyond what this more equitable
sentiment would dictate; which never,even in thought,
attempts any greater vengeance, nor desires to inflict
any greater punishment, than what every indifferent
person would rejoice to see executed.(Smith, The Theory
of Moral Sentiments, 1st ed. 1759, 6th ed. 1790, in
Selby-Bigge, 1897: 279)
Smith began with the 'sense of propriety' (i.e., the
judgement that something is right). (For this account and
below, see Raphael, 1980: 163-4) Hume held that moral
approval and disapproval result from sympathy with people
who are affected by the action judged. A benevolent action
normally has the consequence of giving happiness. We
sympathize with the beneficiary and so approve of the
action. Smith instead looked in the first instance to
sympathy with the feelings of the agent. As a spectator I
imagine myself in the agent's shoes. If I find that I
should be moved to act as he does in that situation, then
my observation of the correspondence between his feelings
('sentiment') and my own hypothetical feelings is an
observation of 'sympathy'. This observation of
correspondence of sentiments causes me to approve of the
agent's motive, to think of it as 'appropriate' or
'proper'.
But then, when I also note the feelings of the person
affected by the action, there can be a second sympathy.
Suppose that B (the beneficiary) is in need and that A (the
agent) is moved to help him. As a spectator I sympathize
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with A's motive of benevolence and I approve of it as
proper. B feels grateful to A. I can imagine myself in B's
shoes, too, and I find that I likewise would feel grateful;
so I approve of B's feelings as appropriate. The
conjunction of the above two sympathies gives rise to the
'sense of merit'. An impartial spectator will sympathize
with B's gratitude, and so think it proper, only if he also
thinks A's action is proper. When he does have this double
sympathy, he judges A's action to be meritorious, i.e. to
deserve the gratitude of B and the kind of action that
gratitude motivates, doing good in return.
Contrariwise, if A harms B, B is liable to feel
resentment. An impartial spectator will sympathize with B's
resentment only if he also thinks that A's action was
improper, i.e. if he feels an antipathy instead of a
sympathy for A's motive. If he sympathizes with A because
he thinks that A's harmful action was justified, he will
not sympathize with B's resentment. But if he does think
that B's resentment is proper and A's action improper, he
will judge A's action to have demerit, i.e. to deserve
resentment and the kind of action that resentment
motivates, a retaliation of harm.
According to Raphael's interpretation of Smith's theory,
retaliation is a law of nature, both the returning of good
for good, and the returning of harm for harm. Where
resentment and the retaliation of harm for harm would be
approved by an impartial spectator, there punishment is in
order.(Ibid. 164) This theory seems to be a most plausible
one to give an explanation for the retributive
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justification of punishment and the notion of just deserts.
However, I think that there appears to be a difficulty in
this theory; the qualifications of ideal spectatorhood are
such that no human-being can be shown ever to possess them.
It follows that nobody can assuredly establish that he has
reached the conclusions an ideal spectator would reach.
Thus this theory alone can not be considered to have a
sufficient explanation without its being complemented by
some form of rational justif ication. (For the critique of
this kind of hypothetical choice theories, see Donagan,
1977: 220-1)
IV. Consensual Theory.
I shall examine another theory of retributive punishment,
though it substitutes consent for moral desert as a
fundamental justifying criterion, which gives much insight
to a rational justification of punishment. C. S. Nino has
recently advanced what he describes as a 'consensual theory
of punishment'.(Nino, 1983: 289-306) Nino's theory is an
attempt to produce a genuinely liberal position on
punishment that on the one hand does not require
assessments of moral desert (the worth of one's moral
character reflected in one's acts), and on the other hand
does not entail unfairly sacrificing individuals for the
common good. The classical problem for liberals has been
that while assessing moral desert looks to be illiberal,
jettisoning considerations of moral desert leads inexorably
to unfair sacrifice of individuals, also illiberal.
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Nino's solution to this liberal dilemma is to substitute
consent for moral desert as the justification for imposing
punishment on specific individuals. Punishment then can be
justified as an institution for social protection, and one
that does not impose unjustifiable burdens on individuals
who commit crimes, not because they deserve their burdens,
but because they have consented to them. Consent is a
trump card in liberal theory, with the power to convert an
otherwise unfair distribution of burdens into a justified
one. And one who commits a crime consents to punishment
because he has acted voluntarily with knowledge of his
act's legal consequences, that is, the punishment
prescribed for that act.
Nino's argument surely appears sound. Within liberal
theory, consent does alter the moral justifiability of
burdens imposed on individuals. And the voluntary
commission of an act which one has no moral or legal right
to commit, with clear notice of the legal consequences
attached to that act, surely can be deemed to be consent to
those consequences. However, we can raise a problem with
the consensual theory of punishment, a problem that Nino
completely ignores. As Larry Alexander points out, the
problem is that consent not only substitutes for desert as
a justification for punishment, but it also overrides
desert as a limitation on the severity of punishment. (See
Larry Alexander, 1986: 179) Put differently, the consensual
theory of punishment justifies any punishment, even if the
punishment is severely disproportionate (in terms of the
actor's deserts) to the severity of the crime. There is no
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proportionality limit to consensual punishment. The point
is simple enough. If the law imposes capital punishment for
an illegal parking, then one who voluntarily overparks
'consents' to be executed. Execution is therefore not
unfair. And deserts by hypothesis do not matter. The
liberal who embraces the consensual theory of punishment
has no 'liberal' argument against severe punishments for
minor crimes.
Nino would reply that the severity of punishment may
impose costs that exceed its benefits. Indeed, Nino does
argue that punitive measures are only justifiable if they
involve "lesser harms than the harm[s] feared" and are
"necessary and effective means of protecting the community
against [those] greater harms..."(Nino, 1983: 299)
The notion of lesser and greater harms, as Larry
Alexander points out, is ambiguous, however. Understood
aggregatively, it could authorize imposition of very severe
punishments for trivial crimes if the total harm averted is
less than the total harm imposed by the
punishments. (Alexander, 1986: 179) Nino can be read as
treating harm aggregatively, because he relies on the
notion of lesser and greater harms to defend a utilitarian
idea of social protection against the charge that it
justifies extremely harsh punishment.
Nino rejects this interpretation by claiming that: "The
argument that social protection would allow extremely harsh
penalties for preventing even the most trifling offences is
clearly absurd: hanging a motorist for the sake of
preventing parking offences would be self-defeating as a
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measure of social protection on the assumption that one
accepts the scale of values which is crucial to the
argument (the death of a person is worse than a congested
traffic flow)." (Nino, 1983: 290-1) He does not explicitly
explain the assumption on the scale of values, but defends
the consensual theory of punishment by setting forth
rather dogmatically some of the presuppositions of his
thesis: "legal punishment is a state action, and the state
and all its acts are justified only insofar as they seek to
secure the rights of people to the greatest degree
possible; when there is a conflict of rights (as would
occur in a case in which state action and state inaction
would both lead to violation of rights) one way out is to
minimize social harms by giving preference to the more
important rights of the greater number of people. But this
policy must respect the side constraint of not using some
people as means to benefit others, and this situation is
avoided when the people who are affected consent to the
normative relations which impose the harm." (Nino, 1986:
183-4)
Here the question is why do people do give consent to the
normative relations which impose harms? According to Nino,
his thesis implies that the goal of punishment is the
minimization of social harms, and that consent is only a
limitation on the pursuit of that goal. (Ibid. 184) Then
what is required for a justification of punishment is the
clarification of this additional element of consent. Here,
what is required to do is constructing a consensual
retributivism. It has to do essentially with what is called
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'fairness owed to consent' . Punishment must be fair in that
it is among other things a product of the will of the
person who suffers it, something which respects his own
autonomy.
Here, we may, following Honderich's account, clarify the
implications of consent by way of propositions about
ordinary contracts in law. (See Honderich, 1984: 220) (i)
Consent here can be shown or given by any voluntary act
done with the knowledge that the act has as a consequence
a certain duty or responsibility. I consent to pay the
cab-driver merely by getting into his cab and giving an
address. I do not need to say that I agree to pay. (ii)
Giving my consent, in so far as the law of contract is
concerned, is not dependent on my attitudes then to what it
is that I consent to do, or certain of my beliefs about it.
I have consented even if I dislike the prospect of paying
up, or am against it all things considered, or intend not
to pay up, or believe that any obligation to do so can be
avoided or will not be enforced, (iii) However, in all
cases of contractual consent, there is the requirement that
the relevant laws be in some sense just as C. S. Nino also
maintains it: "the justification of particular
distributions based on the free choice of the parties
presupposes the fairness of the legal framework within
which those choices are made."(Nino, 1983: 302) (iv) If I
do give my consent, thereby entering into a contract, this
gives others at least a prima facie moral justification for
enforcing it. (v) Finally, if doing what I have consented
to do will issue in an unfair or inequitable or
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inegalitarian distribution of burdens, it does not follow
that I have not consented. It does not matter if the
cab-driver is a secret millionaire, etc. Nor does it
follow, therefore, that there cannot be the mentioned moral
justification for enforcing the contract, despite the
resulting distribution. This is the fairness owed to
consent.
To sum up the consensual theory of punishment, the
individual who performs a voluntary act - an offence, while
knowing that the loss of his legal immunity from punishment
is a necessary consequence of that act, consents to that
normative consequence in the same way that a contracting
party consents to the normative consequences following from
the contract. (Nino, 1983: 298)
There can be raised some doubts and criticisms to the
consensual theory of punishment.(See Honderich, 1984:
223-4) First, there is a certain amount of tension between
parts of it. One of its propositions is that an offence is
a certain consent to a punishment only if the law in
question is somehow just, or if the burden of keeping to
the law is a justified one. Another of its propositions is
that consent once given can justify a distribution of
punishment which may be unfair or whatever. These two
propositions do not come together in a supposedly
consistent account of consensual retributivism. Secondly,
This theory does indeed depend on the first proposition -
the law's being just, its burdens being justified. Since
this requirement is not clarified, and since it is not
shown that it is met, the theory is at least incomplete.
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Here the question raised is that before giving consent to
the presupposed just law or fair system of criminal
punishment, what would be a precise criterion of 'just' law
or a 'fair' criterion of the system of criminal punishment.
This theory seems to remain silent about the answered to
our fundamental question.
V. Contractarian Theory.
A related line of thought about justifying retributive
punishment is argued by employing an extension of the
contractarian approach whose fruitfulness John Rawls has
demonstrated in the area of distributive justice. Although
Rawls makes only a few brief remarks about punishment in
his book, A Theory of Justice (See 1971: 241, 314-15, and
575-76), his approach to a theory of a hypothetical
contract is employed to defend a contractarian theory of
retributivism.
I think we can find a typical contractarian approach to
the retributive punishment in David A. Hoekema's argument
which develops a strategy substantially similar to
Rawls'.(See Hoekema, 1980: 239-69) Before taking up the
argument of punishment, let us see a general outline of
Rawls' hypothetical contract theory.
Rawls suggests that one way of assessing the justice of
social institutions is to ask whether persons would choose
to establish such institutions from a hypothetical position
of equality and freedom. In what Rawls calls the 'original
position' , everyone is imagined to be ignorant of his or
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her identity and social position. The intent of this and
other ignorance conditions is to prevent anyone from making
choices based on personal advantage. In the original
position each party must choose a set of principles which
will govern the basic structure of society.(See Rawls,
1971: 3-21) By approaching questions of justice in this
way, Rawls in effect divides such questions into two
stages: First, what would be a fair situation from which to
choose principles to govern basic institutions? Second,
what kind of principles would be chosen from such a
situation? In the original position as he describes it,
Rawls argues that the parties would choose two basic
principles, a principle of equal liberty and a principle
requiring that inequalities benefit every one, even the
worst off.(See Ibid. 60-5 and 302-3)
Ronald Dworkin distinguishes 'goals', 'rights', and
'duties', as the fundamental justifying devices in a
political theory and suggests that any political theory
must take one of these as the fundamental moral category.
Rawls' theory, according to Dworkin, rests on a 'deep[er]
theory' in which rights are central. Again Dworkin posits
as the foundation of Rawls' theory of justice a right of
all to equal concern and respect in the design and
operation of the institutions to which they are subject.
(See Dworkin, 1973: 500-33, reprinted in Daniels, 1975:
16-53, especially 38-42 and 46)
The question now to be examined for this approach is
which theory, if any, among alternative accounts of
punishment, namely, retributive, deterrent, or
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rehabilitative theory, provides adequate support for a
system of punishment and which poses the least serious
threat to individual rights.
Hoekema approaches this question by putting it before
parties in a hypothetical choice situation who must choose
a set of principles to govern institutions of punishment in
ignorance of the particular facts about themselves and
their position in society. The motivation for employing
this approach is that disagreement over features of social
institutions which arises not from consideration of justice
and fairness but from considerations of personal advantage
may be ruled out by imagining that the relevant principles
must be chosen under suitable ignorance
conditions.(Hoekema, 1980: 248-49)
However, an initial assumption in a hypothetical choice
situation is that questions of punishment belong to
'partial compliance theory'.(Rawls, 1971: 8) What does this
mean? One of the facts about human nature and social
interaction which the parties to the hypothetical choice
know is that the assumption of full compliance with the
laws and policies of society is unquestionably false. Under
any imaginable social order, people will disobey laws and
policies from time to time for a variety of reasons,
particularly when it appears to them that personal
advantage may be served by doing so. Thus, the parties in
this choice situation do not assume full compliance, and
they know that if there are laws they will be broken.
But to say that laws will be broken is not to say that a
system of punishment is necessary. Punishment is the
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deliberate deprivation of rights or infliction of hard
treatment on individuals by duly constituted authorities,
and one option open to the parties in the choice situation
is to omit any such institution from the design of their
society. They might substitute a system of persuasion and
exhortation, or they might choose to create an institution
of legal punishment; and if they do, they will need to
choose how it will be organized and administered.
Then, the choice has to do with a kind of distribution;
in other words, it is a choice of the way in which a
society will distribute a particular set of benefits and
burdens among its members. Here the question is precisely
as to what kind of distributive rule would be adopted. The
parties in the choice situation may take the deontological
principle of desert as their fundamental distributive rule.
Or, on the contrary, the parties in the choice situation
may want to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms to
which they will be subjected. However, as to this question,
Hoekema views that the parties will take the latter
position. (Hoekema, 1980: 250) In order to account for the
motivation of the parties Hoekema employs a version of
Rawls' 'thin theory of the good', the theory of what it
would be rational to want whatever else one wants.(Rawls,
1971: 395-99) This theory seems to assume another truism
about the nature of rational human beings. In order to
explicate this theory, let us see Rawls's account briefly.
Rawls provides a list of several categories of primary
goods - income and wealth, powers and opportunities, rights
and liberties, and 'the bases of self-respect' - which he
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regards as means for the attainment of anyone's particular
ends.(Ibid. 90-95 and 440)
Hoekema follows Rawls in supposing that each party in the
choice situation is interested in securing for himself or
herself the greatest quantity he can obtain of primary
goods - i.e., in this case, the greatest measure of
personal freedom. Now the first choice to be made is the
choice of whether to include an institution of punishment
in society. According to Hoekema, the parties would choose
to include a system of punishment because the harm they
are likely to suffer if no such institution exists poses an
unacceptable cost. They know that a system of laws and
punishment designed to protect the freedom of each person
and to preserve the rights of all will have the effect of
diminishing harmful conflict and infringement of
rights.(Hoekema, 1971: 252-3)
However here the question concerns what particular reason
among the rival justifications the parties would ground
their choice of an institution of punishment? As may be
seen in a logical corollary of the above argument, the
parties would choose to include an institution of
punishment in order to reduce the incidence of crime and
bring about general compliance with the law, thus securing
protection of individual rights. In contrast with the
retributive reasons, then, considerations of deterrence
would provide strong support for the existence of an
institution of punishment. According to the reasoning
heretofore, the above contractarian theory can be
interpreted to support an utilitarian justification.
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But Hoekema contends against the simple-minded deterrence
justification of an institution of punishment. He argues in
favor of a liberal version of deterrence
justification. (1980: 255-6) For this argument, a crucial
consideration is that there are far more effective ways of
achieving deterrence besides punishment, as contemporary
police states have demonstrated. The methods of
indoctrination, intimidation, and surveillance employed by
such states to prevent commission of crimes by citizens are
enormously varied, and vast new opportunities for such
supervision and control are opened by electronic
technology.
Imagine that a well-organized and humane police state
created such effective means of intimidation and
surveillance that scarcely anyone ever committed a crime.
Anyone who is suspected of engaging in illegal activities
is immediately warned to stop by the voice of a police
officer issuing from the receiver portion of his collar. An
electric shock device might be an optional accessory for
emergency use.
The point is that under such a system hardly anyone would
ever succeed in committing a crime, the deterrent purpose
of punishment is therefore undercut. Such a humane police
state would achieve the goal of deterrence even more
effectively than a system of punishment with procedural
protections and extensive personal freedom. Deterrent
considerations would therefore suggest that we eliminate
punishment in favor of such a system.
What is wrong with the kindly totalitarian state, of
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course, is that it achieves deterrence only by trampling on
everyone's rights, such as the right to privacy and to
freedom of the person. The reason why we would choose a
system of punishment over a police state without punishment
is that we want to reduce the incidence of crime only by
means which respect the rights of individuals. Thus
Hoekema argues that the justifiying reason of an
institution of punishment is not just deterrence but
deterrence subject to the constraints of right that we are
seeking. The point that Hoekema makes here is that these
constraints are not retributive, properly speaking, since
they do not establish any acceptable retributive reasons
for creating an institution of punishment. But the
constraints show that the choice of an institution of
punishment is motivated not merely by the result achieved
but by the manner of achieving it. Consequential
considerations alone are not sufficient to support this
choice; the character of the means employed in bringing
about compliance with the law must also be
considered.(Hoekema, 1980: 256)
Once having chosen to include an institution of
punishment in the basic structure of society, the parties
must next select a set of principles which will govern its
application. By what standards shall persons be selected to
be punished and particular sanctions imposed on them? A
contractarian might argue for the answer that
considerations of rights and liberty - the interest which
the parties have in preserving their integrity as choosing
and self-determining agents - will lead them to adopt a
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fundamentally retributive set of principles as the basis
for the application of punishment. But what would be a
precise reason for that argument?
In making their choice they will consider the cost of
ending up in any of the resulting positions and the risk of
being in that position. Rawls argues that the parties to
the original position as he conceives it would choose a
maximin rule and select the set of principles which assures
the best worst position.(See Rawls, 1971: 150-61) But
Hoekema contends that the conditions for adopting a maximin
rule do not appear to be present in the case of
institutions of punishment even if Rawls is correct that a
maximin choice is rational in the conditions he
stipulates. Yet the worst position under a system of
punishment is important, and even if a maximin strategy
would not be adopted Hoekema believes that the worst
position would function as a criterion in a different way.
The system with the best worst position would not
necessarily be chosen, but a system with an intolerable
worst position would be excluded from consideration. The
parties will not be willing to choose a system of
punishment with a worst position which they cannot accept
the risk of occupying. In particular, since the parties
think of themselves as agents with a right to
self-determination, they will not be willing to accept a
system some of whose positions effectively undermine this
fundamental right. A kind of 'worst-position veto' will
thus be involved in their choice.(Hoekema, 1980: 259)
According to a kind of worst-position veto, both the
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deterrent and the rehabilitative systems of punishment have
intolerable worst positions. Then the only acceptable
choice is a retributive system of punishment. The worst
position under a system of utilitarian punishment is the
position of an innocent person punished for the sake of
general deterrence. There are other positions under a
utilitarian system which are similarly objectionable.
Considerations of deterrence would allow and even require
exemplary punishment of the guilty - punishment which is
unusually harsh for reasons of deterrence. The objections
to the rehabilitative principle as the basis of punishment,
or as a substitute for punishment, are equally conclusive.
This principle divorces the treatment of individuals
radically from their choices, since liability to punishment
or treatment is not dependent on one's past acts. It
therefore systematically disregards the individual's right
to self-determination, a right which the choosing parties
are concerned to protect. Under a rehabilitative system I
can not control my future condition by my acts or even
predict my future condition. Whether I will be subject to
imprisonment and rehabilitation depends on whether those in
authority judge that I need such treatment. The remaining
choice for the parties in the choice situation is that of
a fundamentally retributive system of punishment. On
retributive principles, persons are selected for punishment
according to their past deliberate acts of violation of
law, and the severity of punishment is set by
proportionality to the seriousness of the offense
committed.(See Hoekema, 1980: 259-63)
106
Now let us examine the plausibility and soundness of this
kind of contractarian justification of punishment. First,
Hoekema's contractarian argument which employs the Rawlsian
theory of justice has its roots in the Kantian moral theory
and thus regards the autonomy and equal liberty of persons
as fundamental premises. (See Rawls, 1971: 251-7, section
40, "The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness";
see also Rawls, 1980: 515) It is therefore legitimately to
be expected that Hoekema's argument in his contractarian
(Rawlsian) justification for the institution of punishment
should be based on some kind deontological postulates of a
Kantian type. But this is not the actual sense of his
argument, since for Hoekema as well as for Rawls the reason
for choosing the institution of punishment is presented in
terms of a consequentialist notion of deterrence, namely,
by considering the cost and effect of introducing a system
of punishment. (See also Rawls, 1971: 241, "the principle of
responsibility is not founded on the idea that punishment
is primarily retributive or denunciatory.") By contrast,
Kant as a traditional retributivist would call on
retributive considerations at this point, insisting that we
must include the institution of punishment in society
because we have an obligation to impose on criminals the
penalties they deserve, whatever the effects of the
practices may be. This raises questions: on what grounds
ought the Rawlsian contractarian to depart from the Kant's
categorical imperative by adopting an utilitarian notion of
deterrence while insisting on the retributivist
justification of distribution of punishment? Of course,
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there will be no absolute necessity for a contractarian
theorist to use the retributive justification both in
relation to the institution of punishment and in relation
to the distribution of punishment, but it will be
reasonable to ask that at least the Rawlsian contractarian
who confesses to be a Kantian should use a retributivist
theory so as to remain consonant with the Kantian account
of punishment. However, Hoekema does not do this and fails
to give consistent and sufficient explanations for not
doing so. Probably one can find an answer to the question
why Rawlsian theory of justice goes so far to accommodate
the utilitarian notion of consequences of punishment and
thus becomes incoherent with Kantian moral theory by
scrutinizing the main features of Rawls's theory of
justice. But I shall discuss this issue in an other
place.(See Chapter 5, I.(i) Rule-Utilitarianism)
Secondly, one practical issue in Hoekema's contractarian
theory is that of determining just what type and measure of
punishment is in (moral) fact proportionate to the offence
committed by the offender. The difficulty of principle
underlying this problem is that the two elements are
actually incommensurable; there are no acceptable common
units of measurement in terms of which we can assess the
relationship of equivalence. Since the theory of social
contract, as D. D. Raphael points out, was originally
intended to deal with the problem of political obligation
(why should a man obey the state?), rather than to uphold
an explanation of justice, this version of contractarian
theory too gives no substantive guidance to the measure of
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just deserts and leaves this matter to be explained
further.(See Raphael, 1980: 157/ see also Sher, 1987: 89
n.)
VI. Reciprocity Theory or Fair Play Theory.
VI. 1. Removing Unfair Advantage and Restoration of the
Social Equilibrium.
Given what has been said of the deficiencies in preceding
accounts of retributive justification of punishment, it
makes sense to attempt further to explicate the desert
principle within the context of some wider, compatible,
background political philosophy. Here the attempts I will
consider explore the links between the notion of desert and
those of justice, fairness and equality. The concepts of
fairness and equality have been central to the desert
tradition, and it is thus with these that I shall begin.
The perplexing question which traditional retributivists
leave inadequately explained is why a morally autonomous
being of intrinsic worth who voluntarily causes the undue
suffering of another deserves a return of proportionate
suffering or even any suffering at all. By what 'mysterious
piece of moral alchemy' is it that we add suffering to
suffering and get a moral good?(See Hart, 1968: 234) To
answer this question, some contemporary retributivists
emply a so-called 'reciprocity theory', (See Falls, 1987:
26) or 'Fair Play Theory' . (See Cottingham, 1979: 242-3)
Their interpretation of retribution as reciprocity or fair
play essentially maintains that a return of proportionate
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suffering is justified as a way of establishing equal
liberty and autonomy and thus the fair sharing of the
burdens and benefits of law.
The reciprocity theory starts with the uncontroversial
observation that the very existence of a certain social
norm or rule of game (which may be called law) constitutes
both a benefit and a burden for us all. Its prohibitions
against certain kinds of interference in our lives benefit
each, but only as long as each in turn accepts the burden
of refraining from interfering in the proscribed way when
the desire strikes. To this empirical description, the
theory adds the moral claim that fairness, not utility,
demands 'reciprocity': that those who have benefited from
the submission of others to the law should shoulder a
'comparable burden' in return, or that there must be an
'equilibrium of burdens and benefits'. Criminals upset the
balance and gain an 'unfair advantage' or 'profit' . (Falls,
1987: 27; The words 'reciprocity' and 'comparable burden'
are used by Jeffrie Murphy. 'Equilibrium of burdens and
benefits' is used by Herbert Morris. Morris uses 'unfair
advantage'; Murphy prefers 'unfair profit', see Morris,
1968: 475 or 1976:31-88; Murphy, "Kant's Theory of Criminal
Punishment" and "Marxism and Retribution", 1978: 82-92 and
93-115; see also similar accounts, with some variations,
advocated by John Finnis, George Sher, and Wojciech
Sadurski. Finnis, 1980: 263-4; Sher, 1987: Chap.5;
Sadurski, 1985: Chap.8)
This theory, so-called 'restorative retributivism', which
is run together with consensual, contractarian and like
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ideas, but clearly can be separated from them by involving
a certain equality, fairness, justice, rationality,
equilibrium, balance, reciprocity, debt-payment, or order,
is considered thereby to be improved.(See Honderich, 1984:
227)
To try to become clearer about this, we are invited to
consider the nature or function of the criminal law. The
reciprocity theory justifies the institution of punishment
in terms of the ideal of 'balance of benefits and
burdens'.(See Morris, 1968/ see also Sadurski, 1985: 47-59)
Criminal law is concerned with maintaining the equal
distribution of a specific set of benefits among the
members of the community: in particular, the benefits of
autonomy of action within a sphere which should be beyond
interference by others. The enjoyment of these benefits by
a person is correlated with another person's duty not to
interfere with the exercise of recognized rights to
autonomy. This is a prerequisite for the effective use of
an autonomy-right; it may be enjoyed only if others
restrict their activities. Those restraints that are
prerequisites for the effective use of benefits of autonomy
can be represented as burdens upon a person's life since
they cut off a number of options which would otherwise be
available to this person.
From this fundamental premise of equal enjoyment of
autonomy-right, harm inflicted on a victim by an offender
is regarded as constituting the limitation of the victim's
use of his rights. By infringing those rights, the offender
intrudes upon the enjoyment of his victim's autonomy and
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thereby oversteps the bounds of his own sphere of autonomy
in such a way as to limit his victim's autonomy. As a
result, the equal distribution of benefits secured by the
criminal law has undergone a change: the legally recognized
frontiers between any two person's spheres of autonomy are
moved to the victim's detriment. The status quo ante with
respect to the initial balance of benefits and burdens is
upset since the offender has arrogated to himself part of
his victim's sphere of autonomy and he has renounced some
of his own burdens: namely, the burdens of self-restraint.
Then, it is to be argued that this disrupted initial
balance can only be restored by a relocation of burdens. If
an offender has renounced some of his fair package of
burdens, the balance will be restored when he suffers more
burdens than would be normally required to safeguard the
enjoyment of rights by other people. Just as with the
allocation of benefits under distributive justice, where
additional rewards correspond to desert, so in the case of
punishments the burdens inflicted by a society correspond
to the degree of illegitimate benefits gained by the
offender. It is a redistribution after the wrongful
distribution of benefits of autonomy and correlated burdens
of self-restraint has taken place.(See Sadurski, 1989: 357)
VI. 2. Criticisms.
In the light of the above understandings of the
reciprocity theory, let us examine the merits and demerits
of the theory. I shall consider some objections to the
reciprocity theory as a vehicle for clarifying the
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connection between fairness and retributive desert. Most of
the criticisms of reciprocity theory have been aimed at
showing that neither law-abiding behaviour, nor criminal
action, fits the description in terms of 'benefits' and
'burdens', i.e. that law-abiding conduct is not necessarily
burdensome, nor is criminal invasion of other people's
rights necessarily beneficial to the offender.
(i) In an interesting essay, "Do the Guilty Deserve
Punishment?", Richard W. Burgh discusses the retributive
theory and has serious reservations about its ability to
capture our intuitions either about who deserves punishment
or about how much punishment various wrongdoers
deserve.(See his essay 1982: 193-213)
Burgh's first objection concerns the premise that the
wrongdoer gains an unfair advantage by benefiting twice. It
may seem obvious initially that any wrongdoer does benefit
once from the self-restraint of others and a second time
from his own lack of self-restraint. (For this point, see
Sher, 1987: 78)
However, as Burgh notes, this premise seems to fail
whenever the wrongdoer lacks the capacity to be interfered
with as he has interfered with his victim. It fails, for
example, in cases of rape, since (for all practical
purposes) women cannot rape men. It also fails in cases of
embezzlement, since the sphere of noninterference which
laws against embezzlement define protects only those who
have assets that can be embezzled. (See Burgh, 1982: 205)
Yet clearly the fact that an embezzler happens not to be in
a position to be embezzled from should be irrelevant to the
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question of whether he deserves punishment. But if we
understood Burgh's assertion as we follow his argument,
then the rapist and embezzler have not benefited from the
restraint of others as well as from their own wrongdoing
because they cannot be interfered with as they have
interfered with their victims. Hence, we seem unable to
construe their punishment as cancelling their unfair
additional advantage.
This argument however, as George Sher contends, proceeds
too quickly. Even if the rapist cannot be raped or the
embezzler embezzled from, they may have benefited from
their victim's and other persons' restraint in not harming
them in closely related ways. In particular, the rapist may
have benefited by not being physically assaulted, and the
embezzler by not being defrauded. (See Sher, 1987: 79) In
Burgh's own words, they have still obtained "a second-order
set of benefits, namely, those received from obedience to
law in general".(Burgh, 1982: 206)
If Burgh acknowledges that the rapist and embezzler have
benefited from others generally restraining themselves from
wrongdoing, why does he still deny that these individuals
deserve punishment according to the benefits-and-burdens
account? Burgh's second argument is that appeals to
generalized benefits are regarded as illegitimate. To make
such an appeal, he argues, is to imply that all wrongdoers
have received the same benefits, and, hence, "that all
offenders are, regardless of the offense they committed,
deserving of the same punishment."(Ibid.) In view of this,
Burgh maintains that any appeal to generalized benefits
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would fail to capture the intuition that different
transgressions call for different penalties.
This argument is mistaken. As we can see in Sher's
rebuttal, the benefits-and-burdens account regards
punishment as justified not merely by the wrongdoer's
receiving the benefits of other's self-restraint, but by
his having these benefits plus the benefit of his own lack
of self-restraint. Moreover, even if wrongdoers do all
receive the same amount of benefit from the self-restraint
of others, they can be expected to get differing amounts of
excess benefit from their own transgressions. Since it is
the latter excess that punishment seeks to remove, the
amount of punishment needed to remove it can be expected to
vary as well.(See Sher, 1987: 80)
This response seems to dispose of the worry that not all
wrongdoers receive a double benefit. However, in doing so,
it raises a further question. How does the benefits-and
burdens account equate amounts of punishment deserved with
amounts of excess benefit received?: how are these excess
benefits to be measured? According to Morris's account of
the reciprocity theory which stresses on a benefit and
burden of self-restraint by the law-abiding citizens, It is
tempting to say that the wrongdoer's excess benefit is
just the amount of extra freedom he has secured by
transgressing. But this merely defers the difficulty, for
we now need to know what determines the extra freedom
gained.
Here Burgh's third argument is that the most natural
measure of a wrongdoer's extra freedom is the strength of
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the inclination he has refrained from inhibiting. His
argument goes as follows: "The stronger the inclination,
the greater the burden one undertakes in obeying the law.
Hence, if the strength of the inclination to commit one
crime is stronger than another, a greater advantage will
be derived from committing that crime."(Burgh, 1982: 209)
But this produces a serious problem. If the benefits of
wrongdoing are measured by the inclinations that
wrongdoers fail to inhibit, then the amounts of punishment
that wrongdoers deserve will also be measured in this way.
Thus, since "most have a greater inclination to cheat [on
income taxes] than they ever have to murder, " (Ibid.) the
punishment that tax evaders deserve must be greater than
the punishment that is deserved for murder. However,
intuitively, the murderer surely deserves the harsher
penalty. We must accept that the strength of one's
inclination to transgress cannot be what determines the
amount of extra benefit one receives from transgressing.
But even though we endorse our intuition that the
murderer and the tax evader deserve different amounts of
punishment, we still need an answer as to what would be a
plausible criterion of degree of benefit vis-a-vis burden.
Intuitively, our belief that these persons deserve
different amounts of punishment has little to do with any
empirically discoverable differences between them.
Instead, as Sher argues, the crucial difference appears to
be moral.(Sher, 1987: 81) If we believe that the murderer
deserves a harsher punishment, it is surely because we
regard murder as by far the more seriously wrong act. But
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if so, then the most natural candidate for what determines
the murderer's degree of extra benefit is precisely the
strength of the moral prohibition he has violated. By this
criterion, the reason he has benefited more is not that he
has indulged a stronger inclination, nor yet that he has
received greater financial or psychic rewards. It is,
instead, that he has violated a moral prohibition of far
greater seriousness.(See ibid.)
It is plausible, thus, that by equating a wrongdoer's
degree of benefit with his act's degree of wrongness (or,
his moral culpability), we can resolve the problem of
proportionality. Here the central requirement of the matter
is that the proportion must be between the seriousness (or
gravity) of the offense on the one side, which includes not
just the harm caused but also the culpability of the
offender, and on the other side the severity of the
punishment.(See Galligan, 1981: 164) Based on this
interpretation of the problem of proportionality, I shall
discuss the issue of measuring the just deserts in detail
in a later stage.(See Chapter 5, IV.)
(ii) In her interesting essay on 'the moral
accountability theory', M. Margaret Falls criticizes the
reciprocity theory of punishment by pointing out its
incompatibility with a moral tradition which postulates
that "willing the moral good is the highest human good and
therefore in doing evil one harms oneself rather than
profits."(See Falls, 1987: 30-1) This tradition, which
Falls endorses, and which she derives from Kantian moral
teaching, must undermine the view that it is punishment's
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aim to re-establish the equilibrium of benefits and
burdens, since if "doing evil harms the evildoer" then the
"burden of obedience [to law], if accepted, is actually a
benefit", hence "there is no profit for punishment to
remove."(Ibid. 31)
M. M. Falls's criticism seems plausible since we can
agree with a view that human living, disciplining oneself
for the sake of education and enlightenment is a burden
well worth taking on, and people who accept that burden are
'better off' than those who cast it. But, upon scrutiny,
her criticism is mistaken. The meaning of words
'advantage', 'gain', 'benefit', or 'profit' used in the
reciprocity theory is not necessarily a value-oriented one
with some ethical connotations, but rather a value-neutral
one which can be usefully employed for describing a
relationship between a wrongdoer and a law-abiding citizen
in our ordinary social life. ( See Joel Feinberg's usage of
'profit': "When a remorselessly wicked person appears to be
flourishing, and there appear to be no reasons to suppose
he is not, then I 'assume' that he is indeed profiting from
his wickedness, and try to fashion my theory of harm and
benefit to save the appearances.", in 1984: 67) By
contrast, M. M. Falls's usage of the words is a
value-oriented one since she tries to equate 'benefit' or
'advantage' to the 'moral good'. Her insistence on the
usage of words 'benefit' only in the context of furthering
of the moral good can be understandable from a stance such
as that we prescribe our moral life. But the usage of words
we employ in the reciprocity theory is not so much a
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prescriptive one as a descriptive one defining our social
behavior.
(iii) But given that the reciprocity theory establishes
the case for restoring the social equilibrium of benefits
and burdens by removing the unfair benefits of offenders,
why is it that these forms of punishment can remove the
unfair benefits? As D. J. Galligan points out, this theory
"requires at most that the offender be singled out,
condemned and subjected to some form of disadvantage; but
just what manner and form the disadvantage must take is
left open".(Galligan, 1981: 158) Here the reciprocity
theory needs some help from external considerations before
it can provide a full justification of punishment. (For this
point, see Ten, 1987: 59)
The appeal to external considerations is recognized by
John Finnis when he argues that the restoration of fairness
in distribution via punishment is not the only component of
the social good, and so need not be pursued regardless of
consequences.(See Finnis, 1971-2: 135) But if consequential
considerations of this sort enter into the final decision
as to whether punishment should be inflicted, then these
considerations form part of the complete theory of
punishment.(See Ten, 1987: 59)
John Deigh also points out, in the course of discussing
J. E. McTaggart's view concerning the plausibility of the
Hegelian reform theory of punishment,(See McTaggart, 1896:
479-502) the deficiency of the reciprocity theory by saying
that a punishment benefits its criminal recipients.(See
Deigh, 1984: 191-211, especially 202) According to Deigh's
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view, punishment renders a benefit to the criminal by
providing him with the means necessary for his moral
regeneration and expiation, by facilitating reconciliation,
a renewal of good relations and by relieving the weight of
one's guilt and quieting one's conscience.(Ibid. 203) I
think this consideration for the justification of
punishment is an illuminating and a convincing element for
complementing the simple version of the reciprocity theory
and it needs a further exploration. I shall consider this
line of thought later when I discuss teleological
retributivism.
(iv) There is a more general problem about the
application of the reciprocity theory to society in real
worlds which deviate in varying degrees from the ideal of
a just society. In other words, as Sadurski says, perhaps
the most serious argument against the reciprocity theory as
described here is that it ignores (or, even worse,
rationalizes) socio-economic inequalities and the role of
law in maintaining and perpetuating these inequalities.
(See Sadurski, 1989: 365-6)
If punishment indeed aims at restoring the balance of
benefits and burdens, it is argued, for example, by Jeffrie
G. Murphy, that it should take into account not only the
redistribution of benefits and burdens resulting from the
crime, but also the disequilibrium before the crime. To
represent punishment as restoring the social equilibrium
of benefits and burdens is to seriously believe that in a
real life such a balance exists; in this way, this theory
could be seen as a device of ideological distortion or of
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justification of social inequalities. (See Murphy, 1973: 233
and 237-42; see also Hugo A. Bedau, 1978: 617)
So if criminals were all the victims of a broader social
injustice in the distribution of society's resources, and
the victims of crime were all the beneficiaries of the
injustice, then the reciprocity theory would have no
application. But the situation is in fact more complex. As
Sadurski maintains, the above objection to the reciprocity
theory is based on the misunderstanding that it identifies
the 'benefits' with the material privileges rather than
with autonomy of unrestrained action, and 'burdens' with
material deprivation, rather than with
self-restraint.(Sadurski, 1989: 365-6) Also an empirical
observation as C. L. Ten describes tells us that many of
the victims of crime come from the same economically and
socially deprived groups as those who offend against them
and there is also a substantial number of offenders who
belong to the favoured groups in society. (See Ten, 1987:
64) Thus we can still argue that even in societies in which
the distribution of benefits and burdens is quite unfair,
the thesis that crime involves the taking of an unfair
advantage from law-abiding citizens still has an
explicatory force. Of course the problems of general social
justice cannot be solved by punishment alone, leaving the
distribution of socio-economic goods to other instruments
of social regulation (viz, distributive justice according
to deserts and basic needs).
VII. Summary.
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So far I have discussed retributive theories for the
justification of punishment. My discussion has centered on
the notion of just deserts for the justificatory account of
retributive punishment. At first, the notion of retributive
desert was examined as a non-comparative one in the theory
of intrinsic retributivism. Our intuition gives, as we have
examined, a prima facie probative force to the retributive
justification of punishment, though not a conclusive one.
Thus we have investigated various sophisticated versions of
the comparative conception of retributive desert for a more
substantial and conclusive justification of punishment. The
consensual theory and the contractarian theory we discussed
in this context are not desert-based theories but are
theories employed for an essentially retributive
justification.
In addition to intrinsic retributivism, The ideal,
impartial spectator theory and the reciprocity theory have
respectively, though each on a different level, namely, one
on the sentimental basis, and the other one on a rational
basis, provided a plausible account for the retributive
justification of punishment. Particularly, the reciprocity
theory gives us a plausible account of the fundamental
principles of retributive punishment, that is, the
principles of just deserts, responsibility, and
proportionality. However, we also discovered some
deficiencies in the retributive theories described so far
in that they need external considerations for a conclusive
and satisfactory explication of what is a justified
punishment. We need to examine the expressive and
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communicative function of punishment which is an inherent
element of every punishing activity, designed to give some
symbolic messages to the criminals as moral agents as well
as to the victims and the society in general. Further, with
this communicative function, punishment is required to
serve some teleological ideas, namely, moral regeneration
and expiation of the criminal, and facilitating a
reconciliation between the criminal and society. I shall
consider these points in turn in the chapter on
teleological retributivism.(See Chapter 5, II and III)
Before doing so, I shall examine utilitarian theories
briefly in order to develop an understanding of what
similarities and differences obtain between the typical
utilitarian justifications and the teleological
considerations which are employed in my account of
teleological retributivism.
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CHAPTER 4. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
I. Utilitarian Theories and Consequentialist Punishment.
In view of some difficulties with the backward-looking
retributive theories, it now seems appropriate to turn to
the opposed tradition of consequentialist argument to see
whether it can provide a more convincing rationale for
institutions and acts of punishment. For if we were really
to believe that punishment did nothing other than to
restore a social equilibrium: if it had no other good
consequences whatsoever, would we really be prepared to
support it as a social practice, whatever our accustomed
attitudes and discourses of praising and blaming?
The forward-looking utilitarian theory of punishment
emphasizes its beneficial consequences, in the sense that
both the general justifying aim of punishment and criteria
of penalty-fixing are grounded in the value of the
predicted consequences of punishment. Utilitarians claim
that an appropriate punishment should serve four main
purposes: it should deter others who might commit a crime,
it should deter the offender from repeating offences, it
should reform or rehabilitate the offender himself and it
should protect society at large from people who are likely
to commit further crimes. Why and how does an appropriate
punishment bring forth beneficial consequences? Let us
examime utilitarians' main account in more detail.(See
Greenawalt, 1983: 351-2)
(i) General deterrence. Knowledge that punishment will
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follow crime deters people from committing crimes, thus
reducing future violations of rights and the unhappiness
and insecurity they would cause. The person who has already
committed a crime cannot, of course, be deterred from
committing that crime, but his punishment may help to deter
others. Utilitarians normally view that general deterrence
is very much a matter of affording rational self-interested
persons good reasons not to commit crimes. With a properly
developed penal code, the benefits to be gained from
criminal activity would be outweighed by the harms of
punishment, even when those harms were discounted by the
probability of avoiding detection. Accordingly, the greater
the temptation to commit a particular crime and the smaller
the chance of detection, the more severe the penalty should
be.
(ii) Individual deterrence. The actual imposition of
punishment creates fear in the offender that if he repeats
his act, he will be punished again. Adults are more able
than small children to draw conclusions from the punishment
of others, but having a harm befall oneself is almost
always a sharper lesson than seeing the same harm occur to
others. To deter an offender from repeating his actions, a
penalty should be severe enough to outweigh in his mind the
benefits of the crime. For the utilitarian, more severe
punishment of repeat offenders is warranted partly because
the first penalty has shown itself ineffective from the
standpoint of individual deterrence.
(iii) Incapacitation. Imprisonment puts convicted
criminals out of general circulation temporarily, and the
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death penalty does so permanently. These punishments
physically prevent persons of dangerous disposition from
acting upon their destructive tendencies.
(iv) Reform. Punishment may help to reform the criminal
so that his wish to commit crimes will be lessened, and
perhaps so that he can be a happier, more useful person.
Conviction and simple imposition of a penalty might
themselves be thought to contribute to reform if they help
an offender become aware that he has acted wrongly.
However, reform is usually conceived as involving more
positive steps to alter basic character or improve skills,
in order to make offenders less antisocial. Various
psychological therapies, and more drastic intervention such
as psycho-surgery, are designed to curb destructive
tendencies. Educational and training programs can render
legitimate employment a more attractive alternative to
criminal endeavours. They may indirectly help enhance self-
respect, but their primary purpose is to alter the options
that the released convict will face.
The above four beneficial consequences are identified by
utilitarians as the main justifying aims of punishment.
Thus, criminal punishment is justified because, and in so
far as, its good effects outweigh the sufferings of the
convicted person.
The earliest paragon of this view is Jeremy Bentham who
puts the matter in the following fashion:
The general object which all laws have, or ought to
have in common, is to augment the total happiness of
the community; and therefore, in the first place, to
exclude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to
subtract from that happiness: in other words, to
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exclude mischief... But all punishment is mischief: all
punishment is in itself evil. Upon the principle of
utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought
only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude
some greater evil.(An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, edited by J. H. Burns and H. L.
A. Hart, 1982: Chap.XIII, 158)
Punishment serves to 'exclude some greater evil' when by
the working of deterrence, reform and incapacitation, the
misery and insecurity created by crime is reduced. It may
be objected that reform and deterrence effects of
punishment have been exaggerated. Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to suppose that some criminals, when punished,
do not repeat an offence and that the threat of punishment
stays the hands of some persons tempted to crime. In such
cases, if punishment, as compared to other alternatives,
e.g., psychiatric treatment, has maximum utility, the
utilitarian is obligated by his views to endorse
punishment.
We may find the rationale of this argument in the
following features of utilitarianism. First, utilitarianism
is regarded as the theory of individual prudential
rationality as the framework for rational social choice.
Just as the individual agent can discount various present
satisfactions in favour of future well-being, so it is
argued that the utilitarian legislator or the impartial
spectator can discount the interests of some individuals in
favour of the interests of others. (For this point, see
Rawls, 1971: 28) Secondly, utilitarianism is structurally
a monistic theory: that is, it claims that there is only
one morally relevant property, happiness, and only one
basic moral principle to maximize happiness. Thirdly, It is
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also a consequentialist theory: it judges the Tightness or
wrongness of an action purely by its consequences; the
right action is the one which has better consequences, in
terms of human happiness, than any of the alternatives.
However, there is an immediate criticism of the
utilitarianism such as this: punishment which passes
utilitarian standards may be undeserved, hence unjust.(See,
for example, H. J. McCloskey, 1965: 239-55, in Ezorsky,
1972: 119-34) Indeed, as they see the matter, utilitarians
are committed to undeserved punishment of two sorts, legal
and illegal.
Consider a legal case first. Laws prescribing excessive
punishment, i.e. undeserved in light of the offence, may
also satisfy a utilitarian standard (e.g., deterrence).
Imagine a community where loitering is so widespread as to
be a public nuisance. A law is enacted prescribing one year
in prison for loitering. It might very well be the case
that only one person would be punished under this law. The
threat of such severe punishment, reinforced by infliction
on one offender, is sufficient to deter all other potential
offenders. The good utilitarian effects of the law may very
well outweigh the bad ones. But a one year jail sentence
for loitering is certainly undeserved, hence unjust.(See
Ezorsky, 1972b: xv)
Utilitarians, it may be argued, are also committed to
undeserved punishment which is illegal. Let us suppose that
there has been a wave of vicious crimes, and the police are
unable to find the culprit. Since no one is punished for
these offenses, the deterrent threat of punishment becomes
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increasingly ineffective, and more persons are tempted into
committing the crime. To frame and punish an innocent
person for these offences may reinforce the deterrent
threat of punishment. A few such scapegoat punishments
might avert great harm and be worth while for their
utility. This point is precisely the target against which
the strongest criticism of utilitarianism has been raised.
The criticism is that it is wrong that punishment should be
motivated by a social utility alone: whatever is done to
individuals should be primarily concerned with them as ends
in themselves: should treat them as autonomous moral agents
who have chosen their actions. Another reason for the
criticism is that victimizing an innocent is treating him
in a way that he does not deserve.
Perhaps the feature of utilitarianism which generates
the most antagonism among its opponents is its
consequentialism. The guiding principle of consequentialism
appears to be the dictum that the end justifies the means.
Any action, including disloyalty, lying, cheating and even
murder is permissible, indeed obligatory, if it needs to be
done to achieve some good result and if the good achieved
in the end outweighs the harm done on the way. What matters
is not how the good result is brought about, or who brings
it about, but simply that it is brought about.
Here, consequentialism is only concerned with securing
the best outcome overall in a given situation, and this may
mean doing something quite horrible. If the only way to
prevent ten murders is to commit one yourself, then
utilitarianism would appear to require that you do just
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that. Or suppose that your country is waging a just war,
and that an enemy agent you have captured tells you that he
has planted a bomb in an area crowded with civilians and
that, unless defused, it will soon go off, killing many
people. Suppose that there is not enough time to conduct a
general search for the bomb, and that all of your attempts
to get the agent to reveal its location are unsuccessful.
Suppose, however, that you have captured him with his
family, and that by torturing his small child in front of
him you could eventually destroy his resolve and get him to
give you the information. Utilitarianism seems to imply not
only that you may but you must torture the child. These
implications and others like them strike many people as
entirely unacceptable.
In these days, one strong standard criticism of
utilitarian theory is that it cannot provide an adequate
account of individual rights, and therefore fails to accord
due respect to persons. Particularly, contemporary right-
based theorists argue that individual agents are unique
autonomous sources of value which cannot be discounted
against one another. Underlying this argument is an
intuitive belief in the moral priority of persons and their
rights over any conception of social welfare or well-being.
Consequently, they argue that utilitarianism cannot make
sense of distributive justice because it is concerned with
maximizing overall benefits irrespective of how they are
distributed.
What then does this contemporary criticism of
utilitarianism, that it ignores the moral importance of the
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separateness of individuals, mean? The first important
account may be cited from Hart's summary as follows:
Maximizing utilitarianism, if it is not restrained by
distinct distributive principles, proceeds on a false
analogy between the way in which it is rational for a
single prudent individual to order his life and the way
in which it is rational for a whole community to order
its life through government. The analogy is this: it is
rational for one man as a single individual to sacrifice
a present satisfaction or pleasure for a greater
satisfaction later, even if we discount somewhat the
value of the later satisfaction because of its
uncertainty. Such sacrifices are amongst the the most
elementary requirements of prudence and are commonly
accepted as a virtue, and indeed a paradigm of practical
rationality, and, of course, any form of saving is an
example of this form of rationality. In its misleading
analogy with an individual's prudence, maximizing
utilitarianism not merely treats one person's pleasure as
replaceable by some greater pleasure of that same person,
as prudence requires, but it also treats the pleasure or
happiness of one individual as similarly replaceable
without limit by the greater pleasure of other
individuals. So in these ways it treats the division
between persons as of no more moral significance than the
division between times which separates one individual's
ealier pleasure from his later pleasure, as if
individuals were mere parts of a single persisting
entity. (1983: 201-2)
The main opposition to this line of thought of
utilitarianism is provided by theories which are pluralist
and non-consequentialist in structure. The pluralists
believe that more than one property is morally relevant.
Traditionally, they also hold that there are a number of
moral principles which are independent of each other and
cannot be reduced to, or derived from, one basic principle.
Examples from our ordinary moral thought would include
'Don't tell lies'; 'Don't steal'; 'Keep your promises'; 'Be
fair'. According to the pluralists such principles can
stand on their own feet and do not need to be backed up by
appeal to the basic utilitarian principle. They may also
hold that there is a plurality of values. Beauty, truth,
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justice, for example, may be among the things we value,
even when the pursuit of them does not necessarily maximize
human happiness. (For this point, see McNaughton, 1988: 165)
Here, this opposition to utilitarianism may be called
agent-centered moralities. On such account the primary
responsibility of each agent is to ensure that his own
actions do not fall below certain moral standards, nor
breach particular obligations he has to a specific person
or group of people, even if he knows that the consequences
will be worse if he refuses to compromise his principles.
The second influential objection to utilitarianism can be
found in Rawls's account in his later writings. Rawls
argues that utilitarianism gives no direct weight to
considerations of justice or fairness in the distribution
of goods. Provided that net aggregate satisfaction is
maximized, utilitarianism is indifferent as to how
satisfactions and dissatisfactions are distributed among
distinct individuals. So if overall satisfaction will be
maximized under an arrangement in which goods and resources
are channelled to people whose circumstances are already
comfortable, while other people are allowed to languish in
abject poverty, then that arrangement is precisely the one
that utilitarianism will recommend. Or if the total
happiness can be maximally increased by denying freedom to
a few, then that again is what utilitarianism will
require.(See 1971: 22-7)
The third objection claims that utilitarianism is an
excessively demanding moral theory, because it seems to
require that one neglect or abandon one's own pursuits
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whenever one could produce even slightly more good in some
other way. While most people would agree that morality may
sometimes require great sacrifices, many people would
regard as excessive the idea that one may never devote time
and energy to one's own pursuits unless there is no orher
way in which one could produce more good overall.(For this
point, see Scheffler, 1988: Introduction, 3-4)
Utilitarians, however, counter the criticisms by arguing
that, in order to avoid the difficulties encountered by
simple utilitarianism, it is not necessary to accept a
version of agent-centered morality. Those objections, they
say, can be accommodated within a broadly consequentialist
framework. Although there is disagreement among
utilitarians about how best to do this, the following
suggestions may be worthwhile noting.
First, R. M. Hare argues that adopting the theory of
ideal spectator as an analysis of the nature of the moral
point of view commits one to a particular moral theory -
namely utilitarianism.(See Hare, 1973, in Daniels, 1975:
94) I doubt this claim. But why is this? Here, the ideal
spectator theory aims to set a standard of correct judgment
by defining the right attitude as the one that would be
adopted by an ideal spectator. We have no idea what moral
judgments the ideal spectator would make until we have
given it content. The content may be provided by reflection
on what distinguishes a moral attitude from other kinds of
attitude. To adopt the moral point of view, it was
suggested, is to have a disinterested concern with the
welfare of all. The ideal spectator is thus sympathetic and
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impartial. He will also, it was argued, be a utilitarian.
His sympathy will lead him to desire people's happiness and
his impartiality will ensure that he is equally concerned
with the happiness of each. He will therefore approve most
of those actions which will bring the greatest possible
happiness to those affected by them. However, we would be
right to be sceptical about this quick argument. The
utilitarian is a monist and a consequentialist. But the
impartial sympathetic spectator need not adopt either of
those positions. It is simply question-begging to assume
that his concern or sympathy for the well-being of humans
would lead him to regard happiness as the only morally
relevant property. He might well think that other values,
such as justice, are important to human flourishing. Many
critics of utilitarianism have pointed out that we are not
only concerned with the amount of happiness but also with
its just distribution. The ideal spectator could prefer a
course of action which produced considerable happiness,
fairly distributed, to one which would produce slightly
more happiness, but at the expense of great unfairness in
the way it was shared out.(For this point, see McNaughton,
1988: 167)
Secondly, some utilitarians suggest ways to accommodate
distributive concerns in the evaluation of outcomes. They
acknowledge that to a large extent, utilitarianism's
vulnerability on the issue of distributive justice can be
attributed to the specific way in which it evaluates
outcomes. Given any two outcomes with different totals of
aggregate satisfaction, in other words, utilitarianism will
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always say that the outcome with the higher total is
better, even if satisfaction is distributed very unequally
in that outcome and much more equally in the other, and
even if the difference in total satisfaction between the
two outcomes is small. Contemporary utilitarians would
agree that this is an implausible way of evaluating
outcomes, but would insist that the natural solution is to
substitute a principle of evaluation that is more sensitive
to distributive concerns, rather than abandoning
consequentialism altogether. As Scanlon points out, there
are at least two ways to accommodate distributive concerns
in the evaluation of outcomes. One is by giving extra
weight to the interests of those who are worst off, so that
the satisfaction of their interests counts
disproportionately in determining what the best outcome
would be in any given situation. The other is by treating
distributive equality as a good in itself, which must be
considered along with factors like net aggregate
satisfaction in determining the value of an overall
outcome.(See 1988: 79-80 and 86) Though these approaches
seem to narrow the gap between consequentialism and agent-
centered morality and to represent a development within the
consequentialist thought that goes beyond the simplest
formulations of the view, however, they are thought to
constitute an intrinsically unstable compromise, which
tries to occupy an apparently non-existent middle ground
between the two seemingly incompatible moral theories.
Thirdly, other utilitarians, the so-called 'rule
utilitarians' take a different view. They say that, unless
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the result would be very bad, the right thing to do is to
continue to act in accordance with the relevant rules and
presumptions, even though this means doing less good than
one could in these cases. For, they argue, while
consequentialist reasoning determines what rules are
justified and what presumptions should be encouraged, these
rules and presumptions then take priority over case-by-case
consequential calculation in situations where they apply.
Scanlon argues that rights can best be understood on a
'two-tier' model of this kind.(See 1988: 82) However, here
we can raise the same doubt to this attempt of rule-
utilitarianism as that directed to the above-mentioned
second attempt. I shall deal with this rule-utilitarianism
later in more detail.(See Chapter 5, I.)
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of utilitarian
consequentialism, the appeal to it persists, largely
because the simple idea that derives its force from
individual's prudential rationality continues to seem so
plausible, and because the air of paradox surrounding
agent-centered moralities remains so difficult to dispel
convincingly. While agent-centered moralities have great
intuitive appeal when applied to particular cases, however
it also remains true that there are times when such
moralities forbid us to do as much good as we could, or to
prevent as much evil. Most starkly, it is perceived that
there are occasions when one must not violate an agent-
centered constraint even if that is the only way to prevent
more widespread violation of the very same constraint by
others. This apparent conflict between our moral intuition
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of agent-centered morality and a very natural and familiar
conception of rationality seems here to be exhibited.
Hence, this apparent conflict has led many philosophers
to conclude that the most defensible moral view is
probablly some modified form of consequentialism, or
reconciliation between the consequentialism and the agent-
centered morality.(e.g., Rawls and Hart, see Chapter 5, I.
Mixed Theories)
II. Expressive Theories and Teleological Communication.
A number of philosophers and legal scholars have pointed
out a fact about punishment that had not been sufficiently
appreciated by many traditional accounts, retributive,
utilitarian, or 'mixed'. The point is that evil inflicted
on the person punished is not an evil simpliciter, but
rather the expression of an important social message - that
punishment is a kind of language. (Igor Primoratz, 1989:
187)
That punishment has something to do with expressing
condemnation or denunciation of the offense by society has
been recognized by many authors. Accounts that point out
this dimension of punishment are termed 'expressive' or
'denunciatory' theories. (See Walker, 1980: 28-30) One can
analyze punishment as a practice that has this dimension,
and even present it as the essence of punishment, without
taking sides in the controversy about the moral
justification of punishment. In such a case we have a view
or account of punishment, but not a theory of punishment in
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the sense usually assumed in the debates on punishment in
moral and legal philosophy.(See, for example, Feinberg,
"The Expressive Function of Punishment," in his 1970:
chap.5)
But even if this expressive aspect of punishment is
brought up in the context of discussion of its moral basis,
there are two different ways in which this can be done. It
may be claimed that punishment is justified as the
expression of condemnation or denunciation, because that is
how it serves its social purpose; or that it is justified
as being in some way intrinsically right.
One could say, with J. F. Stephen, that society as a
matter of fact feels hatred and vengefulness towards the
offender, that this is 'a healthy natural sentiment', and
that it ought to be given a socially recognized and
regulated form in punishment rather than be left
unchannelled and likely to break out in various disruptive
ways. Or one could see this expression of condemnation of
the offence in the light of its contribution to the moral
education of society, as in A. C. Ewing's 'educative'
theory of punishment.(See Ewing, 1929: Chap.IV; see also
Hampton, 1984: 208-38) It could be claimed, with Durkheim,
that the expression of moral condemnation through
punishment serves to reinforce the 'collective
consciousness' of society. An offence is, first and
foremost, a violation of this consciousness; the latter
"would necessarily lose its energy, if an emotional
reaction of the community [i.e. punishment] did not come to
compensate its loss and [this] would result in a breakdown
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of social solidarity."(Durkheim, 1964: 108) Still another
possibility would be to suggest some combination of these
various uses of the expressive possibilities of punishment,
as in W. Moberly's account of 'punishment as symbol'.(See
Moberly, 1968: Chap.8) However, one could also put aside
all such forward-looking, utilitarian considerations, and
maintain that the expression of condemnation of the offence
in the form of punishment is intrinsically right and called
for. (For this point of 'intrinsic expressionism', see
Primoratz, 1989: 196; see also Primoratz, 1987: 217)
Recently the expressive theory of punishment has been
nicely reformulated by R. A. Duff. (See Duff, 1986: Chap.9)
According to his account, punishment can be viewed as a
communicative enterprise in which we engage with the
criminal. Punishment aims to express to him the
condemnation which his crime warrants; to communicate to
him a more adequate understanding of the nature and
implications of his crime - the injury he has done to
others and to himself; to persuade him to repent his crime,
and to accept his punishment as a penance through which he
can strengthen and express his repentant understanding and
restore himself to the community from which his crime
threatened to separate him. But to talk thus of punishment
as a reformative endeavour is not to suggest that it is a
contingently efficient means towards a further and
independently identifiable end: for the kind of reform at
which punishment aims can be achieved only through the kind
of suffering which punishment aims to impose on, or to
induce in, the criminal.(Ibid. 267 and 234)
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I think this version of the expressive function of
punishment can complement the simple version of reciprocity-
theory of retributivism and make it a comprehensive
account. Understanding punishment as a communicative
enterprise, although it is not an independently justifying
account, is not incompatible with the thesis that
punishment should be basically inflicted according to an
offender's deserts, and thus shall be taken as an integral
function of teleological retributive punishment.
However, here is one problem. If we suppose that
punishment has a part to play in moral education, what
distinguishes this role, and in what conditions can
punishment be expected to succeed in this? Several things
must not be the case. First, the offender should not
perceive his punishment simply as repayment, restitution,
or compensation. Second, the culprit should not see the
punishment simply as the expression of anger, which is a
disturbing transitory state that eventually gives way to
one of tranquility and amicability. And thirdly, the
punishee should not understand his punishment as an unjust
or improper penalty, thus as an undeserved treatment, which
might be entailed from an arbitrary infliction of
punishment violating the principle of proportionality.
As Elizabeth H. Wolgast points out, we come upon a
curious inversion here: when we try to convey the moral
message of punishment, the perspective of the one punished
appears more important than that of the punisher. The child
who is punished may sometimes grasp the intended message
and the parent who punishes may see that the child has
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understood, but even when the intentions of punishment are
clear, the interpretation is not under the control of the
punisher. It is not for the parent or other authority to
define the meaning of the message and determine how it will
be interpreted.(See Wolgast, 1987: 176)
What is involved when the punished child gets the moral
message right? Some features seem obvious. First, the child
who sees punishment as a kind of moral education already
sees the parent as a moral educator. He sees the parent as
having the status, as J. D. Mabbott might say, required to
punish.(See Mabbott, 1972: 167. Mabbott, however, restricts
the notion of 'status' to institutional contexts and
maintains that there is no such thing as punishment apart
from a system of institutional rules: "The only
justification for punishing any man is that he has broken
a law." 1972: 171-2) Parents are seen to have the authority
and responsibility to punish, much as a judge has the
authority and responsibility to sentence. Secondly, and
relatedly, the child sees himself as morally imperfect, as
capable of mistakes in judgement and in need of correction.
So that even though he does not understand why what he did
was wrong, he understands that he needs to learn why in
order to conduct himself more acceptably in the future. (For
these points, see Wolgast, 1987: 176-7) Here the precise
point to be made is that only the just punishment inflicted
by authority can convey a moral message to the punishee.
But on state-imposed punishments, Neil MacCormick argues
that they require a more complicated account, because the
state is an artificial rather than a natural person. Thus
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here, the interrelated acts of many individuals and groups
legislators, prosecutors, judges, juries, and other
officials - acting in their 'official' capacity in the
criminal process of the state are imputed to 'the state' as
its acts. (MacCormick, 1982: 32) Here, MacCormick gives the
following reason:
[While] many human minds and wills must collaborate
together in the criminal process, and the individual
persons concerned have doubtless varying personal
opinions upon moral and political questions, the acts of
all the disparate individuals involved in the process,
however, as organized activity, must cohere together
under common or interrelated norms of official conduct.
And the official conduct is directed by some supposed
common purpose and expressive of what would be a single
attitude were it possible for one individual to
accomplish all (as could the paterfamilias of old within
his own family) . (1982: 31-2)
MacCormick expounds the common purpose by asserting that
here the very facts which enable us to personify 'the
state' and conceive of it as a single acting subject are
the facts of coherently organized systems of action
involving many individual human beings exercising various
sorts of authority under law;, Then the purposes and
attitudes of the state are those postulated official
purposes and attitudes which make rational the interrelated
acts of officials - rational, because they can be
understood as subserving some reasonably coherent scheme of
values. (Ibid. 32; see also MacCormick, 1978: Chapt.7, on
the notion of coherence in the value expressed within a
legal system.) Here the scheme of values to be served by
state-imposed punishments is, I would propose, justice or
the common good.
However, as we have seen, the ability of punishment to
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carry a moral message depends on the attitude of the
punishee; it is thus a chancy kind of communication. The
message won't be understood any more than the explicit
message of a moral lecture, which might in any case be
substituted for it. Walter Moberly says that: "the proper
attitude towards flagrant wickedness is robust and
V
militant, we do not feel this of the misdemeanours of small
children, or of the feeble-minded, but... we feel it
especially of deeds of cruelty or heartlessness, for here,
most manifestly, the offender punished is reaping what he
himself has sown."(Moberly, 1968: 81-2) The hardened
criminal is the target of our fiercest condemnation.
Besides taking a retributive stance in punishing him, we
condemn him further by saying that he does not even mind
being wicked! But as E. H. Wolgast correctly points out,
that complaint tells a tale: if he lacks moral awareness,
then he is beyond our means to help him even while we
condemn and punish him. His position is little like that of
A
a creature from another country or another planet. Would we
punish such a creature, and if so, why? In the absence of
the offender's understanding, punishment lacks its moral
meaning, and thus lacks its important moral
justification.(Wolgast, 1987: 182-3)
An offender's moral understanding needs to be seen, then,
as an aspect of his membership in the community that he
offends. If he is to feel guilt and to see his punishment
as justified, he must see his actions from the viewpoint of
others, including those who are offended by them. Thus
taking punishment morally is linked to seeing oneself as a
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member in a community.(For a recent view of constructing
this kind of 'community conception' of punishment, see
Lacey, 1988: chapt.8)
Some writers on punishment might refuse to give this
linkage any importance. Mabbott, for example, writes: "I
have treated the whole set of circumstances as determined.
X is a citizen of a state. About his citizenship... I have
asked no questions. About the government, whether it is
good or bad, I do not enquire. X has broken a law.
Concerning the law, whether it is well-devised or not, I
have not asked. . . It is the essence of my position that
none of these questions is relevant. Punishment is a
corollary of lawbreaking by a member of the society whose
law is broken."(See Mabbott, 1972: 174) Mabbott thinks that
he has shown that punishment is justified solely by the
violation of some law that pertains to the lawbreaker. The
law itself, not membership in a community or a sense of it,
is correlated with punishment in its full sense.
However, as E. H. Wolgast convincingly argues, it is
evident that the law violated has its status as a law of a
community that includes the offender at the same time that
it punishes him. A wrongdoer is a part of a community, not
an enemy or adversary, and it is simply as a member that he
is punished. Mabbott should therefore think of the offender
as related not only to the law but to the law in virtue of
his membership in the community.(Wolgast, 1987: 184) But
here the questions to be answered further are: what is the
definition of community? And what are the proper contents
of moral communication for the sake of community-concerned
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justice and the common good? I shall deal with these points
later.(See Chapter 6, V. and Chapter 7, III.)
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CHAPTER 5. TELEOLOGICAL DESERT AND JUST PUNISHMENT
I. Mixed Theories.
Given the problems of retributive and utilitarian
theories in isolation, many theorists have sought to
produce satisfactory accounts of punishment through hybrid
theories which incorporate both types of argument, thus
abandoning the attempt to find a single satisfactory
principle. There are two basic models of compromise theory:
for the first, utilitarian arguments are the fundamental
part; for the second, the essence of the theory is a desert
principle.(For this point, see Lacey, 1988: 46) The first
type of theory essentially proceeds from the intuition that
without some good compensating effects we cannot justify
having institutions of punishment, but that we need to
supplement or restrain the basic utilitarian principle with
side-constraints in order to overcome utilitarianism's lack
of a convincing principle of distribution.
(i) Rule-Utilitarianism. An attempt at a synthetic theory
of punishment has been made in the context of developing
rule-utilitarianism. The rule-utilitarian theory of
punishment is meant to transcend the confrontation between
utilitarianism and retributivism by providing a synthesis
which is basically utilitarian, but makes room for
consideration of justice and desert as well.(For this
point, see Primoratz, 1987: 201) The most well-known
attempt is that of Rawls in his paper, "Two Concepts of
Rules."(Rawls, 1955: 3-13, in Acton, 1969: 105-14)
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Rawls distinguishes between, on the one hand, the
justification of a rule, or a practice consisting of a
system of rules, or an institution, and on the other hand,
the justification of a particular act falling under a rule
or practice or institution. An analogous distinction is
made, according to Rawls, between the roles pertaining to
these two levels: the role of the legislator, who sets up
the institution of punishment, guided by considerations of
social utility, and that of the judge, who applies the
rules of the institution to particular cases, giving
offenders punishments prescribed by law for their offences
and acquitting those proven innocent on the retributive
basis. Rawls thus reconciles the utilitarian theory with
the retributive theory by assigning them to different
levels of justification and thus avoiding conflicts
between them. Accordingly, this reconciliation is
basically utilitarian, with retributive considerations
being assigned a secondary, subordinate role.
Is this then, a successful synthesis of utilitarianism
and retributivism, and a plausible view of punishment? The
answer to this question will depend mainly on the capacity
of this theory consistently to rule out punishment of the
innocent and other kinds of unjust punishment. What reason
would this theory give for holding to the rule that only
the guilty are to be punished even in a case when the
utilitarian aim of the institution of punishment, the
prevention of crime, would be best served by making an
exception?
Rawls contends that a utilitarian justification of an
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institution for punishing the innocent whenever that is in
the best interest of society - he calls it 'telishment' -
is 'most unlikely' . (Ibid. 113) Why is it? For one thing,
because the dangers of abuse by the officials of the
institution would be great. This is not very convincing, as
Igor Primoratz points out, for there are hardly any
institutions which cannot be abused; we can assume, for
the sake of argument, that enough reliable, honest people
can be found to ensure that abuse is reduced to an
acceptable minimum.(See Primoratz, 1987: 203)
Rawls's second reason is that in a society which replaced
the institution of punishment as we know it by telishment,
the uncertainty as to whether people fined, put in prison,
or executed were punished or telished, and the
unpredictability of one's own fate, with all the
psychological and social repercussions of such a state of
affairs, would be just too high a price to pay.(Rawls,
1955, in Acton, 1969: 113) However, all this would not be
a consequence of the institution of telishment as such, but
of the public knowledge about it. As a matter of logic,
institutional rules have to be publicly known. Now this is
right in the sense that an institutional rule cannot be
private - known to one person only and secret with regard
to everyone else. But this is not to say that they have to
be public in the widest sense possible, that is, known to
the whole public at large. The rules of telishment could be
internal institutional rules - they could be known to the
officials of the institution, but not to the public. Then
those harmful consequences on which Rawls bases his claim
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that telishment could not have a utilitarian justification
would not be produced. However, the circumstances of
limited and internal institutional rules which might
provide for such justification of the rules of telishment
would be the same as those which make a particular act of
punishing an innocent man justified from the utilitarian
point of view. They would not be transient, but would have
a degree of permanence. Thus rule-utilitarianism does not
really effect a synthesis of the utilitarian and
retributive views of punishment; it does not really
integrate retributive considerations in such a way as to
avoid the commitment to socially expedient injustice in
punishment.(See Primoratz, 1987: 204)
(ii) Hart's Separate Questions. Hart argues that the
justification of punishment raises a number of different
issues, and any account which gives a single answer -
whether it be the pursuit of a single value or a plurality
of values - to a single question is inadequate. (Hart,
"Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment," in his
1968: 3) We have instead to look for different answers to
different questions. Hart distinguishes between three such
questions: first, what justifies the general practice of
punishment?; secondly, who may be punished?; thirdly, how
severely may we punish? The first question is about the
general justifying aim of punishment, while the second and
third questions are about its distribution which has two
aspects: (a) liability (who may be punished?) and (b)
amount (how severely may we punish?).(Ibid. 3-4 and 8-13)
Hart maintains that the general justifying aim of
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punishment is the utilitarian one of protecting society
from the harm caused by crime, and not the retributive aim
of inflicting pain on offenders who are morally guilty. But
he points out that the pursuit of the general justifying
aim has to be qualified by principles of justice which
restrict the application of punishment to only those who
have voluntarily broken the law.
Hart's views on punishment are rather similar to the
rule-utilitarian account espoused by Rawls. But Hart's
theory is different from Rawls's rule-utilitarianism which
tries to show that the punishment of the innocent is not
justified because the utilitarianly justified practice of
punishment prohibits such punishment. Rawls distinguishes
between different levels in a theory of punishment but
believes that ultimately punishment is justified in terms
of a single value, utilitarianism. Hart, on the other hand,
maintains that there are a number of different issues in
the justification of punishment, and there is no single
value which can properly account for all the features of
punishment that require justification. But Hart believes
that although the principles of justice are independent of
and sometimes conflicting with utilitarianism, their
restriction of punishment to those who have voluntarily
broken the law does not refute utilitarianism as the
general justifying aim of punishment.
However, Hart's theory of punishment is exposed to some
difficulties and objections. As C. L. Ten points out, the
promotion of utilitarian values as the general justifying
aim can come into conflict with the principle of justice in
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distribution, and if the constraint imposed by this
principle will have catastrophic results, then the
principle may have to be sacrificed to public utility. So
in extreme situations the theory allows for the possibility
of utilitarian considerations overriding the principles of
justice, and the scope of punishment will then be extended
to cover the punishment of those who have not voluntarily
broken the law. (Ten, 1987 : 84) Also as Alan H. Goldman
points out, the distinction in levels of justification
between the institution and specific acts within it is a
matter of degree (not a matter of separate property), since
when justifying an institution, one must consider acts
within it. (See Goldman, 1979: 42)
II. Teleological Retributivism.
The second type of mixed theory of punishment, with some
variations in content and meaning, may conveniently be
termed 'minimal retributivism',(See Golding, 1975: 100)
'weak retributivism',(See Lacey, 1988: 53-6) or
'teleological retributivism'.(See Ezorsky, 1972a: Chap.II;
Nozick, 1981: 372) This is the thesis which regards desert
of unpleasant treatment as a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for punishment: an offence provides the state
with a reason, but not a conclusive reason for the
infliction of punishment. This is also sometimes expressed
as the principle that offences give the state a prima facie
right to punish, but not a duty to do so. However, having
a prima facie right to do something is not in itself a
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sufficient reason for doing that thing; it can be overriden
by other reasons, most obviously by other right-based
arguments.
This weak retributivist argument is in a sense the
converse of Hart's compromise theory: the latter focuses on
a utilitarian rationale for the institution of punishment,
using the retributivist principle as a constraint upon the
pursuit of the utilitarian goal. The weak retributivist
view regards punishment in accordance with desert as the
central justifying factor, whilst requiring (at least on
some versions) a utilitarian justification for the
infliction of punishment in individual cases. Utilitarian
factors such as deterrence, reform, prevention and so on
thus can act as a limitation on the desert principle.
III. Teleological Desert Theory.
Now it is worthwhile to summarise my version of the
teleological retributive theory. The teleological
retributive theory employs the concept of desert itself as
a primary justifying rationale and the function of moral
communication, rather than the traditional utilitarian
purposes, as an inherent but a subordinate element of
punishment. A communicative component is a defining
characteristic of punishment and in part distinguishes it
from mere retaliation or acting out of revenge where the
goal of bringing about evil for another may achieve all
that one desires. (For this point, see Morris, 1981: 264)
Doing so will open the way to showing that the retributive
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desert principle implies the three sub-principles, namely,
desert, responsibility and proportionality. The moral
communication principle involves a teleological notion of
reforming the offender and reconciling, between the offender
and the society through a communicative act, and thus
functions as a limiting principle which limits the
application of the proportionality principle.
Accordingly the teleological retributive theory can be
clarified and worded as follows:(Compare with M. M. Falls's
'the moral accountability theory', see Falls, 1987: 41)
(1) In the first category as to the principle of
retributive desert:
(i) Punishment is justified if it is one's earned moral
desert. (Principle of Desert)
(ii) Punishment is one's earned moral desert if and
only if one has voluntarily done a wrong. (Principle
of Responsibility)
(iii) The severity of punishment that is one's earned
moral desert is the degree of severity proportionate
to that of the wrongdoing. (Principle of
Proportionality)
(2) In the second category as to the principle of moral
communication:
(iv) Punishment is justified if the one suffering it
remains capable of reflectively responding to the
treatment being received and the condemnation it
communicates. (Principle of Moral Communication)
The teleological retributive theory unqualifiedly
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prohibits torture and any other inhumane and cruel
punishment which makes a moral communication impossible.
(For this point, see Morris, 1981: 270) This is because in
order to be justified in accordance with the intrinsic
worth of persons, punishment must hold the criminal
responsible, and to hold the criminal truly responsible it
must demand and allow response as a moral agent. Thus, to
the list of three principles of retributive desert, a
fourth teleological principle of moral communication should
be added.(See and compare with M. M. Falls's theory, 1987:
47; From the principle of respect for persons, Falls
deploys a concept of 'unearned moral desert' of the same
import as the intrinsic worth of a moral agent. Although it
seems persuasive, I hesitate to extend the use of desert
with such a wide import, and instead follow the ordinary
usage. James Rachels explicitly discounts any desert save
earned desert in his article, 1978: 150-63)
The fourth principle does not contradict the
proportionality principle even though it significantly
limits its legitimate application. The proportionality
principle is solely about earned moral desert, and
according to it torture, death, whatever, may be the earned
moral desert of the most wicked. The fourth principle, the
limiting principle, says something to limit this, intending
the prohibition of torture and any other inhumane and cruel
punishment. It intends to say that whatever one's earned
moral deserts are, the state justifiably administers them
only if doing so serves rather than undermines the practice
of holding one responsible. If the earned moral deserts are
154
of such a kind or degree of severity as to violate the
limiting principle, then the only thing the state can
justifiably do is to approximate proportionality without
destroying the intrinsic worth of moral agency.
Thus far, my account of the teleological retributive
theory has consisted in an analysis of certain terms
revealing that autonomous moral agents of intrinsic worth
deserve to be held accountable by the state, and that the
state does this when it punishes in accordance with the
three retributive desert principles plus a fourth
teleological principle. In other words, punishment is
justified if and only if it is based on (1) the
principle of retributive desert and (2) the principle of
moral communication. In this account, the two principles -
each of those as a necessary condition - function jointly
as the necessary and sufficient conditions for a justified
(here in the sense of 'just') punishment. Hence this
account can be conveniently called a 'teleological desert
theory of punishment'.
Two recent writers have made interesting moves in this
direction, J. R. Lucas, who once argued that we must
understand punishment in essentially deterrent terms, now
wants to place more emphasis on its retributive,
communicative and penitential purposes.(Lucas, "Or Else"
for the earlier account; On Justice, 1980: Chap.6 for the
new account. For this point, see Duff, 1986: 235) Herbert
Morris, on the other hand, once argued that punishment
could restore an abstract and 'rule-established balance of
benefits and burdens', but could not restore those 'close
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relationships defined by feelings and attitudes' which are
essential to our personal and social lives, and which
wrongdoing disrupts. More recently, however, he has
canvassed a 'paternalistic theory of punishment' which,
based on retributivism with some form of utilitarianism,
stresses the idea of punishment as a complex communicative
act and makes a concern for the criminal's moral well-being
and for his relationships with his fellows, central to its
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account; and "A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment," for
the new account.)
IV. Just Desert and Principle of Proportionality.
IV.1. Measuring Just Deserts.
We accepted the principle of proportionality for
measuring just deserts. That principle requires the
severity of punishments to be in proportion to the
seriousness of crimes. As punishments usually consist of
imprisonment, it seems to be easy to measure a
proportional punishment by length of time incarcerated
according to the seriousness of crimes. There is, however,
no definite demarcation test, to give a yes or no choice
between those who are incarcerated and those who are not
but given probation, suspended sentence, or some other
non-custodial penalty.
The first approach to the principle of proportionality is
to understand whether this is identical with the principle
of equality or equivalence, and if not, how it differs from
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the latter. With a method of comparison between good or bad
desert and counterpoising reward or punishment, it seems
initially appropriate to employ the principle that crime
and punishment should be equal or equivalent. Many of those
who support capital punishment for murder would invoke this
principle of equality or equivalence, namely, the Kantian
version of the lex talionis: an eye for an eye, a tooth for
a tooth, and a life for a life. With the Kantian equality
principle, however, in is often impossible Lc determine a
punishment equal to a crime. Although capital punishment
might be equal to murder, what punishment would be equal to
rape? How can we punish a kidnapper according to the lex
talionis, if he has no children of his own? Thus the
Kantian principle of equality should not be understood in
the letter but in the other way - only in the spirit. In
that spirit, Kant actually recommended castration as the
appropriate punishment for rape.(Kant, The Metaphysical
Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd, 1965: 132-3) Then,
Kant's principle might better be called one of equivalence.
Yet, one needs some basis for determining when a punishment
would be equivalent to the wrong done.
One way of ensuring the equivalence is to repeat what the
offender has done with the roles reversed. Just as one can
repay the borrowed sugar by returning something else deemed
to be equivalent, so too it might be thought that
punishment gives offenders their just deserts if it
inflicts on them the degree of suffering which is judged to
be equivalent to the suffering caused by their respective
crimes. Interpreted in this manner, as C. L. Ten points
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out, the principle resembles the utilitarian doctrine in
some respects in that it reduces both the crime and the
punishment to a common denominator, the suffering caused,
against which they may be compared. (Ten, 1987: 153) But it
differs from utilitarianism in insisting that the
punishment must be equivalent to the crime irrespective of
the consequences produced by such equivalence. So even when
a lesser punishment will serve to reduce crime more
effectively thcui ct yrectLei punishment, the latter is still
to be meted out if it is the deserved or equivalent
punishment.
This view of measuring just deserts is deficient and thus
unacceptable since the principle that crime and punishment
should be equivalent, like the lex talionis, focuses on the
harm or suffering caused by the crime, and ignores the
mental state of the offender. But any attempt to remedy the
principle by taking account of the offender's culpability
will destroy the principle. For now the common denominator
of suffering caused is not the only relevant
consideration. Suffering caused by deliberate acts calls
for greater punishment than the same suffering caused by
merely negligent acts. Here we need to examine the
principle of proportionality which has been designed to
solve this problem by combining both elements, namely, harm
and mens rea. Then what is the principle of
proportionality? A simpler version of the principle of
proportionality can be interpreted as a method that we are
able (i) to compare different offences in respect of their
relative gravity, and (ii) to compare different penalties
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in respect of their relative unpleasantness - and surely we
can presume to make such comparisons in many, if not all,
cases.
IV. 2. Two Scales in the Principle of Proportionality.
Most contemporary retributivists settle for the
proportionality principle that the amount of punishment
should be proportionate to the moral seriousness or moral
gravity of offences, with the more serious offences being
punished more severely than the less serious. The
application of the proportionality principle involves
constructing two ordinal scales, one of punishments and
the other of crimes. Punishments are ranked in order of
severity, and crimes are ranked in order of moral
seriousness. The most severe punishment on the scale is
reserved for the most serious offence, the next most severe
punishment for the second most serious offence, and so on.
In general the ranking of punishments in order of severity
seems relatively easy compared with the assessment of the
relative moral gravity of offences.
Although there are no clear-cut ways to rank crimes,
according to the retributivist, two irreducible and
incommensurable factors appear to be involved in
determining the seriousness of criminal conduct: the harm
and the mental element. Mental states can be ranked in
declining order as purposely, knowingly, recklessly,
negligently, and none of them (strict liablity) . The
ranking of mental states, from least to greatest
culpability, can be illustrated by the following examples
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of automobile driving resulting in death. Strict liability:
X is carefully driving down the road, just having had his
car repaired and safety inspected, when a pot hole covered
by snow causes a nondefective tire to blow causing the car
to slide uncontrollably into and killing a pedestrian
walking along the edge of the highway. Negligently: X
forgets to have a safety inspection and his brakes fail at
a traffic light resulting in his running down a pedestrian
crossing with the light. Recklessly: X knew his brakes
were defective and drove anyway, resulting in a fatal
accident as for negligence. Knowingly: X is driving away
from a bank robbery when a police officer steps into the
road, and X runs the officer down without any attempt to
avoid doing so.(Reckless drivers do attempt to avoid
hitting people when the risk materializes.) Purposely: as
in television detective shows, X swerves onto the sidewalk
to run down his worst enemy. As one goes from strict
liability to purposefulness, X poses more of a threat to
security - from doing everything possible to avoid harm to
deliberately causing it.
The ranking of harms, on the other hand, is not easy. The
death of a person is worse than loss of a hundred pounds,
but is it worse than a violent rape not resulting in death?
A controversy would arise: many people would agree because
of the paramount importance of life, but perhaps other many
people would disagree because of their sympathy with the
agonizing feeling and ensuing trauma of the victim. Perhaps
more difficult is distinguishing harms in crimes like
bribery, theft, and wiretapping. It is not feasible to give
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each harm a separate and distinct place on the scale.
Instead, a 'partial ordering' dividing harms into groups
ranked in order of seriousness would be the best possible
in a practical sense. (See von Hirsch and Jareborg, 1991:
17-35)
To sum up, according to the retributivist's account of
just deserts, the moral seriousness of an offence is a
function of two major factors - the harm done by the
offence and the culpability of the offender as indicated by
his mental state at the time of committing the offence.
Other things being equal, killing is more serious than
assault, and intentional killing is more serious than
negligently causing death. The interplay of these two
factors, harm and culpability, is important, and it is
often not possible to know the full significance of one
factor without reference to the other factor. When told
that a person has deliberately or recklessly caused harm,
we do not know how serious the offence is unless we also
know the extent of the harm. But another important problem
to be solved here is: when we take both factors, harm and
culpability, into consideration for testing the moral
seriousness of crime, how is the moral seriousness of
conduct to be assessed objectively?
IV. 3. Assessing the Objective Seriousness of Criminal
Conduct.
How can we assess the objective seriousness of criminal
conduct? Can we lay down standards which are definitive? Or
should we accept that such standards will vary with time
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and place? If there is no consensus on the gravity of every
different crime, then, the crucial question will be whose
standards are decisive in grading seriousness of particular
conduct. Public opinions and attitudes on the significance
of an individual crime appear to change with varying
degrees over time and place. At least we can say that
criminal codes and the penalties they lay down are an
expression of political interests at a particular time and
place. Nowadays in the highly-industrial society where
people live an individual life facilitated by the division
of labour, burglary and cognate offences to the individual
interests are considered to be more serious offences than
the so-called 'white-collar crimes', even though the
amounts of money involved in the latter exceed by a
considerable amount those taken by more conventional
criminal means. Social security fraud is regarded as more
heinous than tax evasion. Thus, the social environment and
political values at a given time which provide a basis for
grading of seriousness should not be overlooked.
Although with the importance of a standard in assessing
the objective seriousness of criminal conduct, there seems
no convincingly comprehensive and coherent theory developed
to deal with this matter. Only a few attempts to develop a
reasonable account for this problem have been made recently
and among them, two are found particularly worth examining.
One interesting exploration of the problem is by Claudia
Card.(See her monograph, 1973: 17-35) She interprets the
problem of proportionality in terms of what she calls 'the
Penalty Principle' and 'the Full Measure Principle'. The
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former states, in part, that a punishment is retributively
just only if it imposes on an offender a deprivation of
rights to the extent of his "evident culpable failure to
abide by the law". The latter requires that the hardship to
which he is thus exposed does not exceed "the worst that
anyone could reasonably be expected to suffer from the
similar conduct of another if such conduct were to become
general in the community". By the Penalty Principle, Card
incorporates the idea that wrongdoing is a function of two
independent components: a factor internal to the offender,
namely mens rea, malicious intentions, motives, or reasons
for inflicting (or attempting to inflict) culpable injury
on others; and a factor external to the offender, namely
the harm caused to the victim. As we can recognize, this
Penalty Principle seems no other thing than the principle
of proportionality itself we have established so far. Thus
the only remaining thing in Card's account worth examining
is the Full Measure Principle.
There also arise baffling difficulties, as Card herself
recognizes, over interpreting the Full Measure Principle.
"The Full Measure consists in a deprivation of rights
exposing the offender to a hardship comparable in severity
to the worst that anyone could reasonably be expected to
suffer from the similar conduct of another if such conduct
were to become general in the community." (Ibid., 27) The
purpose of this principle is to explicate the intuitively
sound requirement of retribuitvism, that a just punishment
consists in "a suspension or withdrawal of rights of the
offender corresponding to his failure to respect such
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rights of others". (Ibid., 32) To apply this principle and
identify a punishment as just or deserved for a given crime
or for an offender who is guilty of that crime, we must
have some way of measuring the hardship or loss of rights
suffered by the victim.
Consider the crime of rape. How much hardship would this
crime involve were it to become general in the community?
What would we undertake to examine in order to assess and
measure that hardship? Would it be the victim's feelings,
such as how much the assault hurt, or the victim's
reactions, such as the subsequent self-imposed
restrictions on freedom of movement, or the victim's
judgments, such as the loss of self-esteem, or all of these
together? Would the hardship take into account the victim's
status, such as whether she was a child, a prostitute, a
spouse, or other effects upon the victim, such as her prior
virginity or subsequent pregnancy? Card does not tell us,
and so we are not clear what would be the appropriate
degree or kind of suffering to legislate for the generality
of rapists "comparable to the worst that anyone could
reasonably be expected to suffer" were rape to become
general in the community. But one important lesson we can
draw from Card's argument is that a measurement of the
objective seriousness of crime should ultimately rely on
public opinion or sentiment. And public opinion or
sentiment on any criminal conduct is such a kind which is
not formed in a particular circumstance but in a
generalized social context of that crime. Then the method
for achieving objectivity Card argues in her Full Measure
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Principle seems to be a similar approach to the ideal
impartial spectator's standard which is espoused for a just
decision-making by moral sentimentalists since Adam Smith.
However there appears one slight difference in
connotation between these two methods. It seems to me that
the Full Measure Principle regards public opinion or the
sentiments formed in a generalized context as a source of
objective justice while the impartial spectator's test does
not rely on public opinion or sentiment in a given
political community but presupposes a universal, ideal
situation for decision-making. But I do not know whether
there will be much differences between two methods in their
practical application since any particular decision-making
under each test requires a universalization within a given
political community with any scale. Accepting for the
moment this idea about universalized public opinion, I
shall next examine an attempt which tries to apply this
kind of approach in a more concrete and empirical way.
This kind of approach is offered by Andrew von Hirsch, in
what he calls 'the principle of commensurate deserts'.
According to this principle, "severity of punishment should
be commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong...
seriousness depends both on harm done (or risked) by the
act, and on the degree of the actor's culpability." (von
Hirsch, 1976: 66 and 69) Von Hirsch relies on the
techniques for measuring degrees of gravity of offences
worked out by the criminologists Sellin and Wolfgang.(See
Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964) They rank-order criminal
offences to the degree of severity, and they do this by
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means of a scale with 2 6 equal intervals on which they plot
judgments drawn from a large sample of persons reflecting
their assessment of amount and relative degree of harm done
by a wide range of crimes. The Sellin-Wolfgang findings
were subsequently criticized on the grounds that their
sample was unrepresentative, formalistic and inflexible
since they provided, for example, no way of distinguishing
murder from manslaughter, for harm is their criterion, not
culpability.(See Freeman, 1983: 416) But von Hirsch,
relying on the similar results with a more representative
group which a sociologist Peter Rossi obtained later,
maintained that a substantial degree of consensus was found
in the ranking of the crimes; and there was comparatively
little variation in response among different racial,
occupational, and educational subgroups.(von Hirsch, 1976:
78-9; see also Rossi et al, 1974: 224-37) He went on to
assert that whatever the complexities in the concept of
seriousness, such studies suggest that people from widely
different walks of life can make common-sense judgments on
the comparative gravity of offenses and come to fairly
similar conclusions.
The incorporation of the Sellin-Wolfgang research by von
Hirsch raises questions: (i) he focuses too much on
judgments about harm and not enough on judgments about
culpability; (ii) whether the criteria and validity of
relying completely on public opinion in the assessment of
seriousness of crime is tenable for these may be
questionable either because they contain factual
misjudgments or because they involve moral judgments that
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do not withstand scrutiny.
Von Hirsch himself acknowledges these problems and
replies that: (i) if we are fully agreed that it would be
helpful to have information available about how ordinary
people rank criminal conduct, we can develop new research
that is better designed to elicit people's common-sense
judgments about culpability; (ii) we should give serious
considerations to the popular judgments, not necessarily
abide passively by them; it is because of this kind of
thinking that even if surveys found that the crime of
burglary was regarded as quite serious, that would not
settle whether it should be treated as such.(See von
Hirsch, 1978: 623)
This leaves the question of how the criteria for
seriousness should be constructed. If seriousness is a
notion without objective quality, it is a perceived
objective seriousness that is at issue. Public opinion and
sentiment can therefore not be ignored. Then, a
satisfactory theory and practice whose soundness is only
based on a rational practical reasoning for a
universalized public opinion will help solve the issue.
Perhaps, the idea of fair market value that is commonly
made use of in appraising property is illuminating here for
our method of identifying the universalized public opinion.
The process of calculating deserved punishment which is in
proportion to the culpability of the criminal conduct seems
to bear marked similarities to that of fair market value.
Then, what is the fair market value and how is this
determined?
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According to Hyman Gross's account, it is universally
agreed that proper judgments of fair market value are
rational judgments based on considerations generally
accepted as determinants of worth in the market community.
Some such notion as the price at which a willing buyer and
a willing seller engage in a transaction is used, and fair
market value can thus be seen to depend on the normal
dispositions and attitudes of those who make a market in a
community at a given time. (Gross, 1979: 439)
However, the qustion to be raised here is: how is the
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objectide criteria for determining fair market value and
the objective process for it formed?
Several things seem important here. Though the criteria
of value make reference to presumed dispositions of members
of community, to be objective criteria, they make reference
only to dispositions that can be rationally defended.
Though market value from time to time tends to reflect
people's subjective factors, the objective criteria do not
depend upon what those who make up some representative
cross-section of the community would in fact be disposed to
offer or accept, but rather upon what any member of the
community would be bound in good conscience to admit is a
fair price once he has considered carefully all those
things that bear on it. And finally, though judgments of
fair market value again reflect opinions that within
reasonble limits will inevitably differ depending on who is
making the judgment, there are ways of criticizing and
defending opinions by appeal to reasons, and so there are
ways of deciding which opinion is best. (See Gross, 1979:
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439-40)
If the above analogy between the measurement of objective
seriousness of crime and that of objective fair market
value of property is plausible, we can draw an idea about
what is objective public opinion with regard to crime and
punishment. The standard of fair punishment which is in
proportion to the culpability of the criminal conduct can
be an objective one if it depends not on what most people
feel like seeing the perpetrator suffer, but rather upon
what is defensible through reasoned argument. It is not
then the bare opinion of some majority that prevails, but
a considered judgment that any one may arrive at. (See
Gross, 1979: 440)
To sum up the discussion so far, even though Card's
formulation is too imprecise to afford any real guidance,
one important point which focuses on public judgment in
generalized context is worth exploring. The approach to
obtain an objective test based on empirical and scientific
survey on public common-sense judgment, which is espoused
by von Hirsch, is a more advanced one but still needs
further development. Gross's analogy between the
determination of fair market value of property and that of
fair punishment seems persuasive but still stops short to
any concrete application. Nonetheless, I suppose this
approach is the right direction to pursue.
If one were able to develop a scale of seriousness, there
comes the further problem of matching a scale of penalties
with it. Here, Bedau objects that more than one penalty
scale could satisfy the requirements of proportionality,
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and concludes that any proposed scale would therefore be
'arbitrary'.(See Bedau, 1978: 615)
But why must one assume that the proportionality
principle should yield a single unique solution? As von
Hirsch argues, we are better to recognize that the
principle imposes only certain 'outer' constraints on the
over-all magnitude of the penalty scale, but leaves some
choice within those constraints. (See von Hirsch, 1976:
Ch.ll) It is appropriate to have ranges of possible
punishment for each category of crime rather than one
fixed amount. If one does not, then one must sacrifice
utilitarian considerations of specific deterrence,
incapacitation, and reform. Not all instances of assault
and battery are alike; they can differ by the amount of
harm inflicted and other circumstances, such as a barroom
brawl versus a random vicious assault. As Michael D. Bayles
maintains, individualization of punishment is to be
adopted: laws should permit, and judges should impose,
individualized punishment within maximum and minimum limits
for each crime.(Bayles, 1987: 342) Thus, the average
sentence should be less than the maximum permissible to
allow for aggravating and mitigating considerations. As a
possible convictee, one would want and accept attention to
mitigating features of one's case. Nor could one rationally
object to a greater than average punishment based on
aggravating factors so long as the punishment was no more
than the maximum permissible. The minimum amount of
punishment helps ensure that prevention is not unduly
weakened.
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CHAPTER 6. DESERT, UTILITY AND THE COMMON GOOD
I. Desert as constituting a prima facie obligation for
reward and punishment.
According to the principle of desert, it is held that
virtue deserves reward and vice punishment. Does this mean
that it is obligatory for the virtuous man to receive
reward, and the vicious punishment, i.e. that someone has
an obligation to give them what they are said to deserve?
Difficulty arises with ill-desert. If a man has
deliberately done wrong when he could have done right, we
say he deserves punishment, but does this mean or imply in
every case that someone has an obligation to punish him?
The trend of modern consequentialist accounts is that the
actual infliction of punishment is to be justified only if
it will lead to a balance of good, that it is to be
justified by utilitarian considerations of deterrence and
reform. Where there is an obligation to punish, therefore,
the obligation ultimately depends on the future good
consequences of the act. But the teleological desert theory
of punishment clearly opposes this account. The statement
that a man deserves punishment is justified by the fact
that he has deliberately and knowingly acted contrary to
what was his duty. But, to say that he deserves punishment
cannot mean the same as saying that someone has an
obligation to punish him (although, someone ought to punish
him.), for the two statements differ in their
implications.(Though the terms 'duty', 'obligation', and
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'ought to do' are often used interchangeably by
philosophers, the expression 'ought to do', however, in our
more careful ordinary discourse, is used in a wider sense
to cover things we would not regard as strict duties or
obligations or think another person has a right to.(For the
difference in moral connotation between 'obligation' and
'ought', see Frankena, 1973: 47; Williams, 1981: Chapter 9)
To understand better the different implications, we need to
examine at least four different accounts of the notion of
desert. These different approaches to desert can be stated
briefly as follows.(For this point, see Mackie, 1986: 623-
4)
(i) Negative retributivism: One who is not guilty must not
be punished since he has no ill desert.
(ii) Permissive retributivism: One who is guilty may be
punished according to desert. You must not punish the
innocent, but you may punish the guilty; you must not
punish excessively, but you may punish up to a
proportionate degree. This permissive account does not say
that wrong acts are positively a reason for imposing
penalties; but it does say that wrong acts somehow cancel
the basic reason for not imposing penalties; the guilty
person loses his immunity in proportion to his guilt. (For
examples of this view, see Raphael, 1980: 40; Garcia, 1989:
263)
(iii) Prima facie positive retributivism: One who is guilty
ought to be punished according to desert. This is only a
weak, prima facie obligation for punishment. (For an example
of this view, see Hestevold, 1987: 257)
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(iv) Positive retributivism: It is obligatory that one who
is guilty be punished according to desert (in every case).
This is an absolute requirement for punishment. (For this
point of strong or maximal retributivism, see Kant's,
Hegel's and Bradley's theories)
My position is that a desert-claim constitutes a prima
facie obligation to act. It is only a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for the complete moral justification
of punishment. It is, however, a necessary and sufficient
condition for justice under the teleological desert theory
explicated before. But justice is not the whole of
morality, only a part of it. Thus the complete
justification of punishment (and also, reward) has to be
viewed as a two-stage procedure, the first stage dealing
with justice, the second with the common good.
What does this mean precisely? Desert provides only a
valid basis for claims, but these claims are, though
crucially important, not necessarily or even usually claims
against or binding on particular individuals. Nor do they
always entail an obligation to act towards someone as that
person deserves.(See Galston, 1980: 176; Similarly, Brian
Barry argues that ascribing desert to a person for a some
facts about him gives a necessary but not a sufficient
condition. see Barry, 1965: 106) In a more concrete
account, when we say that an especially hard-working
self-employed farmer deserves to succeed, or that a person
of fine moral character deserves to fare well, we typically
do not mean that anyone is absolutely obligated to take
steps to provide what is deserved. Similarly, when we say
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that a superior athlete deserved to win a contest he lost
on a fluke, we do not imply that anyone has absolutely
failed to act as he should have. In these and many other
cases, desert does not squarely bear on anyone's conclusive
obligations. (See Sher, 1987: 5)
Feinberg gives a similar account. According to him, that
a subject deserves X entails that he ought to get X in a
ceteris paribus('other things being equal') sense of
'ought', but not in the 'all things considered' or 'on
balance' sense. This is simply another way of saying that
a person's desert of X is always a reason for giving X to
him, but not always a conclusive reason, that
considerations irrelevant to his desert can have overriding
cogency in establishing how he ought to be treated on
balance.(See Feinberg, 1970: 60)
Consider following cases from John Kleinig, for example.
Kleinig argues: (i) "If jailing a man for theft would
(because of prison conditions) endanger his life, then,
provided that other possible means of punishment were also
open to objections, we could argue that he ought not to be
punished [on balance], even though he deserved it. We would
probably ask that his sentence be suspended." He further
argues, (ii) "Similarly, were the punishment of a convicted
spy likely to trigger off a nuclear war, then we would have
a ground for saying that he ought not to be punished [on
balance]. But this would in no way eliminate the fact that
he deserved to be punished."(Kleinig, 1971: 76)
Although Kleinig does not give a clear account why
reasons other than desert would prevail in above cases, it
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seems to me that social necessity or some significant
aspect of general welfare places obstacles in the path of
desert and thus justice. The occurrence of serious
emergencies, such as war, civil strife, or natural
catastrophe, may require the taking of expeditious measures
which may be questionable from the vantage point of
justice, or which may violate a law considered fair and
reasonable under ordinary circumstances. (For this view, see
Bodenheimer, 1967: 112) St. Thomas Aquinas said: "So if a
case crops up in which the general good would be harmed by
observing the law, the law must not be observed. . . Only
when the danger is urgent and allows no time for recourse
to such higher authority does necessity itself, which knows
no law, dispence us."(St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,
Part II, Chater 9. Law and Grace, Qu.96, Art.6, 1991: 292)
Let us take an example for this case. The problem of
necessity was squarely posed in World War II when the
Japanese-Americans were evacuated from the West Coast of
the United States and removed to relocation camps in the
interior. The military authorities defended the measure by
asserting that there existed a serious threat of Japanese
invasion of the Pacific Coast, that the loyalty of the
Japanese-Americans was under a cloud, and there was no
time to separate the reliable from the unreliable elements
by a screening process. If these facts had been borne out
by the record, the obvious injustice done to loyal
Japanese-Americans might have found its justification in
pressing military necessity.(The existence of a serious
invasion threat at the time of the evacuation and the
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charge of wide-spread disloyalty among the members of the
group were, however, questioned by a number of authorities
after a thorough analysis of the facts and records.)(See
Rostow, 1945: 489; see also 1944: Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214)
But here for a more proper understanding of desert (also,
justice) as a prima facie obligation, I think it is worth
while examining an act of mercy which has been considered
according to differing theorists, on the one hand, as a
supererogatory benevolence, and on the other hand, as a
special softening case of legal justice and thus an element
of desert. If an act of mercy could be understood as a part
of desert, then it would be a prima facie obligation to
exercise mercy. Let us examine this issue more in depth.
II. Justice and Mercy.
If we take desert to be the all-important reason for just
punishment, then will an act of mercy, which apparently
involves the imposition of less than the just penalty or
less than the deserved punishment on an offender, be unjust
and wrong? And is this not contrary to our deepest moral
convictions of desert? Mercy seems to contradict justice,
or desert. Something of this is caught by the old-fashioned
schoolboy's description of his stern headmaster as 'a
beast, but a just beast'. In this case, is a 'just beast'
actually 'just' and thus a virtuous type of human being?
Mercy has always stood as high in the moral scale as
justice - indeed, even higher. Aristotle himself placed
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greater value on equity than on strict justice {The
Nicomachean Ethics, Book V. Chapter 10 ) Equity, of course,
is not the same thing as mercy; but in as much as it aims,
or should aim, at mitigating harsh consequences, it
partakes of the same quality.(See Allen, 1958: 56 n.)
However mercy might be thought to be the dictate of that
part of morality which lies in benevolence, and therefore
should not be considered a part of justice itself.
The contention that mercy does involve a compromise of
justice would seem to follow from such a statement that "to
be merciful is to let someone off all or part of a penalty
which he is recognized as having deserved" (For this point,
see Armstrong, 1961: 487); or Alwynne Smart's claim that
'genuine mercy' involves the 'imposition of less than the
just penalty' or 'less than the deserved punishment on an
offender.'(Smart, 1968, in Acton, 1969: 217 and 224)
Here to understand the nature of mercy properly, it would
be useful to distinguish the criminal law paradigm of mercy
from the private law paradigm of mercy. (For this point, see
Murphy, 1986: 9-12) With the criminal law paradigm of mercy
we think of mercy as a virtue that most typically would be
manifested by a sentencing judge in a criminal case. With
the private law paradigm of mercy as typically represented
in Merchant of Venice, the central focus is a contract
dispute. In that play, Antonio has made a bad bargain with
Shylock and, having defaulted, is contractually obligated
to pay Shylock a pound of his flesh. Portia, acting as
judge, asks that Shylock show mercy to Antonio by not
demanding the harsh payment.
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Murphy argues that this private law case differs
radically from the criminal law case. His accounts are as
follows: "A judge in a criminal case has an 'obligation' to
do justice - which means, at a minimum, an obligation to
uphold the rule of law. Thus, if he is moved, even by love
or compassion, to act contrary to the rule of law - to
the rules of justice - he acts wrongly (because he violates
an obligation) and manifests a vice rather than a virtue.
A criminal judge, in short, has an obligation to impose the
just punishment; and all of his discretion within the rules
is to be used to secure greater justice (e.g., more careful
individuation). No rational society would write any other
'job discription' for such an important institutional
role(Murphy, 1986: 10) From this reason he suggests that
the criminal law paradigm of mercy is a failure. Although
it appears to be persuasive, I can not accept his argument
in detail. But before elaborating this argument further,
let us see his account of the private law paradigm.
Murphy argues that in the private law paradigm, the
virtue of mercy is revealed when a person, out of
compassion for the hard position of the person who owes
him an obligation, waives the right that generates the
obligation and frees the individual of the burden of that
obligation. He gives following account: "a litigant in a
civil suit is not the occupier - in anything like the same
sense - of an institutional role. He occupies a private
role. He does not have an antecedent obligation, required
by the rules of justice, to impose harsh treatment. He
rather has, in a case like Shylock's, a 'right' to impose
178
harsh treatment. Thus, if he chooses to show mercy, he is
simply 'waiving a right' that he could in justice claim -
not violating an obligation demanded by justice... I do not
necessarily show a lack of respect for justice by waiving
my justice-based rights as I would by ignoring my
justice-derived obligations."(Murphy, 1986: 10)
I agree with Murphy about the moral virtue of mercy in
the private law case - this private law paradigm of mercy,
I would call a 'genuine mercy' or 'supererogatory mercy'.
However, I still think there is room for mercy as an
important moral virtue with impact upon the law in the
criminal law case - this criminal law paradigm of mercy, I
would call 'judicial mercy' or 'equitable mercy'. Hereafter
I shall discuss this latter kind of mercy in order to
understand the relationship between justice and mercy.
To place this problem in its proper perspective, we need
to look briefly at the language of mercy employed even in
the criminal cases. As John Kleinig points out, the view
that mercy involves giving someone less of an ill than he
deserves, while true in some instances, is unnecessarily
restrictive.(Kleinig, 1973: 87) Judicial mercy, as Alwynne
Smart shows, arises when a guilty man has such extenuating
circumstances or has suffered so much already as the result
of his crime, that the judge sets in motion the machinery
to obtain a sentence lower than the existing law allows -
this act is called a recommendation of mercy. He may also
speak of showing mercy when he imposes less than the
maximum penalty for a crime, but again only implying that
the accused's crimes or his circumstances do not justify
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the full penalty. (See Smart, 1969: 213 and 221-3) In these
cases mercy is but a mitigating factor in the law or a
standard term used in explaining a reduced punishment. Its
use implies the acceptance of reduced culpability or some
other excuse as a factor to be taken into account in
arriving at a fair sentence. We speak of mercy 'tempering'
or 'seasoning' rather than 'replacing' or 'opposing'
justice. Then the showing of mercy does not necessarily
involve a compromise of justice. Let us examine cases of
judicial mercy more in depth.
The contexts in which we commonly talk about and
recommend mercy are many and varied, and some seem more
appropriate than others. It is more appropriate to speak of
mercy in respect of some murderers rather than others. This
is sometimes because one kind of murder is intrinsically
worse than another. Suppose, for example, that in a
particular State, the penalty for murder is death or
life imprisonment, with no provision for lesser penalties.
Suppose a man discovers that his wife is unfaithful to him,
and blind with uncontrollable anger and jealousy, he shoots
her with a rifle that happens to be lying around. Now take
another case - the case of a man who murders his wife for
her money after weeks of careful planning. We believe that
coldly premeditated murder for personal gain is morally
worse that heat-of-the-moment murder and that it warrants
a harsher penalty. We might consider the full penalty
prescribed by the law to be the right punishment, be it
death or life imprisonment. It is generally felt that
heat-of-the-moment murder does not warrant the same
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punishment and one would expect the jury to add a
recommendation of mercy to its verdict. Thus it is right to
say that mercy ought to be exercised in such a case, even
if it is difficult to reach agreement on what penalty
should be imposed instead. The reason why mercy ought to be
exercised is that the penalty as it stands is too harsh for
the particular offence. To treat these two kinds of murder
as being of equal gravity and warranting identical
penalties would be a great injustice, one into which the
crudeness of the law would force us if there was no
provision for mercy riders.(See Smart, 1969: 212-3)
In actual legal matters, we can find that many
recommendations for mercy are supported on grounds which
constitute not so much a deviation from moral justice, but
an adjustment to moral justice. Although it is one of the
functions of laws to give a practical and efficient means
of judgment, legal judgments, however, frequently fail to
take into adequate account the special circumstances
surrounding individual cases. In such cases pleas for mercy
are entered, so that all morally relevant circumstances
might be taken into account in the final sentencing. This
is especially noticeable in cases where the judge has no
alternative but to pass the death sentence.(See Kleinig,
1973: 88)
Here Claudia Card rightly argues that mercy is deserved
in those cases: "Mercy ought to be shown to an offender
when it is evident that otherwise (i) he would be made to
suffer unusually more on the whole, owing to his peculiar
misfortunes, than he deserves in view of his basic
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character and (ii) he would be worse off in this respect
than those who stand to benefit from the exercise of their
right to punish him (or to have him punished) . When the
conditions of this principle are met, the offender deserves
mercy. Although desert of mercy does not give rise to an
obligation, it can present a case sufficiently strong to
outweigh the initial justification for punishing and allow
us to discriminate among offenders without violating the
rule of justice(Card, 1972: 184-5; For the view of mercy
as desert, see also Armstrong, 1961: 487; But for an
opposing view, see Sadurski, 1985: 240) As Card goes on to
maintain, mercy can be the form of charity specifically
deserved, as punishment can be the form of social justice
specifically deserved in certain situations. By contrast
with punishment and reward, mercy is deserved on the basis
of what one has endured and the nature of one's moral
character on the whole, rather than on the basis of
individual performances or omissions.(Card, 1972: 198) I
think her argument is convincingly plausible and can be
adopted here for our account. I would call this kind of
criminal law paradigm of mercy an 'equitable mercy'. It may
clarify this view to point out its similarity to
Aristotle's view of the relation between two kinds of
justice - equity and legal justice. In much the same way,
we can understand judicial mercy as an expression of
justice, a perfection of justice.
However, it might also be argued that mercy is not
justified if it involves unfair discrimination against
others. If a judge has before him two cases which are
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identical in all relevant respects, and exercises mercy in
one case but not in the other, he could rightly be
criticised for showing favouritism and committing an
injustice. If he is going to let one off lightly he ought
to let the other one off lightly too, and equally
lightly.(Smart, 1969: 218-9)
III. Desert,Justice and Utility.
If we understood desert as constituting a prima facie
obligation to make proper, or appropriate reward and
punishment, then, a question arises: what about
considerations of utility in the course of final judgment?
Is utility to be considered as the ultimate reason after
desert is taken into account? This is a matter of
relationship between justice and utility. In our ordinary
thoughts, we find that we do want just punishments to be
useful as well, and useful laws to be just as well.
However, useful laws cannot always be just, and just
punishments cannot always be useful. One can define away
the possible conflict and identify justice with usefulness
only if one ignores the frequent competition between laws,
or sentences, which might be useful by bringing future
benefits and what is felt to be just, i.e. deserved by past
guilt. This competition occurs, as van den Haag correctly
points out, because in practice legislators, who prescribe
punishments, do not focus exclusively on usefulness, and
courts, which distribute penalties, do not confine
themselves exclusively to justice. When the phases of the
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criminal justice system are not wholly separate - and they
can never be altogether discontinuous - the demands of
justice may compete with the requirement of utility. (See
van den Haag, 1975: 26)
Utilitarians attempt to answer this problem in the
following way. They hold that punishment is justified
solely by its consequences. The idea of ill-desert,
included in that of punishment, is a concealed way of
referring to, and achieving, good consequences. (For this
point, see Feinberg, 1970: 80-83)
Recently this utilitarian view on deserved reward has
been expressed by Anthony Quinton. Quinton, like J. S.
Mill, argues that the idea of desert and justice is not an
independent moral principle to be employed in distribution
but rather something that can be interpreted in utilitarian
terms. (See Quinton, 1989: 77 and 79) Let us examine his
view by using his own example of the distribution of
oranges in society. Since his description of the example is
not in detail, I shall elaborate his case in his
utilitarian terms for the sake of discussion.
If we focus first our attention on the matter of
production of oranges in society, as opposed to their
distribution, we may see that the idea of utility would
operate in this circumstance. If we envisage that oranges
are produced by individuals who cultivate orange trees, and
that this process of cultivation involves, as it must,
effort and disutility on the part of the cultivators, then,
in our judgment about the distribution of oranges, we may
have to take this disutility into account. If a cultivator
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produces two oranges and he is interested in consuming all,
then it would not normally maximize his utility to transfer
one orange to someone who has not contributed to cultivate
that. This is because the cultivator might see the
consumption of oranges which he had grown as a compensation
for the disutility and effort involved in the cultivation
of them.
In this case, Quinton's view is that "it would be no
injustice if he [the laborious cultivator] were to eat both
[of the oranges] and not give half of his crop to another
man who happens to be passing by at the time when it
becomes ripe... To bring him up to the normal level of
satisfaction, which the passer-by may be presumed to enjoy,
he needs both oranges."(1989: 77)
In the above account, Quinton's view of desert and
justice may be interpreted rather like entitlement on the
ground that the cultivator has expectation about what he
ought to receive as a reward for the labour and
contribution to the production, otherwise he would not have
undertaken that. Here, the claim of justice, according to
Quinton, is interpreted in utilitarian terms.
In a market economy, it is assumed by utilitarians that
people are rewarded according to their effort and
contribution; the larger the contribution they make to the
total system of production, the larger their rewards are
expected to be; since their greater efforts contribute to
the growth of the economy and therefore greater aggregate
satisfaction of wants, their greater rewards are considered
just on the ground that they are entitled to get back their
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due share of the contributed utility even though this will
lead to inequalities of various sorts. (For this kind of
account, see Plant, 1991: 160) I shall refute this view
shortly by pointing out the deficiencies in its underlying
assumptions.
However, according to the utilitarian theory of desert,
a similar account, mutatis mutandis, would be given of
deserved punishment, when we say a man deserves punishment,
the whole meaning of our statement can be resolved into two
clauses: (i) he has done a wrong action; (ii) it is useful
to apply certain punishments to him - useful, that is, in
the way of influencing his habits and other people's. The
utilitarian theory will make deserving a four-termed
relation - A, the agent, deserves P, the penalty, because
C, the consequence of P, tends to discourage W, the wrong
act. (For this point, see Duncan-Jones, 1952: 137-40) In
other words, when we say that the punishment 'fits' the
crime, we are referring, not to any specifically ethical
relation between them, but simply to the causal property
which the punishment has of tending to remove or repress
the harmful tendency. (For this theory of punishment and
reward, see Nowell-Smith, 1954: 273; see also his article,
1948)
Now, the objections to this account, as D. D. Raphael
maintains, are twofold.(See Raphael, 1980: 38-9)
(i) Punishment and reward are not the sole type of action
(or indeed of painful and pleasureable action) that is
useful in averting public harm or promoting public good.
Quarantine is useful in averting public harm, and it
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happens to involve, as imprisonment designedly includes,
the experience of isolation, which to most people is
unpleasant. Instruction makes people useful to society, and
to some it is pleasant (and so like reward) , to others
painful (and so like punishment). Taking medicine benefits
society as well as the patient, since a sick person is a
burden on society; and it may be unpleasant. Yet it is not
called punishment. Sermons are intended to strengthen our
morality, to reinforce our virtue and to correct our vice;
the virtuous may perhaps find them gratifying, and the
vicious may find them tedious. Are we to say that sermons
are rewards to the one and punishments to the other? We can
not say so. But a difficulty for utilitarian theory is
that it tends to assimilate to punishment all other ways of
prevention of social harm and reform, and this is open to
criticism. This defect of the utilitarian analysis of
desert constitutes our first objection.
(ii) On the utilitarian theory of desert, we should have to
say, where any action causes the removal of an undesirable
tendency or the strengthening of a desirable one, not only
that the action is to be called punishment or reward, but
that the person to whom it is directed 'deserves' it, since
the propriety or fittingness of desert simply expresses
this causal relation, in the same sense in which medicine
is appropriate for the cure of sickness. Indeed, we might
say that the sick person 'deserves' his medicine. But we do
not in fact use the language of morality in such
circumstances. When we speak of desert we imply that the
agent knew what he was doing, could control his action at
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that time, and was aware of a right and a wrong. We say
that, according to the teleological desert theory,
punishment is justified when it is just and beneficial as
well.
However, to explicate the teleological desert theory
better, it will be illuminating to compare it with the
'permissive desert' theory espoused by D. D. Raphael.
IV. Permissive Desert versus Teleological Desert.
Raphael argues that he can agree with the utilitarian
theory of punishment to the extent of thinking that where
there is an obligation to punish, the obligation arises
from utility. The strength of the so-called retributive
(or, as he prefer to call it, the desert) theory of
punishment lies, not in the justification of a positive
obligation to punish the guilty, but in the protection of
innocence.(Raphael, 1980: 39) The utilitarian theory
requires us to say, when "it is expedient that one man
should die for the interest of society at large", that he
deserves this as a punishment. It is here that common sense
protests against the injustice of utilitarianism, and it is
here that the retributive theory of punishment has greatest
force.
Raphael maintains: "Punishment is permissible only if it
is deserved. But this does not of itself give rise to an
obligation to punish. An obligation to inflict punishment,
where punishment is permitted by desert, arises from the
social utility of its infliction. Where a person is guilty
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of having wilfully done wrong, he has thereby forfeited
part of his claim to be treated as an end-in-himself; in
acting as a non-moral being he leaves it to open to his
fellows to use him as such." (Ibid. 40) He goes on to
assert: "If it should be thought necessary to override the
claim of the individual for the sake of the claim of
society, our decision is coloured by compunction, which we
express by saying that the claim of justice has to give way
to that of utility. Where the individual has been guilty of
deliberate wrongdoing, however, his claim not to be pained
is thought to be removed; there is held to be no conflict
of claims now, no moral 'obstat' raised by justice to the
fulfillment of the claim of utility. This thought is
expressed by saying that the individual 'deserves' his
pain, and the pain is called 'punishment', which is simply
a way of saying that in this situation the infliction of
pain, for the sake of social utility, involves no trespass
on the claims of justice, no conflict between utility and
justice. Justice is 'satisfied' by the 'punishment', for
justice has not, in the circumstances of guilt, a
countervailing claim that would have been breached by
pursuing the path of utility."(Ibid. 40-1)
Raphael's accounts of 'permissive desert' and the
relationship of justice and utility are, I think,
unconvincing. His arguments have at least two defects: (i)
the defect of utilitarianism in general as the primary
justifying factor, namely, the problem of
incommensurability of value or human good, and (ii) the
absence of any clear account of the principle of
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proportionality in the amount of punishment, which will be
an equally crucial question when justice and utility
conflict. Before proceeding to a deeper analysis of these
problems, let me propose the basic viewpoints of the
'teleological desert theory'.
Here my argument is in a sense the converse of Raphael's
permissive desert theory. The permissive desert theory
focuses on the utilitarian rationale for the infliction of
punishment, using the desert-claim as a constraint upon the
pursuit of the utilitarian goal. The teleological desert
theory regards punishment in accordance with the
teleological notion of desert as the central justifying
factor, whilst permitting a utilitarian justification (at
least in some versions) in individual cases. Utilitarianism
thus acts as a supplement or a limitation(e.g. in cases of
an immediate, overriding concern for social security) on
the desert principle.
It does not follow from this viewpoint of utilitarianism
as a supplement (or, a limitation) that deterrence, reform
of the criminal, and prevention of crime and social
protection are undesirable functions of criminal policy or
that they should be given no weight in the debate about
appropriate punishments. However, they cannot constitute
the supreme justification of punishments but rather they
are to be seen as the desirable by-products of a system of
punishment. Since desert is interpreted, under the
teleological desert theory, as an essential constituent of
justice and since according to desert what is due to it is
considered as a communicative enterprise conveying a sense
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of justice, a deserved punishment itself involves some
beneficial consequences by virtue of being a moral
communication. We may hope that just punishments will help
to attain utilitarian goals, and we should adopt methods
which facilitate the likelihood of achieving them. It is
hard to deny that utilitarianism has a strong persuasive
power as a moral theory since it takes its root in a
forward-looking insight about maximizing social utility.
However, the problem of the utilitarian approach is that it
tends to neglect the individual value and human right of
moral agents since its main orientation is to maximize
total value no matter what kind of distribution this
entails. Therefore, if justice is considered to be the
basic criterion of appropriate punishment, utilitarian
considerations should be taken into account in so far as
they do not conflict with the just verdict and sentence
based on guilt.
In practice, it may be concluded that while the justice
principle provides the basis for singling out, condemning
and taking punitive action against the offender, the choice
of particular forms of punitive action may depend upon
utilitarian considerations. (See and Compare von Hirsch,
1976: 55; see also Galligan, 1981 : 160) The retributive
desert does not make a distinction between a fine,
compulsory labour or imprisonment as long as these burdens
are equally proportionate to the crime. As Sadurski argues,
if one form of punishment is just while another form of
punishment is equally just and, in addition, brings about
beneficial social consequences, the latter punishment
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should be chosen.(Sadurski, 1985: 256) The withdrawal of a
driving licence may be equally as burdensome for an
offender as short-term imprisonment; retributive desert
will give no guidance as to which of these penalties should
be chosen but the teleological desert theory may give some
guidance by way of introducing the element of moral
communication. In actual cases, the appropriate decision
should, if possible, promote both justice and utility.
Here, one plausible account of combining both retributive
desert and teleological consideration may be given by the
criminal cases with regard to a possible distinction
between the case of complete but unsuccessful attempt and
that of complete crime. The reason why we may better make
a distinction in punishment between attempted and completed
crimes is that by doing this we can satisfy not only the
requirement of retributive justice but also that of
teleological element of moral communication both of which
are comprised in the principle of teleological desert. How
can we justify this? It may be doubtful since there seems
to be no difference in wickedness and thus guilt, though
there may be in skill, between the successful and the
unsuccessful attempt.(See Hart, 1968: 129)
Here, if we take personal choice and voluntary conduct
seriously as the theorists of retributive desert suggest,
we might face a perplexing issue of why a failed attempt
can count as a lesser offence and be punished less severely
than the relevant complete offence. We can perhaps suspect
that the mere fact of failure in a criminal attempt cannot
show the agent to be any less deserving of punishment, or
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to deserve any less punishment, than one whose similar
criminal endeavour succeeds.
Imagine a case in which Jack and Tom each fire a shot at
an intended victim: each intends, and makes a competent and
whole-hearted attempt, to kill. But while Jack succeeds in
killing his victim, Tom fails to kill his not because his
attempt is incompetent or half-hearted, but because his
victim moves suddenly, or is saved by unexpectedly prompt
medical treatment. The difference between their two
endeavours, such that one succeeds while the other fails,
is thus purely a matter of chance or luck: so they are
surely equally culpable, and deserve equal punishment; for
it cannot be just to make the extent of an offender's
criminal liability depend on the chance fact of whether he
actually caused the harm which he tried to cause. If
punishment should depend on desert, it should, we might
argue, depend on culpability rather than on the actual
causation of harm; on what the criminal wrongfully chose or
tried to do, not on the chance matter of what harm he
actually did.
An argument which I shall suggest here is that the ideas
of just desert and retributive justice may not allow us to
punish attempts less severely than completed crimes.
However, the idea of teleological desert (or due desert)
and furthermore the higher principle of common good might
allow a reduced punishment to criminal attempts with a
teleological consideration of beneficial effects both to
the criminal and the society. We can approach this issue in
two ways, from the basis of two elements of crime, a
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subjective (in the sense of mental operation) and an
objective one (in the sense of physical sequence).
First, as to the matter of desert, we must now attend to
the subjectivist argument that there is no difference in
culpability, and should therefore be no difference in
criminal liability, between a failed attempt and a
completed offence. What distinguishes Jack's action from
Tom's? Not their subjective character: each intends to kill
his victim, and does what he thinks will kill a person. If
we describe their two actions from the agent's own
subjective viewpoint, our description will be the same in
each case, since such descriptions are independent of what
objectively happens. Whether the shot hits or misses;
whether the victim dies or is saved by prompt medical
treatment: both Jack and Tom try to kill, since both intend
to cause death by their actions. The one vital distinction
between them is that in one case the killing has not been
brought off. This distinction makes Jack guilty of murder
and Tom guilty only of attempted murder: but it depends on
the objective rather than on the subjective aspects of
their conduct. Whether an action counts as an attempt to
kill depends essentially on its subjective character: but
whether that attempt succeeds or fails depends on the
objective matter of what actually happens.
This objective distinction between Jack and Tom, however,
is only a matter of chance, which depends on factors (such
as whether or not the victim moves) outside the agent's
control. Justice requires that criminal liability should
depend on voluntary choice and desert, not chance: on what
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an agent freely and responsibly does, not on what happens
as a matter of chance; on what is within his control, not
on factors lying beyond his control. Liability may thus be
determined by the subjective aspects of the agent's action,
not by its objective aspects: for what he chooses to do,
what is thus truly his as a responsible agent, is his
action as subjectively described. An attempt to save
someone that fails through no fault of the agent's is as
morally commendable as one that succeeds: for the agent has
done what he can to save life. He is commended for the
subjective character of his action, as one of saving life,
since it is this which he chooses and controls: its
objective character, as a failure to save life, lies
outside his control and cannot detract from his moral
credit. Analogously, Tom can take no moral credit for the
failure of his attempt at murder since his complete
attempt is equally as dangerous and harmful to society as
Jack's successful crime: that failure cannot reduce his
culpability, nor, therefore, should it reduce his criminal
liability.
However, in a complete justification of punishment by
maintaining the legal distinction between attempted and
completed crimes, we need to show that the objective
aspects of the defendant's conduct can make a relevant
difference to the moral character of his action, and to his
own moral and legal standing as the agent of that action:
but how could this be shown?
A possible answer may be given by the consideration of
some forward-looking policy, for example, in the interest
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of controlling the victim's resentment. Since the
resentment felt by a victim actually injured is normally
much greater than that felt by the intended victim who has
escaped harm, it will be a social interest to control that
greater resentment by differentiating the punishment
between two cases - namely giving a severe punishment to
the completed crime and a less severe one to the complete
but unsuccessful attempt. (For this kind of account, see
Hart, 1968: 131) This view has an insight by giving a due
consideration to the social aspect of crime but stops short
to the crucial aspect of moral communication which
punishment is designed to bring forth.
A more plausible answer may be this. One, if not the
only, essential purpose of criminal punishment is to
communicate to the offender, and to the wider community, a
proper condemnation of his crime; a condemnation which
answers to the character and seriousness of the wrong which
he has done: we want him to come to understand, and to
repent, his crime for what it was. Now if the law punished
failed attempts as severely as completed crimes, the
message which it communicated would be that it does not
matter to the law whether an attempt to commit a criminal
wrong succeeds or fails: it would be saying to the man who
failed in his attempt to injure his victim that his crime
was just as serious as that of someone who succeeds in
causing grievous injury to another person - that it does
not matter that he actually failed.
But our intuition says that it does matter to us, and
should matter to him, whether his attempt succeeded or not:
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we are, and he should be, relieved that it failed (for if
he comes to repent his crime as he should, he will be
relieved that it failed) ; and if his punishment is to
communicate to him an adequate understanding of his crime,
it should surely aim to communicate the appropriateness of
this relief. But this is precisely what the distinction
between attempted and completed crimes achieves.(For this
kind of account, see Duff, 1990: 191)
We can hope with this distinction to communicate to a
criminal the appropriateness of that relief, and bring him
to share it. This answer can be understood from a
perfectionist conception of the proper purposes of criminal
punishment, namely, one according to which the goals of
punishment are to bring not only the restoration of social
equilibrium disrupted by criminal wrongs but also the
reconciliation and education of the criminals and the
community.
V. Justice, Utility and The Common Good.
Let us examine further the relationships among justice,
utility, and the common good. Here the primary concern is
with the criteria for determining the common good, since
both justice and utility are considered to be its
constituent parts. As is to be expected, there exists no
unanimity of opinion as to the criteria which are to be
used in specific situations in order to determine the
common good. But here our starting point is an intuitive
idea that the evaluation of a human community is properly
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directed to the way of life enjoyed by the individuals
comprising that community. Then a question to be raised is:
What is a good community?
We may say, as Galston asserts, that a 'good community'
provides a way of life in which each individual realizes
the human good to the greatest extent possible for that
individual. In such a community, the only limitations on
achievement of the good would be internal obstacles -
genetically stunted capacities or psychological
characteristics that interfere with self-development and
the enjoyment of existence. And furthermore, the good
community can be said to rest on three preconditions:
nonscarcity; members who rationally respect one another's
interests; and suitable relations with other communities.
(See Galston, 1980: 192) Here I conceive that the notion of
the human good is comprised in four elements: the value of
self-preservation; the value of self-fulfillment; the value
of happiness and harmony; and the value of practical
reasonableness.(See and compare Galston, ibid., Chapter 3.
Elements of the Human Good; see also Finnis, 1980: Chapter
IV. 2, The basic forms of human good)
By contrast, a 'just community' allocates the human good
or the means to it in accordance with valid claims. The
just community is distinguished from the good community in
at least one of two respects: the existence of relative
scarcity, or the presence of some individuals whose acts or
qualities limit their valid claims to less than what is
required for the greatest possible achievement of their
good.(Remember Hume's or Rawls's notion of 'the
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circumstance of justice' in which the existence of relative
scarcity is presupposed.)
Based on above preliminary sketches on the relationship
between a just community and a good community, I shall
examine the notion of the common good (or, in other
interchangeable words, 'the common interest', 'the public
interest', or 'the general welfare'). Four basic approaches
can be suggested for dealing with the problem: (i) The
first approach is purely formalistic and simply identifies
the common good with the aggregate of authorized
governmental decisions and actions. (ii) The second
approach is procedural and considers the common good test
fulfilled when fair methods of procedure are used in
arriving at authoritative decisions. (iii) The third
proposed solution is thoroughly individualistic and
utilitarian and equates the common good with the
arithmetical sum total of individual interests, (iv) The
fourth is normative and perfectionistic, in that it
proceeds from the conception of a public order which aims
at the realization of certain goal values assumed to have
objective validity.(For these four approaches, see and
compare Bodenheimer's accounts of the 'public interest',
Bodenheimer, 1967: 127)
V.l. The formalistic approach.
At first sight this approach to the common good problem
would seem to satisfy the legal positivists who advocate an
'command theory' of law. It is because those theorists tend
to identify any legal power and policy decisions of the
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government authorities with the legitimate interests of the
state as well as the governed. But this approach is
unsatisfactory. As Bodenheimer similarly argues, it cannot
be conceded that the common good consists in whatever the
public authorities by their fiat declare it to be. If the
organs of government were always and necessarily endowed
with the will to accomplish as well as the capacity to
discern the best interests of the community unfailingly and
without deviation, then perhaps there would be room for an
identification of the public interest with governmental
decision-making. But under the conditions of the actual
world, every informed person is well aware of the fact that
this identification is without a rational basis. Government
officials may misconceive the community interest, make
serious and unquestionable mistakes in framing and
executing public policies. They may also be motivated by
selfish desires in exercising their responsibilities and
interpret their functions purely in terms of personal
advancement or aggrandizement of power. Thus we can not be
confident with an assertion that the common good coincides
with the policy decisions of the public authorities.(See
Bodenheimer, 1967: 127-8)
V.2. The Procedural Approach.
Secondly the purely procedural interpretation of the
common good is likewise subject to objections. Let us take
an example of this point of view briefly. Benn and Peters
argue: "To seek the common good means to try to act justly
and is not of the same type as 'maintain full employment'.
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Whereas the latter is a counsel of substance, the former is
one of procedure." (Benn and Peters, 1959: 273) In other
words, they maintain: "To seek the common good does not
describe a determinate goal at all. It is an instruction to
approach policy-making in a certain spirit, not to adopt a
determinate policy. To say that the state should seek it is
to say only that political decisions should attend to the
interests of its members in a spirit of
impartiality."(Ibid.)
As H. L. A. Hart points out, this identification of the
common good with justice is not universally accepted since
justice in a sense of impartiality is regarded at least as
a necessary condition to be satisfied by any legislative
choice which purports to be for the common good.(See Hart,
1961: 163 and 252) An impartial method of decision-making
is not necessarily a guarantee for the promulgation of
laws or policies which promote the general welfare. For
example, the practice of holding hearings at which
interested parties are given an opportunity to express
their views on proposed legislation, though it is quite
desirable from the viewpoint of procedural due process, has
not brought about unfailing excellence of legislation in
democratic states. We are well inclined to think that in
addition to procedural fairness some consideration of
substantive justice and the practical reasonableness of
goal-achieving-endeavour should be brought into the
situation.
In the political community, as Finnis asserts, the common
good is said to be the securing of a whole ensemble of
201
material and other conditions that tend to favour the
realization, by each individual in the community, of his or
her personal development. Then the common good refers to
the factor or set of factors which, as considerations in
someone's practical reasoning, would make sense of his
collaboration with others and would likewise, from their
point of view, give reason for their collaboration with
each other and with him. (See Finnis, 1980: 154) This
collaborating endeavour, on this view, aims at the
well-being and flourishing of all members of the community.
V.3. The Utilitarian Approach.
Thirdly it is also not tenable to assert a congruence of
the common good with the sum total of private interests. It
was Bentham who put forth this equation in his social
philosophy.(See Bentham, 1982 edition: Chapter I, 1-7) He
was convinced that the pursuit by each individual of his
private utility would necessarily advance the general
utility and result in the greatest happiness of the
greatest number. J. S. Mill developed this point further in
a more sophisticated account. Mill distinguishes the
standard of justice which should be applied in the framing
of laws from the origins of the sentiment of justice which
are to be found in 'the impulse of self-defense and the
feeling of sympathy.' (Mill, 1962: 306) The standard he
advocates is social utility. He goes on to assert: "the
justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part,
and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all
morality. Justice is a name for certain classes of moral
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rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being
more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation,
than any other rules for the guidance of life." (Ibid.
315-6)
One can well agree with Mill that justice refers to that
area of social conduct which is of particular importance
for the effective and harmonious operation of the social
system, and that the norms of conduct postulated by justice
deserve to be invested with an obligatory force of
particular strength. But the further question remains
whether the standard of utility advocated by Mill is or is
not the most satisfactory one that can be employed in the
solution of the problems of the common good. The criterion
proposed by him and Bentham was whether or not a particular
legal measure served to increase pleasure and decrease
pain; and it was his own as well as Bentham's view that
which enhanced the pleasure and happiness of an individual
was generally, though not necessarily, apt to promote the
happiness of the social body as a whole. This idea of
hedonistic utilitarianism which is based on the empirical
premise that pleasure alone is good as an end offers much
ground for doubt and criticism.
From a simple psychological observation, we can
acknowledge that the basic assumption of the hedonistic
utilitarianism, pronounced as a universal truth, does not
stand unbiased scrutiny. From the teachings of Aristotle,
St. Thomas Aquinas, T. H. Green, through contemporary
perfectionist philosophers, we are informed that man is a
goal-seeking being. Here the goals he pursues are no doubt
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manifold and highly diversified, including many objectives
other than pleasure. Producing serious works of art,
literature, architecture, and engineering often involves
much toil and renunciation of comfort. We can find, as an
another example, that mountaineers undertaking difficult
ascents often have to overcome obstacles of an extremely
arduous nature. It might perhaps be contended that such
ventures are embarked on for the sake of the ultimate
pleasure of having accomplished one's objectives. But as
Erich Fromm convincingly points out, pleasure is not a
primary motive of action, but merely a potential companion
of productive activities.(See Fromm, 1947: 175-180)
Similarly John Dewey maintains that a clearcut distiction
must be made between pleasure and happiness by saying that
"pleasures are so externally and accidentally connected
with the performance of a deed, that attempting to foresee
them is probably the stupidest course which could be taken
in order to secure guidance for action." (Dewey, 1960: 39)
We are now in a position to grasp an idea that, when
man's striving becomes directed exclusively at the seeking
of pleasure, the result will often be frustration
accompanied by neurotic symptoms, rather than satisfaction
and joy. It is interesting to note that J. S. Mill himself
became aware of the deficiencies of a hedonistic philosophy
after many years of serious intellectual journey. In his
autobiography he wrote: "I never, indeed, wavered in the
conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of
conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this
end was only to be attained by not making it the direct
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end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds
fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the
happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on
some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself
an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find
happiness by the way."(Mill, 1944: 120)
The foregoing rejection of a hedonistic utilitarian
philosophy as an ultimate gauge of law and legislation
should not be taken as a suggestion that lawmakers ought to
be unconcerned about human happiness. The true happiness of
the human-being must be the lodestar for all those who are
engaged in building the good society. But the readiness to
bear hardships and make sacrifices for the sake of
attaining the higher goals of life might be a necessary
condition for the realization of genuine contentment and
psychic harmony. Truly as Fromm asserts, we can say that
the opposite of happiness thus is not grief or pain but
depression which results from inner sterility and
unproductiveness.(See Fromm, 1947: 190)
What ultimate conclusions regarding the relationships
among justice, utility, and the common good can we distill
from these considerations? In sum, we are able to see that
a concept of utility which rests on a universalist form of
hedonism can not be deemed adequate for the accomplishment
of the aims of justice and the common good.
V.4. The Normative Perfectionist Approach.
Finally after eliminating the deficient approaches so far
examined, the only feasible method of determining the
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common good would be the elaboration of certain normative
standards which may be of use in the appraisal of public
policies. Generally speaking, these standards cannot be
quite different from the criteria which should govern the
realization and administration of justice in a political
community. The concept of the common good is, however,
somewhat broader than the notion of justice because it must
also include measures that are dictated by inescapable
social necessity or overriding efficiency and utility,
although they may be limited in applicability and
questionable from the vantage point of justice.
Let us now remind ourselves that the state which
proclaims to promote the principle of common good as its
fundamental goal tends to interpret the principle in favour
of advancing its own interest. But here if we fail to grasp
the fact that this good of the social body is also the
common good of human persons, as the social body itself is
a whole made up of human persons, this formula would lead
in its turn to other errors, of a collectivist type - or to
a type of state despotism. The common good of society is
neither a mere collection of private goods, nor the good
proper to a whole, which draws the parts to itself alone,
and sacrifices these parts to itself. As Jacques Maritain
argues, the common good involves, as its chief value, the
highest possible attainment (that is, the highest
compatible with the good of the whole community) of the
good by persons in their lives as persons, and in their
freedom of self-expansion or autonomy.(See Maritain, 1971:
9)
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As the upshot of the discussion so far, we can see its
three characteristics of the common good. A first essential
characteristic involves recognizing that the common good is
actively created by citizens participating together in some
shared process. This view of the common good implies that
the public domain - people's life together as part of the
same society - demands a shared debate, negotiation and
decision-making over issues of justice, freedom and
equality. Unless these common interests are fostered by
active participation, individuals will relapse into
competitive self-interest, and Elites will use power on
behalf of interest groups.(For this point, see Jordan,
1989: 85) A second characteristic relates to authority in
society. The common good is the foundation of authority;
for indeed leading a community of human persons towards
their common good, towards the good of the whole as such,
requires that certain individuals be charged with this
guidance, and that the directions which they determine, the
decisions which they make to this end, be followed or
obeyed by the other members of the community. A third
characteristic has to do with the intrinsic morality of the
common good, which is not merely a set of advantages and
conveniences, but essentially integrity of life, the good
and righteous human life of the multitude. Justice and
moral righteousness are thus essential to the common good.
That is why the common good requires the development of
the virtues in the mass of citizens, and that is why every
unjust and immoral political act is in itself harmful to
the common good and politically bad. We can also see how,
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because of the very fact that the common good is the basis
of authority, authority, when it is unjust, betrays its own
political essence. (For these points of a second and a third
characteristic, see Maritain, 1971: 9-11)
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CHAPTER 7. LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN VALUE
I. Autonomy and Desert.
When we argue for a non-institutional conception of
desert as an essential criterion of justice, we need to
demonstrate how this argument is to be justified. Tackling
this question requires a substantive moral inquiry. As we
shall see, any kind of approach to desert-based justice
presupposes both a particular vision of the self and a
specific view of the social relations of persons. Thus my
central aim here is to display the underlying justification
of desert-claims by a normative inquiry into personal
identity, personal autonomy, and the nature of a person's
social relations. Let us first examine the notion of
personal autonomy.
It seems safe to say that there is a generic feature of
every desert-claim that is morally significant. This is the
connection between desert and autonomous action. Thus, as
James Rachels points out, treating people as they deserve
is one way of treating them as autonomous beings,
responsible for their own conduct. A person who is punished
for his wrongdoings is held responsible for them in a
concrete way. The recognition of desert is bound up with
this way of regarding people. (See Rachels, 1978: 159) But
this suggestion, though sensible, is far too weak to
justify any specific desert-claim. To do that, the
desert-autonomy link must provide some positive reason for
persons to have what they are said to deserve. Since it is
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widely agreed that persons ought to have and exercise
autonomy itself, the most natural way of giving such a
reason is to argue that the value of a person's acting
autonomously is somehow transmitted to, or inherited by,
what he is said to deserve. In other words, it may be
possible to infer from the premise that it is good that
persons act autonomously the conclusion that it is good
that they have certain things that flow from their
autonomous acts.
How can we make this argument work? To do so, we must
show, first, that autonomous acts have real value, and
second, that the link between such acts and the outcome we
take to be deserved is a suitable conduit for this value.
At first, few would deny that persons ought to be able to
choose and act autonomously since we can hardly say that it
is a good thing when someone else can determine our own
fate. We can easily observe that in democratic societies at
least this particular conception of human well-being based
on self-determination and personal life-plan has acquired
considerable popularity. It is the ideal of personal
autonomy. The ideal of personal autonomy is, stated
briefly, the vision of people controlling, to some degree,
their own destiny, fashioning it through successive
decisions throughout their lives.
Furthermore, as Raz points out, this is an ideal
particularly suited to the conditions of the industrial age
and its aftermath with fast-changing technologies and free
movement of labour. Industrial and post-industrial
societies do call for an ability to cope with changing
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technological, economic and social conditions, an ability
to adjust, to acquire new skills, to move from one
subculture to another, to come to terms with new scientific
and moral views.(See Raz, 1986: 369-70)
The next question to answer is how the value of
autonomous acts is transmitted to particular outcomes. Why
should the value of anyone's exercise of autonomy mean that
he should have one thing rather than another? Indeed,
however valuable autonomy is, why should its exercise imply
that a person should have anything at all?
To answer these questions, we must look more closely at
autonomous action itself. There have been much discussions
of the conditions under which persons act autonomously, and
of the bearing of causality and reasons upon an agent's
autonomy. At this moment, though, what matters is not an
autonomous act's antecedents, but its projected
consequences. Before acting, we typically weigh alternative
acts whose consequences extend from the present into the
intermediate and more distant future. Our deliberations
thus encompass both possible initial acts and the various
later events we expect them to cause. But if our
deliberation itself displays this complexity, then the
contents of the resulting choices must be similarly
complex. Because we deliberate with an eye to consequences,
our autonomous choices must encompass not just our
immediate doings, but also the later lines of development
to which we expect them to lead. Thus, at least one
connection between autonomous acts and their consequences
is internal to the notion of autonomous agency itself.
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And, given this connection, we can indeed see why any
value that attaches to an autonomous act might carry over
to that act's consequences. Because at least some of those
consequences are part of what an agent chooses, it would be
quite arbitrary and inappropriate to say that it is good
that the agent perform the act he has chosen, but not good
that he enjoy or suffer that act's predictable
consequences. Since choices encompass both acts and
consequences, any value that attaches to the implementation
of choice must belong equally to both.
In light of this, our common sense reason for saying that
autonomous agents ought to enjoy or suffer specific
consequences, namely, be held responsible for specific
consequences of their conduct, is that those consequences,
where predictable, have acquired value from the fact that
they are part of what the agent has chosen.In that case,
what justifies our desert-claim will be the value of the
retrospective aspect of autonomous action itself. (For this
line of argument, see Sher, 1987: 39-40)
II. Autonomy-based Freedom and the Predicament of Choice.
Let us turn to the issue of autonomy-based freedom and to
what extent the exercise of freedom will be allowable in
the fabric of contemporary democratic societies. Previously
in Chapter 1, we have dealt with the idea of
freedom as 'free will' or 'moral freedom'; the freedom we
shall deal with here is 'political freedom' as the idea
describing or demanding a kind of relation between one
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person and others, and more particularly the problems of
freedom as a political ideal, as an object which political
and social institutions ought to be desighed to preserve or
achieve.
The doctrine of political freedom is widely understood to
be based on the ideas of autonomy and value-pluralism. It
is sometimes thought that the argument from autonomy is the
specifically liberal argument for freedom, the one argument
which is not shared by non-liberals, and which displays
the spirit of the liberal approach to politics. Thus it is
sometimes assumed that respect for autonomy requires
government to avoid pursuing any conception of the good
life. Those favouring autonomy urge that the process of
justification of political institutions must be acceptable
to each citizen, must appeal to considerations that are
recognized to be valid by all the members of the society.
In particular, the ideal of autonomy is used to support a
doctrine of political freedom reflecting
anti-perfectionism, the exclusion of ideals from politics.
This view, for example, is related to what Ronald Dworkin
refers to as the notion of equal concern and respect. A
government is required to treat its citizens neutrally, in
the sense that it cannot favour the interests of some over
others. This idea is used by Dworkin to argue for the
existence of various rights. However, my position here is
to argue against such views, espousing a perfectionist
value of autonomy.
It is rational to think that autonomy has to be valued in
order to get the liberal programme of individual persons
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off the ground. However, the belief that an autonomous life
is more worthwhile than other forms of existence can be
better justified if the autonomy is utilized to promote
human excellence in its relevant field of exercise. I am
not alone in vindicating this view. For example, Vinit
Haksar claims that an appeal to the value of autonomy
involves an appeal to perfectionist considerations.(Haksar,
1979: 189) We may argue in line with Haksar that, even when
a liberal society is set up, we would still need to appeal
to perfectionist considerations in order to operate it, for
instance, in order to decide which forms of life to
encourage among the young or in order to show why some
exercise of liberties is more important than others. How
can we substantiate these arguments?
If we try to bring up a child so that he becomes an
autonomous agent, we shall in a sense be influencing him;
we shall be helping to make him a different sort of person
from what he would be if he were not an autonomous agent.
The view that autonomy is among the constituents of a
person's good is a kind of perfectionism. A person who has
been conditioned in the Brave New World may also have
freedom in the sense of capacity to fulfil his wants and
aims, though he will not have the freedom to choose
between alternative ways of life. Indeed if he has been
suitably conditioned (so that he does not aim too high) he
may also find it much easier to satisfy his wants and aims
than the autonomous agent who may be pursuing aims that are
difficult to attain. Thus a view that some forms of life
should get lower status than others is not quite as
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outrageous and eccentric as it may appear at first. This
view can be sustainable with evidences which we can
recognize in liberal democracies. For instance, even when
there is equality between all religions, the equality does
not automatically extend to all groups that claim to be
religious. Let us take a case as an example: in the United
States there are groups that go in for drugs such as LSD as
a means of attaining Spiritual Salvation, yet such groups
are not automatically given all the legal privileges and
rights that are extended to all recognized religious
groups.(See ibid. 188 and 297)
If we examine more closely the ideal of autonomy which
bears on our ordinary course of action, we will find that
autonomy functions as not only a political ideal, but also
a social and moral one.(See Gerald Dworkin, 1988: 10-2)
As to a social aspect of autonomous action, let us
consider the following problem. We have a set of issues
concerning the ways in which the nonpolitical institutions
of a society affect the values, attitudes, and beliefs of
the members of the society. Our dispositions, attitudes,
values, wants are affected by the economic institutions, by
the mass media, by the force of public opinion, by social
class, and so forth. To a large extent these institutions
are not chosen by our free and autonomous determination; we
simply find ourselves faced with them.
Many social theorists have worried about how individuals
can develop their own conception of the good life in the
face of such factors, and how we can distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate ways of influencing the minds
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of the members of society. While Marxists have been most
vocal in raising the issues of 'false consciousness', and
'true versus false needs', it is important to see that the
question is one which we must tackle carefully to maintain
a healthy democratic society. For it is a reasonable
feature of any good society that it is self-sustaining in
the sense that people who grow up in such a society will
acquire a respect for and commitment to the principles
which justify and regulate its existence.
And then, what is the moral implication of autonomy?
Conceptions of autonomy are also used to argue for the
illegitimacy of obedience to authority. The emphasis in
this argument is on the individual making up his own mind
about the merits of legal restrictions. This use of
autonomy seems much closer in content to the ideal of moral
autonomy. Then, what is the ideal of moral autonomy? As a
moral notion which is forcefully vindicated by Kant and
shared by many philosophers, the argument is about the
necessity or desirability of individuals choosing or
willing or accepting their own moral code. According to
this idea, we are all responsible for developing and
criticizing our moral principles, and individual conscience
should take precedence over authority and tradition.
The upshot of above discussions is that in those three
areas of autonomy - political, social, and moral, we find
that there is a notion of the self which is to be
respected, left unmanipulated, and which is, in certain
ways, independent and self-determining. But here, we also
find certain tensions and paradoxes. If the notion of
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self-determination is given a very strong definition - the
unencumbered self, the unchosen chooser - then it seems as
if autonomy is impossible. We know that all individuals
have a history. They develop socially and psychologically
in a given environment with a set of biological endowments.
They mature slowly and are, therefore, heavily influenced
by parents, peers, and culture. How, then, can we talk of
self-determination?
Again, there seems to be a conflict between the afore¬
mentioned notion of self-determination and other important
notions of correctness and objectivity. If we are to make
reasonable choices, then we must be governed by canons of
reasoning, norms of conduct, standards of excellence that
are not themselves the products of our own self-tutored
choices. We have acquired them at least partly as the
result of others' advice, example, teaching - or, perhaps,
by some innate coding. In any case, we cannot have
determined these for ourselves. Here our formidable
question is how and to what extent we can allow people to
enjoy independent autonomy and freedom as respected persons
while not ignoring the factual predicament of choice which
has been forged and defined by customary practices and
community values. I shall tackle this problem by proposing
an analysis of personal identity in contemporary societies
and, based upon that, by combining two kinds of the
indispensable human good for becoming a perfect citizen,
namely, individual liberty and communitarian virtue.
III. Liberal-Communitarian Value.
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It has become a commonplace that most contemporary
liberal theory is 'deontological', that is, gives priority
to the right over the good, in contrast to utilitarian, or
communitarian, or perfectionist theory, which is
' teleological' , that is, gives priority to the good over
the right. Like so much else in the current vocabulary of
political discourse, this distinction was made prominent
by Rawls's Theory of Justice. Rawls argues that it is a
great virtue of his theory that it gives priority to the
right over the good. Critics, however, have argued that
this is liberalism's foundational flaw. The criticism is
found not just among the old-style utilitarians Rawls was
chiefly arguing against, but also among socialists and
conservatives, communitarians and feminists. The desire to
give priority to the right over the good is said to reflect
unattractive or even incoherent assumptions about human
interests and human community. The question of whether the
right or the good is prior is now seen as a central
dividing point for contemporary political theories.
My task here is an eclectic one: while taking a view that
the good is prior to right as a foundational point, I shall
try to narrow the gaps between two onesided arguments by
clarifying the differences of view on personal identity and
social conditions under which we live.
Let us first examine the communitarian attacks against
liberal theories. There are perhaps almost as many
communitarian positions as there are communitarian writers.
Nevertheless, some common threads run through most of the
important communitarian works. The fundamental
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communitarian criticisms seem to be these:
(See Buchanan, 1989: 852-3)
(i) Liberalism devalues, neglects, and undermines
community, and community is a fundamental and irreplaceable
ingredient in the good life for human beings.
(ii) Liberalism undervalues political life - viewing
political association as a merely instrumental good, it is
blind to the fundamental importance of full participation
in political community for the good life for human beings.
(iii) Liberalism fails to provide, or is imcompatible
with, an adequate account of the importance of certain
types of obligations and commitments - those that are not
chosen or explicitly undertaken through contracting or
promising - such as familial obligations and obligations to
support one's community or country.
(iv) Liberalism presupposes a defective conception of the
self, failing to recognize that self is 'embedded' in and
partly constituted by communal commitments and values which
are not objects of choice.
(v) Liberalism wrongly exalts justice as being 'the first
virtue of social institutions', failing to see that, at
best, justice is a remedial virtue, needed only in
circumstances in which the higher virtue of community has
broken down.
Once we attempt to interpret these rather abstract and
complex pronouncements and delineate connections among
them, the task of reconstruction will form shape. It will
be easier if we simplify the main points of communitarian
critique against the liberal political thesis,
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distinguishing the gist of the communitarian points into
two different versions. The first is the radical
communitarian view that rejects individual civil and
political rights out of hand and seeks to replace
references to individual rights either with teleological
talk about the goods of communities or with talk about
group rights. The moderate communitarian, by contrast,
acknowledges individual civil and political rights but
denies that they have the sort of priority the liberal
attributes to them. This latter claim does, however, depend
upon how strongly the liberal's priority thesis is stated.
For Rawls the priority appears to be as strong as possible
since he accords the basic liberties lexical priority.
The liberal political thesis which communitarians with
different versions concurrently attack is the thesis that
the proper role of the state is to protect basic individual
liberties, not to make its citizens virtuous or to impose
upon them any particular or substantive conception of the
good life. This thesis is the principle of neutrality. Thus
with this, if the state enforces the basic civil and
political rights it will leave individuals free, within
broad limits, to pursue their own conceptions of the good
and will preclude itself from imposing upon them any one
particular conception of the good or of virtue. Neutrality
is justified because it is the practical expression of
priority of freedom over the good.
However, there can be another version of the liberal
political thesis which we may call perfectionistic
liberalism. By this thesis we can argue for the worth of
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the life characterized by distinctively liberal virtues and
goals. This view asserts the worth of a life of
self-mastery, self-expression, active pursuit of knowledge,
unhesitating acceptance of moral responsibility. The
liberal state is justified, according to this view, because
it is designed to foster liberal virtues, to allow the
maximum scope for their exercise. This view has been
defended, for example, by Brian Barry who insists that "a
liberal must take his stand on the proposition that some
ways of life, some types of character are more admirable
than others... He must hold that societies ought to be
organized in such a way as to produce the largest possible
proportion of people with an admirable type of character
and the best possible chance to act in accordance with
it..."(Barry, 1973: 126)
Here my strategy for espousing a thesis of liberal-
communitarian value is to explore the possibility whether
we can accommodate the communitarian core virtue of caring
as an objective value within the realm of perfectionistic
liberal value. But before doing this, let us examine more
closely the communitarian critique of liberalism and the
contents of its validity and deficiencies.
First, we may begin with the radical communitarian
complaint that liberalism devalues, neglects, and
undermines community. To assess its force we must do two
things: first fix on a preliminary idea of what community
is, and then understand the nature of the thesis that
community is a fundamental human good and the implication
of this thesis for the liberal political thesis.
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Communitarians emphasize that a genuine community is not
a mere association of individuals. Members of a community
have common ends, not merely congruent private interests,
and these are conceived of and valued as common ends by the
members. If I am a member of a community I share goals and
values with other members. I and they conceive of these as
our goals, not just as goals which we each have as
individuals and that happen to be the same for all of us.
By contrast, in a mere association, individuals conceive of
their interests as independent and potentially opposed.
Their relationships with one another are viewed not as in
themselves constituting the good of their endeavours but as
the means toward private goods independently identified.
As Buchanan argues, the claim that community is a
fundamental good for human beings may be understood in two
ways: either as a descriptive psychological generalization
that human beings strongly desire community, or at least
find it deeply satisfying or fulfilling when they achieve
it; or as a normative claim that community is an important
objective good for human beings. Then, the former must be
supported by empirical data while the latter requires a
philosophical theory of the good - a theory of objective
value.(See Buchanan, 1989: 857)
Can we then explain the human desire for communal
relationship with any psychological theory? According to
Erich Fromm, a social psychologist, there are two kinds of
basic needs which are indispensable parts of human nature
and imperatively need satisfaction, namely, physiologically
conditioned needs and psychologically conditioned needs.
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The former needs are rooted in the physiological
organization of man, like hunger, thirst, the need for
sleep, and so on. For each of those needs there exists a
certain threshold beyond which lack of satisfaction is
unbearable for self-preservation. Likewise the
psychologically conditioned need is equally an imperative
part of human nature. This need is not rooted in bodily
processes but in the very essence of the human mode and
practice of life: the need to be related to the world
outside oneself, the need to avoid aloneness, to have a
feeling of communion and belonging. (See Fromm, 1942: 13-5)
As to a normative claim that community is an objective
social value for human beings, we can deduce the premise
from the fundamental nature and factual conditions of human
beings.
After all, the radical communitarian attack against the
liberal political thesis is that the latter rests upon a
distorted psychology or a distorted normative theory that
fails to recognize the good of community. The distortion,
allegedly, is that the underlying psychology and normative
theory are excessively individualistic. Thus what we
require, if we are, to respond to this radical
communitarian complaint is to advance a
non-hyper-individualistic justification for the individual
civil and political rights that are thought to be
distinctive of liberalism.
My view of liberal individual rights is that they should
not be seen as set in invariable opposition to community
values, but can provide valuable protections for the
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flourishing of community. My hypothesis is that radical
communitarians have been blind to the value that individual
rights contribute to community because they have wrongly
assumed that the primary if not the only justification for
them rests exclusively upon an ideal of individual
autonomy or of individual well-being in which
participation and sharing in community is not conceived of
as being an important ingredient in the individual's good.
Then how do the liberal individual rights protect
community? Although we are acknowledged that community is
an important human good and participation in political
community is an essential ingredient in the good life for
all humans, the radical communitarian vindication for an
all-inclusive communal participation seems untenable. Given
the apparent diversity of the conditions of human
flourishing, the pronouncement that the best life for all,
or even most, humans requires participation in the most
inclusive form of political organization is sheer
dogmatism in the absence of a well-defended, highly
particularistic, and absolutist theory of objective good.
It would be a mistake, of course, to argue that the liberal
political thesis is superior by virtue of being
value-neutral or value-subjectivism based on skepticism -
neither of which it need involve.
Then again how can the liberal individual rights be
reconciled with community value? We can reply by giving
sound practical reasons for employing individual rights,
yet without smuggling in objectionably
hyper-individualistic assumptions. First, individual rights
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to freedom of religion, thought, expression, and
association facilitate rational, nonviolent change in
existing communities as well as the rational, nonviolent
formation of new communities. Secondly, I wish to suggest
that liberal society offers the best feasible framework for
rendering autonomy and commitment to others compatible. The
compatibility is achieved, of course, through compromise.
Without the protection for autonomy and independence
guaranteed by liberal rights, the individual, absorbed in
community, unable to reflect critically upon his role, his
obligations, and the character of his community as a whole,
may become an unwitting accomplice in an immoral way of
life. A moral agent is one whose behavior in some basic
sense is his own; and one makes behavior one's own through
the exercise of choice, either directly or indirectly.
Members of a community will be neither unencumbered, bare
selves nor social robots who have abdicated their moral
agency (or never been allowed to develop it) . For the
community itself will be constituted in part by a tradition
of ongoing self-criticism.
Here, the important idea is that the notion of desert as
the central criterion of justice is most viable in the
context of a liberal community; reward and punishment
according to individual efforts and contributions are most
meaningfully acknowledged in that liberl community whose
primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for
man and the good of that community and where individuals
identify their primary interests with reference to those
goods.(See and compare Maclntyre, 1985, 2nd edition: 250)
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I have argued so far that the justificatory basis for the
liberal political thesis need not and should not be
construed so narrowly. The advocate of the perfectionistic
liberal thesis can embrace an expanded psychology and a
richer theory of the good and can admit that not only
autonomy but also community is of fundamental importance.
My analysis suggests that the best justificatory framework
for the liberal political thesis has the resources to
incorporate much of what is valuable in communitarian
thought without abandoning the prominent role for
individual rights that is distinctive of liberalism.
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CHAPTER 8. TWO-STAGE JUSTIFICATION FOR REWARD AND
PUNISHMENT
I. Framework of Justification.
So far I have proposed a two-stage justification for
reward and punishment, namely, the first stage on the
principle of justice based on desert and the second stage
on the principle of the common good. Since justice is not
the whole, though it is central and a particularly
important element of social morality, a justification of
reward and punishment based on justice ('just' reward and
punishment, just-making) is not sufficient for a complete
justification of those kinds of treatment. The complete
justification which should be based on the common good
('appropriate' reward and punishment, good-making) needs an
extra consideration of utility in the individual case in
addition to the primary test of justice.
In these two different senses of justification, namely,
just-making and good-making or just and appropriate, I have
argued that we can establish a two-stage justification for
reward and punishment. (See Chapter 5, III. and Chapter 6,
I.) For establishing the above premise I have employed
explicitly or implicitly a number of supporting principles.
We may recall those principles as follows:
(i) While there are diverse basic human goods and values of
life in society, namely, self-preservation,
self-development, happiness and harmony, and practical
reasonableness, the ultimate end to which the rational
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human pursuit or possession of such goods is directed is
self-fulfilment and flourishing.('The thesis of
self-fulfilment')(See Chapter 6, V.)
(ii) In making progress toward self-fulfilment, the human
being, though he is in his thought and conduct influenced
by his social, psychological, and physiological conditions,
is by his fundamental nature regarded as possessing and
exercising free-will. As to the principle of responsibility
of a free and rational moral agent, autonomous action,
personal choice, and one's desert on account of one's acts
and choices will be a proper basis for rendering one's due
reward and punishment.('The thesis of free-will and
autonomous action')(See Chapter 1, III. and Chapter 7, I.)
(iii) Any distributive inequality in reward and punishment
according to desert is only justified if in regard to the
matter of distribution everyone has been given an equal
opportunity to participate and exert effort.('The thesis of
equal opportunity for desert')(See
Chapter 1, 11.3.(2))
(iv) Any distributive inequality in reward according to
desert is only justified after each member of society has
given an equal satisfaction of basic needs according to the
principle of needs. ('The thesis of equal satisfaction of
basic needs')(This principle is introduced here for the
first time.)
(v) Desert discourse and thus justice discourse are in
their nature teleological since invoking or administering
justice requires a communication and sharing of a common
sense of justice among the members of community or society,
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and this development and sharing of a common sense of
justice is of value since it creates the conditions for
nurturing the other human virtues in society.('The thesis
of desert and justice discourse as teleological
communication')(See Chapter 1, II.2 and Chapter 5. III.)
(vi) Since human nature and the idea of justice are
essentially teleological, the concept of justice as a
static equilibrium, or as formal reciprocity, requires to
be transformed into a dynamic equilibrium, equitable
reciprocity with due regard for the common good where the
seemingly conflicting ideas of liberty, equality, and
solidarity are fully intertwined and harmonized as a state
of social homeostasis.('The thesis of dynamic equilibrium
and harmony')(See Chapter 6, II. and V.4)
(vii) Where rewards or punishments are apportioned by
public institutions, the proper criterion for a person's
reward or punishment is not abstract moral desert but
'institutional desert', determined according to whether or
not the person succeeds or fails in fulfilling the
requirements of institutional rules or laws which have
themselves to be justified by their tendency to secure
abstract desert and the common good.('The thesis of
institutional natural law')(See Chapter 6, II. and V.4)
These schematic principles of justice and the common good
look rather abstract and simplified while real situations
for human life are so complex that they cannot be plotted
on to a simple and straightforward framework. However, I
believe my framework and principles of justification are
plausible as a basis for better understanding of and better
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solutions to concrete problems. Thus, to substantiate my
theses, I need to give a fuller exposition of each
principle with supporting arguments, where possible testing
the principle for its applicability to real or hypothetical
problem cases.
II. Seven Theses.
II.1. The thesis of self-fulfilment.
We may first consider the general question about the
reason why we should live, or more correctly, live a life
in society at all. The most plausible answers to this
question seem to connect with various kinds of teleological
theories, namely, egoistic hedonism, utilitarianism, or a
perfectionistic theory of self-fulfilment. Men should live
in society because of the obvious advantages derived
therefrom. Without society men cannot survive, since
society alone makes possible the division of labour and
exchange of commodities which are necessary for the
satisfaction of men's material needs. Many philosophers
also stress that other kinds of goods besides biological
and economic ones are made possible only by social
relations, including those of human association itself:
men value one another's company and friendship quite apart
from any economic benefits they may derive therefrom. Other
philosophers add that the cultivation of the moral and
intellectual virtues is possible only through society.
Although the initial emphasis of each of these arguments
is seen from egoistic viewpoints, referring to the good of
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each individual separately, they also become, by extension,
utilitarian arguments referring to the greatest general
happiness. That is, more total good is achieved if men live
in society than if they do not.
The self-fulfilment theory which I have defended so far
is not opposed to the idea of pleasure or happiness, but it
does not regard pleasure as the specific end of human
action, or as the one quality which makes right acts right.
As we have discussed, when a human being aims at and
strives to achieve specifically human goals, then there can
be deeper satisfaction in achievement. For example, to a
violinist who is playing for a much-acclaimed orchestra, a
sculptor, a carpenter, or any teacher, and in general to
all human beings who have a function or activity, the good
would be thought to reside in performing that function
well, while pleasure or satisfaction is a by-product of
such good functioning, not the end or aim.
A self-fulfilment theory is much more clearly
teleological than utilitarianism in being concerned with
the goals persons intend to achieve by their actions and
not with consequences as such. Ends and consequences are
not identical, for, although ends may be looked upon as
intended consequences, consequences need not be intended.
It is also true that persons do not always succeed in
producing the consequences they intend. So there seems to
be a real difference in judging actions according to ends
or intentions, on the one hand, and in judging them
according to consequences, on the other.
Many of the consequences of actions are accidental or
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unintended. A policeman chasing a bank-robber fires a gun
to stop him, but by mistake accidentally wounds a nearby
innocent pedestrian. Sometimes, when a doctor intends to
cure his patients' disease quickly by giving them a
high-unit antibiotic, he happens to harm them instead. Thus
the difference between a perfectionist and a utilitarian is
that the perfectionist focuses on the intention as the
factor that determines the morality of the act, and the
utilitarian focuses on the consequences. Intentions also
tend to be determinate or specific, whereas consequences
are indeterminate. Persons usually know what they intend to
accomplish by their actions, but they cannot always know
what the consequences of their actions will be.
However, goals and consequences are related in a number
of ways. Goals may be spoken of as intended consequences.
We also judge the success or failure of an intention by
looking to see what is actually done. But sometimes we
distinguish the goodness or badness of an act based on a
consideration of its consequences from the goodness or
badness of the agent who performs that act based on his or
her intentions. That is, we may say that someone is a good
person, for intending to do well, even though that person
brings about bad things - by failing to do what is
intended.
Thus, in such a context we may argue that the agent's
culpability depend crucially on whether he intended to do
evil, or rather foresaw evil as a side-effect of his
action: this is because, for instance, while it is always
wrong to intend the death of an innocent, we may sometimes
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justifiably do what we know will cause the death of an
innocent as a side-effect.
Let us consider a situation where a person is confronted
by a voluntary or involuntary threat from somebody to his
or her own life or safety. Any one so confronted is morally
justified to repel the threat, to stop it in its tracks, by
means sufficient (but not more than sufficient: here is the
case of a genuine use of 'proportionality') to stop it even
if those means will as a matter of fact cause the death of
the attacker whose act (however involuntary) is itself the
threat. This act of self-defence on the part of the
defender is an act with a double effect; one effect is the
stopping of the life-threatening act, the other is the
bringing about of the death of the attacker. For the one
engaged in justified self-defence, the latter effect is a
side-effect and so can be unintended; and where death is an
unintended and unwanted result of an act which is otherwise
justifiable, there is no direct killing and no choice
directly against the basic good of life.(See Finnis, 1983:
132)
The self-fulfilment theory may be criticized because of
the demands it makes upon individuals, because its standard
is human excellence. We hear much talk today about the need
to avoid stress and how we can make ourselves feel good by
lowering our expectations or reducing our goals. We are
sometimes told to be non-judgmental, to be forgiving of
our faults. Although such advice may help us avoid excess,
it tends to miss the point, so central to self-fulfilment
theory, that there can be deep satisfaction in achievement.
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There is satisfaction to be found in the struggle to
achieve a goal, as well as in the accomplishment of it - as
a student, a parent, or in a profession or even a hobby.
II.2. The thesis of free-will and autonomous action.
(1) Free Will.
The idea that personality has some kind of essence,
struggling for self-realization or free expression - that
positive freedom consists in actualizing this ideal self -
is a recurrent theme in moral and social philosophy. A
person as a free and rational agent is thought of as a
responsible and potentially progressive being moving toward
self-fulfilment, yet the degree of, and means of achieving
that goal may vary according to one's actual individual
character and choice of instrumental value.
We have suggested, in defining the justifying and
extenuating conditions of punishment, that both blame and
punishment presuppose acts stemming from the deliberate
intention of a free and responsible agent.(See Chapter 5,
III.) Consequently, a case for either could be rebutted by
showing that a man was not responsible for his actions. If,
for instance, he had been compelled to act with a pistol at
his back, or if he were insane and subject to
uncontrollable impulses, we should say he could not help
doing what he did - that he was not a free agent - and
therefore not culpable (or not eligible for reward).
Some people, however, claim that there is a sense in
which none of us is free. Everyone, they would say, is
formed by his past and by his environment. What he is and
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what he does can be accounted for by complex causes that go
back to childhood and even beyond. Free-will is thus an
illusion; the choices made by normal men are as much
determined as those of lunatics. We are all prisoners of
our past.
This view has been widely held to be destructive of
morality. For if we are not free to choose between right
and wrong, what point could there be in saying we ought to
choose the right, and blaming anyone for choosing the
wrong? Similarly, it has often been thought to undermine
the moral basis of punishment. For since we have allowed
that no one ought to be punished who is not responsible for
his actions, would it not seem to follow that if no one is
responsible, punishment must be given up altogether, and
replaced by remedial treatment? If an assassin cannot help
the murder he commits any more than the dagger cannot help
stabbing the victim, what point is there in concepts like
guilt, responsibility, and punishment?
As we have observed, questions of free-will usually arise
when being free is contrasted with being determined; for it
is thought that if there is determinism in human affairs,
then we cannot be really free. Hobbes, for example, who was
fascinated by the science of mechanics, suggested that
human-beings,like watches, were part of a mechanical system
of nature, and that all their actions were determined, as
those of a clock are determined by its spring.(See Hobbes,
1904: Introduction, xviii.) Hobbes viewed that human
relation or social organization is the product of the
interactions of mechanically determined individuals and
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innate competitive and aggressive drives.
Other significant strands of determinism were later added
by Marx who stressed the economic determinants of social
action, and by Freud, who stressed the unconscious
psychological determinants of individual behaviour laid
down in early childhood. Let us see their theories briefly.
Marx, having been influenced from Hegel's historical
determinism and Darwin's notion of natural selection,
developed his own theory of economic determinism. He
believed that our characters and actions are not as much
historically determined as they are economically and
socially determined. Marx's theory, called dialectical
materialism, states that human beings are determined by an
evolutionary economic class struggle. He believed that
there is an inevitable economic force in nature which human
beings cannot control and which will eventually lead to the
ultimate goal, a classless society. However, some immediate
attacks on this theory are as follows: although there is no
doubt that people are influenced by their individual
economic status and that of their society, there are many
other influences which affect economics as well as human
beings. For example, scientific and technological
developments have a great deal of influence on the economic
stutus of societies and their members - perhaps more than
that economics itself has on science and technology.
Furthermore, human beings affect or determine the changes
in economics at least to the extent that economics affects
them, as can be seen in the current development of economic
reform in Soviet Union.
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Freud put forth the theory that human beings are
determined, even prior to birth in the womb, by their
unconscious minds and by various natural drives which their
society's mores and customs require them to repress. For
example, one of Freud's theories is that all sons are
basically in love with their mother (Oedipus complex) and
all daughters are basically in love with their fathers
(Electra complex). Because incest is forbidden in most
societies, these unconscious yet natural drives must be
repressed, causing human beings to be affected in different
ways. Therefore, if mothers or fathers give too much, too
little, or the wrong kind of love to their sons or
daughters, the entire mental and emotional lives of the
children can be affected to the point where they become
neurotic or psychotic. Here, the most striking and
controversial aspect of Freud's view of human nature is his
emphasis on sexuality, whether repressed or not, as a
motive for human action. Though there are a great deal of
deeper and more subtle theories developed and maintaied by
Freud which I cannot deal with here adequately and this
matter is beyond my purpose, one major criticism of his
theories is that they are too generalized to have any real
and conclusive basis in fact.
However, such theories have given rise to a widespread
conviction that human decision is impotent in determining
what human beings do. Men were pictured as puppets at the
mercy of forces which they could not understand nor
control. But here, an important question to be raised is
that: is this postulated antithesis between being free and
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being determined really legitimate? What do we mean when we
say that our behaviour is determined? And if our behaviour
is determined, does this mean that it cannot also be free?
Problems connected with freedom and determinism are best
clarified by examining what we wish to convey when we say
that an action is 'determined' . For there are two different
things, which are often confused, which 'determined' can
mean. Firstly, there is what we might call 'causal
explicability' and, secondly, 'unavoidability'. Many
people have failed to distinguish these two very different
strands in the meaning of the term 'determined', and they
have often thought that 'determined' involves both of these
things. When we say that our behaviour is determined,
therefore, it is often assumed both that our behaviour has
causes and that it is unavoidable. But my position here is
that simply because our behaviour has causes it does not
necessarily follow that it is unavoidable. There is in
general no necessary connection between the two senses of
'determined'. Events whose causes are known are not
necessarily also unavoidable. Indeed, very often, knowing
a cause of something is a necessary condition of being able
to avoid it. If we know that late nights cause irritability
at breakfast, we know what to do to avoid irritability at
breakfast. Thus 'free' and 'responsible' are only used
appropriately as contrasts to 'determined' if by
'determined' we mean 'having causes of the compelling
sort' . (For this point, see Benn and Peters, 1959: 198-9)
In sum, since we know that physical events can cause
thoughts and feelings, there is no reason to suppose that
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the opposite cannot happen. The ideas of moral
responsibility, moral guilt, and remorse all presuppose
that a deliberate act is freely chosen and could have been
avoided. A charge of moral culpability can be rebutted with
the claim that one could not help doing what one did. If
the action could not have been avoided, then one is not
culpable. Along with these ideas go those of desert and
just punishment. Punishment involves voluntary choice and
responsibility. Let us examine in more detail the idea of
autonomous action or voluntary choice.
(2) Autonomous Action.
As a complete set of criteria of justice, I shall propose
three in this thesis: moral desert, institutional desert or
entitlement, and basic needs. Among these three, the claim
based on moral desert is the most important and ultimate
criterion of justice since only the idea of moral desert
can squarely reflect the value of an autonomous action and
the responsibility of human beings as moral agents. Why is
it worthwhile living in a human society? Is it because we
can earn food, clothing, and shelter in a more secure way
than in any other form of living and thus enjoy well-being
by satisfying our wants and desires? Or is it because we
can live a meaningful life in a society by allowing
everybody to fulfil his or her ideal through exercising his
or her own autonomous choice and effort? It is now widely
perceived as an uncontested idea that every human being
should be given an equal worth and dignity when we
recognize each other as moral persons. Then, in order to
truly treat a person as a responsible being, as a master of
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his or her life and fate, giving a due reward and
punishment to his or her own choices and works will be
considered to be essentially a fair and proper way of
treating each with the respect due to a moral agent.
Let us take a case which can explain why voluntary action
of one's own choice is important in the apportionment of
rewards and punishments. Imagine that a group of students
go on a sea-sailing exploration and are stranded on a
desert island, with limited resources. They have some
loaves of bread to distribute. Everyone is given one loaf
of bread. Everyone eats his loaf except three people. The
first of them has a mouldy loaf. The second gets a normal
loaf but, to his personal interest, voluntarily decides to
go angling to the seaside with his loaf using it as a bait,
hoping that it will not be snatched off by a fish before he
succeeds in catching it, but knowing that there is a risk
of its happening so. The loaf of bread is snatched away by
a fish from his fishing rod. The third one is like the
second, except that the person's reckless venture is a
result of a disease.
If the group of students have only two loaves of bread
after the initial distribution, then they should give a
loaf each to the first and third person rather than to the
second. The rationale for this decision may be a
retributive idea that the second person cannot complain of
his suffering of hunger due to his reckless risk-taking. It
would have been better if he had been able to eat a loaf or
a fish even though he ventured into a risk-taking angling.
But he deserves less sympathy than the other two. The loss
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that he undergoes should be discounted to some extent. Not
that he wanted the loss, but he knowingly and recklessly
took a risk, so in a sense he voluntarily brought the loss
on himself. But I do not mean that every kind of voluntary
risk-taking and subsequent probable loss should always be
discounted. If a mountaineer in a rescue team hurts himself
during a rescue operation, he brings the loss on himself.
Yet such a loss is not discounted; we do not give it a
lower priority in the allocation of medical resources. The
relevant rationale here is that we discount a loss when the
risk-taking business is oriented merely for an individual
interest and benefit rather than for a socially useful
purpose and there is a method of avoiding the loss that the
agent could reasonably have been expected to use.
This general rationale also applies to punishment.
Infliction of punishment may be viewed as an evil, but it
would be less of an evil when the person brings it on
himself. The voluntary wrongdoer has by his own free choice
and recklessness exposed himself to a liability to
punishment. We are less impressed with his loss when he
could and should have avoided it. So, other things being
equal, we are more ready to punish the voluntary criminal
than the involuntary one. One might believe in this general
rationale for rendering rewards and punishments because it
strikes one as intrinsically fair. This account is a basic
justifying reason for retributivism which holds that a just
punishment should depend on desert: punishment is justified
only if it is deserved for a voluntary offence, and the
severity of the punishment should be proportionate to the
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seriousness of the offence.
II.3. The thesis of equal opportunity for desert.
If we are ordinary, healthy, law-abiding members of
society, we are supposed to be engaged in some valuable
work in our own work-place as part of our pursuit of a
meaningful life. As a poet, carpenter, teacher, driver,
politician or whatever kind of a worker, we are engaged in
producing artefacts or goods, or rendering services, and as
a return for such work, we receive valuable goods or
services to maintain and sustain our life. That is a
somewhat idealized but essentially factual picture of our
ordinary social life. And, as we have observed in our
previous discussion, humans as free and autonomous agents
are all pursuing their diverse ways of life according to
available opportunities and their own abilities and
preferences as to job or position, in order to fulfil their
own purposes in plans of life.
If we endeavour to participate in valuable contributions
to society and expect a fair return for our contributions,
how can we secure a just opportunity to participate in that
work for a fair return? The maxim of justice, 'to give to
each one's due', requires us to ask what one's due is and
how we can decide to give one his or her due. Since in the
'circumstances of justice' we find it necessary to compare
and distinguish each person from others to give each his or
her own due, we should look after all at the qualities or
attributes of each person. This discernment of personal
characteristics for the sake of justice is not an easy
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task. However, the relevant criteria of just distribution
should be three, namely, moral desert, institutional desert
(entitlement), and basic needs. If these criteria would be
considered to be acceptable, the ensuing question to be
answered will be how, or in what manner, we can assess and
rank, if feasible, the relative value of each person's
moral or institutional desert, or basic needs. Furthermore,
if there arises a conflict among those three seemingly
competing criteria, how can we solve the problem of
priority-setting among those three?
Suppose, for example, an old man who has established a
substantial amount of wealth after a long life of hard work
is going to die. He has several children, one of whom is
blind, another a playboy with expensive tastes, a third a
prospective politician with expensive ambitions, another a
poet with humble needs, another a sculptor who works in
expensive material, and so forth. He wants to be called a
fair father and contemplates a just and equitable way of
distribution. How shall he draw his will? For all the
differences in characteristics of each child, he loves his
children 'equally' and wishes every child well-being and
flourishing. Now he wants to know how he can treat his
children justly or fairly and whether just treatment is
identical with equal treatment. Then, the question is what
equal treatment is. Is it equality of resources, or
equality of welfare, or equality of opportunity? With these
questions I shall begin discussions.
Our assumption here is that in any kind of society,
whether in family, company, or the state, there is a moral
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or legal obligation to distribute social wealth and
resources justly to the members of society. Our main
question then concerns the justifying grounds of any
particular mode of distribution. My approach to this
question is twofold: Firstly, under the general principle
of equality, an initial appeal is to a presumption of equal
distribution of society's benefits and burdens among
members.; Secondly, if the initial presumption of equal
distribution is found inappropriate, then, (i) as to the
matter of desert, "from each according to his autonomous
choice, to each according to his desert", (ii) as to the
matter of basic needs, "from each according to his means,
to each according to his needs." So let us begin with
those.
(1) The Right to Equality.
As a formal way of treating people justly, we should
start from the principle of equality which is derived from
the fundamental premise of natural rights of man, namely,
that "all human beings are created free and equal in
dignity and rights." However, the principle of equality,
like justice itself, is another controversial notion; no
simple definition of equality has been made. Certainly,
equality would cause trouble if it does mean that everybody
is or should be the same: humans are unequal in capacities,
whether of physical strength or of brain, as they are in
beauty. The statement that "all men are equal" (or "all men
are born equal") should be meant primarily, not as a
statement of fact, but as a statement of right: all men
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have a right to equal treatment.
However, this right to equal treatment is only one source
of justice since another fundamental human right to freedom
requires a different, modified mode of treatment. Freedom
and the corollary of its exercise require us to accept
unequal treatment as can be seen in cases of giving varied
rewards to each person according to his or her desert. Thus
a right to equal treatment is only a presumptive one for
justice, applying only except and until when relevant
differentiating criteria between persons are established.
Then we can say that the principle of just treatment
presumably requires a right to equal treatment. If put in
a different formulation, it is to say, 'treat like cases
alike' or 'treat equals equally', 'treat unequals
unequally'.
To what do all men have an equal right? We may first
consider that everyone has a right to equal consideration.
If I show greater concern and give a favour to a
handicapped child, I may require a justifying account that
a handicapped child needs greater welfare support to
maintain even a minimally satisfactory life as a human
being. Otherwise I may face a complaint from other children
that they are ignored and thus treated discriminatorily.
Here, the right to equal treatment is initially a right to
equal consideration; and unless there are relevant
differentiating grounds, it requires giving the same
non-discriminatory treatment to the various people who are
affected by my decision. Then what about those relevant
differentiating grounds and circumstances? I suggest two
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relevant grounds: firstly, there is a right to equal
opportunity; and secondly, there is a right to the equal
satisfaction of basic needs.
(2) Equal Opportunity.
As a preliminary to the justification of equal
opportunity, we require some clarification of the concept
of opportunity. An opportunity may be said to occur when an
agent is in a situation in which he may choose whether or
not to perform some effortful act which is considered to be
desirable in itself or is a means to the attainment of some
goal which is considered to be desirable. An opportunity is
thus a type of liberty or freedom for it involves the
absence of prohibitions or obstacles limiting what agents
may do or acquire. The question now is whether a society or
the state is obligated to create equality of opportunities
in the senses just defined. We may imagine at least two
ways in which equality of opportunities can be defended.
Those would be: (i) the notion of desert; (ii) the
principle of efficiency.
The first and most important justification of equality of
opportunity focuses on the notion of desert. For each
social role or position, it is argued, a certain range of
personal qualities may be considered relevant. Here, the
essential element of relevant personal qualities is
individual's valuable effort. When we evaluate a person's
qualities, the most important element to be taken into
account of human value is, after differences of natural
endowment and social background of each person are
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considered, the distinctive characteristics of each person
enabling him to exert voluntarily and intentionally worthy
effort resulting in some valuable social contributions.
Individuals who have demonstrated and now possess these
qualities to an outstanding degree deserve that role or
position. A fair competition guided by equality of
opportunity will allow exemplary individuals to be
identified and rewarded.
Many critics have objected to this line of reasoning. It
is a mistake, they argue, to regard social positions as
prizes. In athletic competition, the first prize goes to
the one who has performed best. Here, it would be
inappropriate to take future performance into account or to
regard present performance in the context of future
possibilities. The award of the prize looks only backward
to what has already happened. The prize winner has
established desert through completed performance. In the
case of social positions, on the other hand, the past is of
interest primarily as an index of future performance. The
alleged criterion of desert is thus reducible to
considerations of efficiency.
This critique contains elements of truth, but I believe
that the sharp contrast it suggests is overdrawn. After
all, societies do not just declare the existence of certain
tasks to be performed. They also make known, at least in
general terms, the kinds of qualities and abilities that
will count as qualifications to perform these tasks.
Relying on this shared public understanding, young people
strive to acquire and display these qualities and
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abilities. If they succeed in doing so, they have earned
the right to occupy the corresponding positions. They
deserve them. It would therefore be wrong to breach these
legitimate expectations. It would be wrong if we say,
"Sorry. We cannot grant you a license to practice law even
though you have studied legal subjects many years, passed
a bar examination, and now have an appropriate quality to
be a lawyer.", just as it would be wrong to refuse to give
a prize to the victorious runner who crossed the finishing
line first.
In short, no clear line can be drawn between tasks and
prizes. Many jobs, which are regarded as opportunities to
perform activities that are intrinsically or socially
valuable, contain the characteristics of prizes. These jobs
as kinds of prizes carry special double characters - not
only backward-looking but also forward-looking rather than
complete in single backward-looking - and this gives rise
to legitimate disagreement about the criteria that should
govern their distribution. There is no science that permits
completely reliable inferences from past to future
performance in any occupation. But once criteria, however
flawed, have been laid down, they create a context within
which claims of desert can be established and must be
honoured if possible.
To sum up, if the criteria for awarding positions are
based on qualifications for performing productively in
them, then individuals who succeed in satisfying the
criteria deserve the positions; but only if opportunities
for acquiring qualifications have been equal in the
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relevant sense. Otherwise, qualifications are less a
measure of effort and achievement than of initial social
and economic advantages. Thus, equal opportunity is viewed
here as a necessary condition for individuals coming to
deserve the positions they occupy.
As a corollary of the institutionalization of desert,
members of society have a broader range of chances of
personal development and ensuing self-satisfaction. Since
individuals are encouraged to believe that their
life-chances will be significantly related to their
accomplishments, they will be moved to develop some portion
of their innate capacities. Thus, it may be argued,
equality of opportunity is the principle of task allocation
most conducive to personal development as a crucial element
of the human good.
It is also true, however, that more frequently and more
obviously equality of opportunity can be justified as a
principle of efficiency. Economic efficiency and
productivity, with its effect on social utility, seemed to
be a good reason to move from equal distributions of goods
to unequal distributions with equal opportunities for
acquiring the better shares. Efficiency does certainly
appear to be served by equalizing opportunities to compete
for positions and to achieve them on the basis of
competence or productivity. When those who are most
competent or productive are placed in the positions they
seek, then the productivity of the economic system as a
whole should increase. It is surely inefficient to limit
the development of the talents of those in the lower
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economic strata, or to bar people who are competent from
positions on economically irrelevant grounds such as race,
sex, religious background.
Efficiency, when focused on developed competence and
aptitude, can be correlated with the justifying grounds of
desert, but because of its main concern of maximum
consequential effect, it will in most cases diverge from
the notion of desert. The utilitarians' claim that equality
of opportunity can be better justified as a principle of
efficiency is refutable. This is because efficiency will
not be an ultimate criterion of justification for equality
of opportunity. Furthermore, their argument that economic
efficiency stemmed from equality of opportunity can be
equated with social utility is doubtful. We will see some
problems of the mismatch if we follow their utilitarian
logic faithfully here.(For this point, see Goldman, 1987:
94)
Consider an example in which only two teachers work at
school with two tasks, teaching English and mathematics.
Suppose that teacher A can teach both subjects better than
teacher B and is by an absolute measure better in English
than in mathematics. Furthermore, suppose that A is only
slightly better than B in English but much better in
mathematics. (Let us say in numerical degree for comparison:
as to A, 10 points in English and 7 points in mathematics;
as to B, 9 points in English and 5 points in mathematics.)
In this case, it is more efficient and productive for the
school as a whole to allocate the English teaching to B and
mathematics to A, although A will then not be doing what he
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does best. (9 points as in English teaching by B + 7 points
as in mathematics teaching by A = 16 points, which is
compared with 15 points in reverse case.) As a consequence,
efficiency may not go in parallel with aggregate social
utility in both senses of maximization of productivity and
satisfaction. (Consider a case of A's substantial amount of
disutility due to job discontent in the light of his long
teaching experience and talent.)
Also, an efficient competition among individuals to fill
social roles may not produce aggregate social utility, even
if the most talented is chosen to fill each individual
role. In actual societies where opportunities are equal,
the differential rewards attached to tasks which are
justified by efficiency can produce comparable distortions.
In these societies, efficiency is usually measured by a
higher productivity, or, in monetary terms, by higher
wage-earning. If, let us say, lawyers are paid much more
than teachers because of their more selective procedure of
recruitment and its resultant tendency of monopolization,
the talent pool from which lawyers are selected is likely
to be better stocked. Teachers will then tend to be
mediocre, even if the best are selected from among the
candidates who present themselves to be competent teachers.
In the long run, this circumstance may well impose
aggregate costs on society in the sense of the less
appropriate functioning of society as a whole.
In sum, economic growth spurred by more equal opportunity
which is justified by efficiency and productivity may have
negative effects on aggregate levels of social utility. The
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emphasis on equal opportunity to compete on the basis of
productivity will increase the competitiveness and
acquisitiveness of an already highly competitive and
acquisitive society. Both effects may lower levels of
contentment while increasing levels of productivity and
varieties of consumer goods. As competition becomes more
intense, those who lose out, and even those who temporarily
gain, might be caused more anxiety and disutility. Here, we
find justifying reasons for the state to intervene into the
market with an institutional tool of restraining of
excessive competition while securing equal opportunity to
compete on fair terms. Nowadays fair competition with equal
opportunity is widely established in the field of antitrust
and trade regulations in many advanced industrialized
countries.
(3) Fair Equality of Opportunity.
Though the notion of desert is justified by the principle
of equal opportunity, this can be best defended on the
basis of fair equality of opportunity rather than formal
equality of opportunity. However, question here is whether
the idea of fair equality of opportunity is sufficiently
clear to be applied in any determinative way? How can we
secure fair equality of opportunity between persons with
different aptitude or skill, or different financial means?
It would seem relatively easier to secure fair equality of
opportunity when the contestants for position or job have
similar intelligence, skill, or material means because in
that case we can simply subject all the participants to a
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competition in which each has to satisfy equal
requirements. But other cases are not so easy. Consider for
example the case of admission to the bar as between persons
with high intelligence and good education and persons with
low intelligence and poor education? The former would have
greater prospects of passing the bar examination and of
practising law successfully than the latter. Can the latter
ask for a different type of examination - supposedly an
easier type, for the sake of fair equality of opportunity?
Perhaps, no. But what about related and partly similar
circumstances such as, for example, that of law school
admission as between two applicants with similar
intelligence and aptitude, where one is from a wealthy
family background and the other is from a socially deprived
underclass group? The former has greater means to maintain
law study well than the latter. Can the latter ask for some
financial support from the school authority or from the
state, to pay academic expenses for the sake of fair
equality of opportunity? Perhaps, yes.
To answer those questions better, we need to distinguish
between prospect-regarding and means-regarding equality of
opportunity. (I borrow these terms from Rae et al, 1981:
65-6) Let us distinguish an end-good X from both the
'prospect' of attaining X, and some 'means' for attaining
X. Then two principal forms of equal opportunity are: (i)
Prospect-regarding equality of opportunity. Two persons, A
and B, have equal opportunities for X if each has the same
prospect or probability of attaining X; (ii)
Means-regarding equality of opportunity. Two persons, A and
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B, have equal opportunities for X if each has the same
means or instrument for attaining X.
A lottery is a good example of prospect-regarding
equality of opportunity; for here the prospects of success
are equal for all since each lottery ticket has the same
chance of being drawn. Here is the case in which nothing
about the differing efforts or differing abilities of
persons affect the result. A boxing match or a university
entrance examination is a case concerning means-regarding
equality of opportunity, at least, in relation to
equalisation of certain means. Equal rules and equipment -
equal means - are provided to each contestant in order to
reveal unequal effort and ability, resulting in unequal
prospects of success. Why is this so? Every boxer must stay
within the same kind of ring and eschew the same illegal
punches; every subject of university entrance examination
requires applicants to answer the same questions. The
purpose and effect of these equal means are not equal
prospects of success, but legitimate unequal prospects of
success since equal means are designed to balance unequal
conditions or obstacles in competition in order to
demonstrate differing efforts, skills, and potentialities
of human development.
Thus, as to the meaning of fair equality of opportunity,
our focus will be on means-regarding equality of
opportunity. It should be taken that opportunities are
equal when equal means - equal rules or equipment - are
fully available to the present or prospective participants
in a competition. This requires equalizing or balancing of
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existing unequal means. However, someone might go further
and demand an increase of means for the less talented
beyond the share provided through means-regarding equality
of opportunity. This policy, if adopted, would be extremely
problematic to implement. It would require the state to
intervene into ever deeper aspects of human genetic
endowment and ensuing developmental situations. We are not
ready to accept the resultant great curtailment of freedom
which this kind of 'Brave New World' policy will bring
about.
John Rawls argues for an egalitarian view that fair
equality of opportunity should mean that those with similar
abilities and skills and also the same willingness to use
them should have the same prospects of success regardless
of their initial place in the social system.(See 1971: 73)
This egalitarian appeal of equal opportunity is vitally
connected to its prospect-regarding form, but its practical
implementation is meant to be means-regarding since
prospect itself will in most cases be materialized through
means. Here, of course, 'means' are to be understood as
external conditions of action in two ways: At first,
tangible means, such as money, equipment and other various
material means; Secondly, intangible means, such as social
rules, rules of permission or rules of prohibition. 'Means'
in these senses lie outside of the acting subject, in
contrast to internal or intrinsic properties of the agent,
such as ability, aptitude, willingness, which are also
conditions of successful action. A prospect-regarding form
of egalitarian policy would demand greater means for the
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persons from deprived and underclass groups, beyond those
already equalized in reliance on means-regarding equality
of opportunity; for the demand for the same prospects of
success needs far greater means than a liberal policy of
fair equality of means. Here, one immediate problem would
be again the restraint of freedom in social activity since
the securing of the same prospects of success entails
greater state intervention into resource allocation. I have
reservations about this kind of prospect-regarding fair
equality in all ordinary circumstances. Certainly, in some
extraordinary circumstances prospect-regarding policies
might be acceptable on the basis of forward-looking
considerations of utility. But since my view of justice is
essentially based on the notion of desert, this is
irrelevant to justice. Thus our idea of fair equality of
opportunity is basically in the means-regarding form,
demanding equal or equalized means.
Now return to the old man in the aforementioned case. We
are prepared to propose desert to him as a criterion of
justice. The children's worthiness or deservingness of any
share of their father's wealth may be assessed by the
degree of valuable effort they have exerted toward personal
and social good. Thus in this context no child will be
morally fitting to inherit his father's property right
without showing equivalence to his father in deservingness
of reward; for his father, like any person possessing
property, can justify what he possesses only by his labour
plus its added value to society. Desert-based justice is an
idea to serve the common good by on one hand respecting
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personal development and social contribution through
meaningful labour voluntarily undertaken and on the other
hand disvaluing free-riding and wrongdoing in society. Also
this idea of meritorian justice is secured by fair equality
of opportunity as the only method of obtaining just results
in the competition for limited resources and benefits, for
only in this way will the consequent grading of individual
persons reflect the moral worth rather than the potential
utility of the contestants. But here it is to be remembered
that fair equality of opportunity is such that the
successful grasping of an opportunity is an indication of
desert rather than of fortuitous circumstances such as
natural ability and social background. The aim of
desert-based justice is to distinguish a person's
praiseworthy effort and acquired ability from all those
factors which are ultimately outwith the control of the
agents. Thus as the individual person can no more take the
credit for his natural ability than for his family
background, both these factors must be equalized or
balanced by unequal means in the provision of equality of
opportunity.
Now there would be immediate complaint from the talented
and competent members of society about this meritorian
version of equality of opportunity. More intelligent and
talented children might argue that in order to increse the
family fortune more effectively and enhance the family fame
more efficiently by productive contribution to society, it
is expedient to allocate them more opportunity and
resources rather than seemingly less efficient allocation
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based on moral worthiness and fair equality of opportunity.
In a competitive capitalistic society in which high social
utility and high monetary reward are intended to go
together, it would not appear to be appropriate to stick to
the desert-based justice with fair equality of opportunity
in the process of education and selection for scarce and
desirable jobs. However, this head-on clash between
justice and utility is not an actual implication of my
notion of desert-based justice. The notion of ' teleological
desert' rather than 'just desert' involves not only past
worthy action but also a present state of potentiality.
This is because we understand human beings as moral persons
as in the middle of continuing development which is in most
cases difficult, or rather unsuitable for radical and
clear-cut separation between what I have been, what I am
and what I have the present potential to become. This
understanding of human life and moral person alike as an
on-going project allows us to view the evaluation of a
person's deservingness of reward and punishment in a
broader way.
Let us suppose that handicapped persons in wheelchairs
are in many cases viewed by normal people as less worthy
human beings because of their apparently restricted
opportunities for worthy action and social contribution.
But now consider their being shown (on TV, ets.) as
participants in the paralympics (paraplegic's Olympics).
They demonstrate effortful action and enormous potentiality
to overcome their handicaps. And thus ^normal' people
cannot but evaluate them differently than heretofore. The
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reason why they are apt to think in that way is that those
handicapped people show more conspicuously the great human
potentiality for development even under handicap.
Furthermore, in my scheme of two-stage justification of
reward and punishment for the sake of justice and the
common good, the complete justification allows us to take
necessity or utility into consideration in addition to
justice in individual circumstances. Appropriate reward or
punishment is the way of justification which can accomodate
both backward-looking and forward-looking evaluation. Let
me take an example: Imagine a small middle-class town where
due to parents' $ eager attitude to education several pupils
have shown musical talents with various kinds of
instruments in a national contest of young musicians, but
one pupil has particularly shown enormous potentiality for
becoming an excellent violinist. However in this town
because of limited funds, parents have to consider what
course of action to take: either they should distribute
funds equally to all prize-winners in the national contest
to help them get into national music school, or they should
distribute funds unequally by giving the greatest portion
to the most promising pupil in order to send him or her to
a renowned foreign music school. If parents consider the
justice requirements seriously, they would choose the
former way; if they consider not only justice but also
utility to the town, they would choose the latter way. Our
full justification of the theory of reward will support the
latter way of decision.
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II.4. The thesis of equal satisfaction of basic needs.
(1) Duty of humanity or duty of justice?
Another criterion of distributive justice, besides
desert, which rebuts the initial presumption of equal
distribution of resources is the principle of needs. The
doctrine, "from each according to his means, to according
to his needs", requires radically different ways of
burden-bearing and benefit-distribution from the doctrine
of desert, "from each according to his autonomous choice,
to each according to his desert". Under this doctrine, as
to burden-bearing, every member of society is required to
bear a burden levied by the state or a public welfare
institution, for example, tax or social service payment,
according to his or her means; as to benefit-distribution,
scarce resources ought to be distributed in proportion to
the needs of potential recipients, at least to a certain
minimum level of satisfaction. Then, this principle of
needs is understood as a criterion of justice for the
development of welfare policies. In many welfare states the
language of justice has been effectively used in the
demands for, or justifications of, improvements in the
welfare of needy sections of the population, among them,
for example, the elderly, the sick, and the disabled.
However, on a theoretical level, it has not been always
clear whether the principle of allocation in accordance
with basic needs is to be subsumed under the heading of
justice. There have been claims that equal satisfaction of
basic needs can be more securely based if we appeal to
humanity (or charity, benevolence) instead of to justice.
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(For example, see Campbell, 1974: 1) The theorists of these
claims have voiced that the duty of humanity - the
obligation to work for the relief of suffering of the needy
people - is not only distinct from the duty to be just but
may properly be regarded as on an equal footing with (or
perhaps as overriding) justice in the distribution of
benefits and burdens. It is perhaps right to say that if we
encounter a strange beggar in a street who looks extremely
poor and miserable, we as ordinary citizens with sound
moral sense may feel a moral obligation to render help
though we may not think it would be right to have a legal
obligation to do so. We may have some compunction for our
inhumane attitude if we ignore a poor fellow human's
predicament. This is due to our common humanity which
demands that we avert suffering and promote well-being of
ourselves and also in the same degree makes us have
sympathy for a fellow human's plight.
We can agree with the theorists who argue that there is
a justification of our moral obligation to relieve the
needy people of their suffering on the basis of our common
humanity (or charity, benevolence). However, I wish to
argue here that as a matter of the social morality of
welfare policy, we can more correctly explain the civil
obligation to render aid to needy people on the basis of
justice. I believe that neglecting the satisfaction of
basic needs as a general social issue would constitute a
social injustice as well as serious inhumanity. Why would
it do so? This issue forces us to consider the
philosophical basis of welfare policy. My view here is not
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focused on a particular situation giving rise to a personal
duty to rescue particular needy persons whom we encounter,
but rather a general social morality giving rise to a civil
duty to take part in assisting the needy section of the
population.
At first, the fundamental human worth and dignity which
we equally possess gives rise to a justifying claim of all
members of society to satisfaction of their basic needs. If
there are some members of society who are severely ill,
handicapped, or starving and thus unable to put themselves
into a basic normal life while all other members of
society have some resources above their basic needs and are
capable of exercising their effort and ability so as to
enjoy meaningful life, then those needy members are
properly regarded as standing at an unfairly disadvantaged
base line for whatever path of life they want to pursue.
What explanation can be given to this asserted 'unfairly
disadvantaged base line' ? I do not think it unfair that
people enjoy different states of health, wealth or ability
if those differences among people are results of their
different effortful plans and actions. But this itself is
a view which presupposes that people were born equally
with at least a minimum degree of health and ability and
given a fair equality of opportunity to develop them. Since
all those people who are given means or opportunities to
develop health and life over a minimum level are expected
to manage their health and their life plan with due care
and diligence, the resulting differences will usually bear
a reasonable relation to what they deserve. However, there
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are cases of initial differences. Some people are luckily
born with health, ability, or supportive family background
while other people happen to be born handicapped, disabled,
or in a deprived family background below a minimum level of
decent life. The latter group of people are naturally put
in a disadvantaged position beyond their control. Some
people might be at some later stage of life put in an
equally severely deprived, handicapped position owing to
causes beyond their control. Those situations of below a
minimum level of decent life caused by forces beyond one's
control are what I call standing at an 'unfairly
disadvantaged base line'. And these unfairly disadvantaged
positions are cases which require the state to take
supportive measures in order to remove obstacles, or
provide necessary conditions, for the needy people to lead
at least a minimally worthy life or enter into a desired
course of life where social competitions are bound to run.
So 'unfairly' disadvantaged positions depend on a doctrine
of fair competitive conditions as a prerequisite for
applying the desert principle.
If the above argument that the needs of those deprived or
handicapped people for basic food, shelter, education or
medical treatment give rise to a legitimate claim for their
provision is right, then we may call provision of this
required state support a duty of justice. If the state
obligation to provide needy people with basic social
service is regarded as a duty of justice, the correlated
civil obligation to provide the state with funds for social
service is essential to promote just social order. All
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members of society are now expected to bear a burden of
contribution according to their means.
However, some advantaged group of people may contend that
even though they concede that there is a civil obligation
to contribute to welfare policy funds, there would be no
positive obligation on their part to contribute greater
than an average or a minimum sum. They may argue that since
their own property rights are fruits of their own effortful
action and valuable venture, their property should not be
taken away without a just reason or a just compensation.
But if we consider the social circumstances in which we
establish achievements and obtain property, we may
acknowledge that there are various elements of luck and
natural or social contributions beyond our control and
desert. While disadvantaged people may have sufferred from
bad luck or endowment, advantaged people may have enjoyed
good luck and thus have been able to accumulate property.
What the advantaged people are expected to return to
society without bearing an unfair burden is this portion of
fortune which they have earned through (undeserved) good
luck or with neighbours's contributions. This
redistributive scheme aims at mitigating natural handicaps
and inequality in endowments toward equal satisfaction of
basic needs of all needy people. This scheme is also
justifiable if we acknowledge that the lack of social
commitment to satisfying basic needs of the least
advantaged people would prevent the development of a sense
of community, a sense of communal solidarity, and the
common good.
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So far we have discussed justifying grounds on which a
welfare policy of satisfaction of basic needs itself
constitutes a matter of justice. But if we consider the
ways in which basic needs and desert are associated in
social transactions, a more conspicuous picture of the
relationships between basic needs and justice emerges.
Basic needs may arise because of maltreatment at the hands
of others as when injury is inflicted by the intentional
action or inaction of another person, or because
exploitation has taken place as when one group uses its
position of dominant power to reap the benefits of the
productive acts of another group. In the case of the
deliberate infliction of injury, blame attaches to the
injurer and justice requires that compensation be paid to
the victim as well as that punishment be meted out to the
offender. In the case of exploitation, the redistribution
of scarce resources as between the exploited and the
exploiter is just and appropriate, and so perhaps is
punishment of the exploiters.
(2) The Concept of Basic Needs.
Suppose all agree that basic needs should be satisfied.
One immediate problem is that of what precisely people's
basic needs are? Do people need everything they say they
do? Musicians need instruments. Homeless people need
shelters. Blind people need canes or guide dogs. Smokers
need lighters. And so on. Among many need statements we can
distinguish three different types of need:(For this point,
see Miller, 1976: 127)
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(i) 'instrumental' needs, e.g. Smokers need lighters, (ii)
'functional' needs, e.g. Musicians need instruments, (iii)
'intrinsic' needs, e.g. Homeless people need shelters.
Blind people need canes or perhaps guide dogs.
When we talk about basic needs, what we are required to
satisfy equally is intrinsic needs, the satisfaction of
basic needs of subsistence, to all equally, irrespective of
desert. Thus, intrinsic needs are such essential human
needs as without those humans will suffer severe harms in
physical, emotional, and intellectual aspects. Food,
shelter, and clothing are essential for at least physical
and emotional subsistence. But friendship and a primary
education are also essential for minimum decent life and
intellectual development. What are intrinsic or essential
needs for a minimum decent life is bound to be related to
a person's way of life or plan of life.
But, just where the line of the basic minimum or
essential needs should be drawn is not always clear.
Different countries, and different political groups within
a country, will take different views of what constitutes
the basic necessities of human subsistence that ought to be
provided for all. People in affluent countries may regard
a guide dog as a basic necessity for the blind, and
special educational institutions as basic necessities for
the mentally-handicapped, but people in less developed
countries may regard a cane as a basic need for the blind,
with only special care and medical treatment for the
mentally-handicapped. In practice, therefore, the standard
of basic needs to be met by public action has to be set by
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each politically organized society for itself, in the light
of its own economic situation, technological expertise, and
its evaluation of competing claims. However, still the
fundamental premise of equal and inviolable human dignities
(natural rights of men) requires every state to secure at
least the maintenance of minimum-level living standards in
that society.
The upshot of the above discussions means that the equal
satisfaction of basic needs does not always imply an equal
distribution of the material means and intangible resources
necessary to such satisfaction. Everyone needs food to
live, but the diabetic needs insulin as well. Every child
needs education, but the blind child cannot be educated by
means of the normal provision made for other children and
has to be given special, more costly, facilities. The needs
of the diabetic and of the blind child are greater than
those of the normal person, and so the provision for their
special needs is greater than normal. The distribution of
beneficial means is therefore unequal, though the aim is
that distribution of benefit, of satisfaction fulfiled
should be equal.
(3) Desert, Needs, and Equality.
We have discussed that just and equitable distribution
may depart from equal distribution of resources on grounds
of desert and basic needs. However, as we have seen, desert
and needs are competing claims, necessarily in conflict
since no society can distribute its goods both accoding to
desert and according to needs simultaneously. But, we
suggest that it can distribute part of its goods according
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to needs and part according to desert. The principle of
needs is given priority to the notion of desert. Desert
should be used to govern the distribution of the surplus
goods once basic needs have been equally satisfied. Above
the line of the minimum normal life, the principle of needs
should leave individual persons free to compete for higher
rewards according to their voluntary choice and action.
Thus, our scheme of justice is an amalgam of ideas drawn
both from liberalism and from welfare egalitarianism (or,
a kind of 'liberal-communitarian justice') .
Finally, one conclusion to draw is that the relationship
between justice and equality is close and intimate yet
still less than identical: they may point to different
aspects of one situation. We may suggest that the notion of
equality refers primarily to both the fair starting
position - the equal level of opportunity enjoyed and the
state of end result - the equal level of basic needs
satisfied, whereas justice refers to the way in which each
person is to be treated - according to his or her needs and
desert. This particularised treatment fitted to an
individual person corresponds to the maxim of justice as
'to give each person his or her due'('suum cuique').
r
II.6. The thesis of desert and justice discourse as
teleological communication.
When we try to implement the idea of desert and justice
in real world, we necessarily engage in the discourse of
desert and justice. Here the essential characteristics of
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desert and justice discourse are three: a deliberative
procedure on the matter of distribution or retribution, a
teleological reflection on the value of just relations as
a virtuous state, and a communicative expression of the
meaning of deserved treatment. In the 'circumstances of
justice' in which people compete with each other for
possessing some resources, positions, or opportunities
which are valuable and scarce, the grammar of desert and
justice discourse may be formulated like this: "A deserves
X in relation to B by virtue of F at the time of evaluation
H for the sake of Y in contribution to the ultimate purpose
Z." Here X is deserved treatment, B is a fellow human being
who enters into a social relation - particular or general,
F is desert basis, Y is immediate aim of desert and justice
- reciprocity or equilibrium, and Z is the ultimate goal -
the common good.
However, the above formula should be understood as the
general grammar of moral desert and justice discourse. The
grammar of institutional desert and justice discourse
(mostly, legal justice discourse) has essentially the same
structure and logic as the moral discourse, yet the desert
basis F is rather a satisfaction of legal or other
institutional qualification than the worthiness of actions
or the quality of persons. Let us see some examples of this
institutional desert and justice discourse.
If we join in a local council's debate on legislating a
new local tax law, or a session of a judicial tribunal
concerning what sentence to pass on a convicted criminal,
or the meeting of a company board of directors for
269
determining the rate of salary increase among executives
and ordinary employees, I think that we will unavoidably
get involved with desert and justice discourse. In case of
a local council, is introducing a poll tax at a flat rate
fair? If not, what about income or property tax? If income
or property tax, what kind of tax exemption or benefit
should be introduced? Who will deserve a particular tax
benefit? In case of a criminal trial, does this convicted
person who committed a crime of theft for providing his
sick child with medicine deserve such a sentence? In case
of a company meeting, do the executives and employees in
this particular section of business who did not contribute
to the sale of company products deserve the same amount of
salary increase as the workers in factory who did? These
kinds of questions are not uncommon.
As we can see in the above cases, legal justice discourse
as well as other institutional desert discourse carries
special characteristics of positivity-orientedness and
practicality-mindedness, namely its relationship with valid
law and rule, however this is to be determined. Because
this apparent orientation of legality and practicality in
the institutional desert discourse makes it different from
morality in moral desert discourse, we are frequently
requested to examine and criticize the former from the
viewpoint of the latter. The aim of moral desert and
justice discourse is to promote a better state of justice
by narrowing the gap between the criterion of institutional
desert and that of moral desert. The nearer the goal of
institutional desert to that of moral desert, the better
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our chance of attaining a desirable state of social
justice. Thus, it is worthwhile for us to consider the
general characteristics of moral desert and justice
discourse.
First, a deliberative procedure on the matter of
distribution or retribution. If the proper business of
justice discourse is the discovery or determination of a
criterion by which right can be distinguished from wrong,
the task of this ethical reflection will be an enterprise
of setting the procedures for determining the normative
validity of any proposition. I assume without argument that
this is essentially a cognitive task. However, this
cognitive task takes a deliberate procedure for settling a
proper standard acceptable to the members of community. In
any given society there may be a wide range of so-called
valid laws. The standard of these laws may lie, upon
scrutiny from moral viewpoint, on the wide continuum of
justice from flagrant injustice to poetic justice;
egregiously unjust, clearly unjust, apparently unjust,
apparently just, clearly just, and perfectly just.
Repealing a grossly unjust law or, even amending an
apparently normal but defective law takes no short time not
only because of an inherent characteristic of law
preserving its security but also on account of the very
nature of democratic procedure requiring popular
participation and consensus.
The mere fact that a particular standard or norm has been
recognized by a community as valid does not establish its
validity as such in every real case. If abstract norms are
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to be applied to real issues, they should be interpreted in
a coherent and universalized manner within that practical
context where a multitude of opinions may conflict. How is
this procedure possible? What is the presupposition of this
discourse? One basic condition should be the universal
participation of all interested parties. No one should be
excluded. Everyone should be given an equal opportunity to
make his or her own claims and to criticize others freely.
Thus, no single person in a local council, or in a judicial
tribunal, or in a board of directors as in the
aforementioned cases, though he or she may be the senior,
or the wisest, or the most experienced member in that
meeting, is allowed to impose his or her opinion without a
proper procedure of rational deliberation. The only norms
valid at this stage are those regulating common interests.
In other words, normative validity is determined by
applying of the principle of universalization.
Universalization, the basic principle of a discourse ethic,
implies a specific procedure whereby contested norms are
accepted once their consequences are debated and understood
by all without coercion. This is the basic principle every
democratic procedure should take and develop.
This manner of general moral discourse through the
employment of the principles of coherence and
universalization within that democratic deliberation
enables us to achieve a rational consensus on the actual
validity and acceptability of a norm. The practical
implication of this principle involved here is that a norm
is right when it corresponds to a general or generalizable
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interest. If tested by the above procedure, a particular
interest or a proposition put forward by any individual can
get consensus and be accepted by all those involved.
Acceptance of the principle of universalization allows us
to turn to the next stage for determining the validity of
norms. They are valid when, in the context of practical
discourse, they are determined by rational consensus. How
could a rational consensus be achieved? We may say that the
potential agreement of all participants will be possible
only subject to the conditions both of the truth of a
non-normative statement and the correctness of a normative
statement. Is it attainable? It would be unrealizable in
ordinary situations. It would be attainable or at least in
close proximity to its goal in an ideal discourse situation
by all participants who are equally rational, impartial,
and veracious. However, this procedure of attaining
rational consensus may be characterized as a formal logic,
in the sense that it offers no substantive ethical
orientation. Therefore it does not provide a basis for
adjudication between equally rational solutions that might
be backed by alternative value systems. This means that a
differentiation should be made between different approaches
to justice which can be derived each from a universalistic
procedure. Attaining justice which intends to lead to the
common good, requires an additional characteristic to the
rational procedure of moral discourse, that is, a
teleological element of ethical discourse.
Secondly, a teleological reflection on the value of just
relations as a virtuous state. The teleological nature of
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desert and justice discourse involves a cultivation of
human virtue which is an inherent property of moral desert
and justice as an ideal. When we endeavour to match the
formula of moral desert and justice that "A deserves X by
virtue of F" to a real situation, we are taking part in and
sharing the moral property of justice. Why do we say that
the matter of justice is a teleological enterprise as well
as a virtuous one?
Justice as an ideal does not consist in merely saying
what is just; it consists in a certain moral disposition or
state of character on the part of persons who strive to
attain it. We may recall the celebrated formula of justice
made by Ulpian, which stands in the forefront of
Justinian's Digest, that justice is not only ' suum cuique
tribuere' (to give each man his due) but also a ' constans et
perpetua voluntas'(firm and perennial disposition) towards
procuring suum cuique. That 'firm and perennial
disposition' is a certain moral attitude, or habit without
which justice cannot manifest itself, and it is not again
merely a matter of facile intuition, but of intuition
ripened by sympathetic experience and by persistent
cultivation of practical reasonableness on the part of
persons who endeavour to attain justice.
We may find a case of perfect justice only in the
judgment of a perfectly virtuous man. However, our
endeavour to attain justice in our justice discourse is to
take part in this enterprise of cultivating a firm and
perennial disposition which in turn enables us to nurture
our virtuous character. Let us recall here the famous
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American film entitled 'Twelve Angry Men' which depicted a
courtroom trial and a deliberation procedure in the jury
chamber. Twelve members of jury are deliberating the murder
case of an old man allegedly committed by his juvenile son
in their quarrel. The testimony of a neighbouring witness
and circumstantial evidences produced by the prosecution
proves unfavourable to the accused boy. Every member of
jury except one man shows strong inclination to believe
that the convicted boy is guilty according to his previous
record of bad behaviours, low education, poor family
background, and so on. One courageous member of the jury
expresses a reasonable doubt surrounding the collection of
evidence and the testimony of witnesses, and points out the
inconsistency and unreasonableness of arguments on the
part of other absolute majority members of jury. Other
members of jury who started with a strong predisposition
against the accused boy are brought through heated
discussion to understand the important probable
consequences for the boy of the trial and their verdict.
The eleven members of jury who initially had no doubt of
guiltiness of the convicted boy are persuaded one by one to
believe differently; their changed view is brought about by
this persistently courageous and virtuous man who firmly
believes that justice should be done to every person
regardless of his or her colour, race, or, social class.
The lessons we may draw, if any, from this film are that
attaining justice or implementing justice requires of us
our firm willingness to pursue the truth of fact and the
correctness of value. Taking Justice discourse seriously
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and rendering just judgments are to be understood as
elements of human conduct directed towards the firm and
perennial pursuit of human virtue and perfection.
Particularly, the virtuous nature of justice arises out of,
and expresses itself in, a moral attitude toward others.
The enterprise to give each person his or her due, or, of
reciprocating burdens and benefits in implementing desert
is only made possible by our moral actions imagining
ourselves into somebody else's shoes, or entering into our
'inter-subjectivity' with others once described as the
nature of justice by Giorgio del Vecchio.(For this term,
see his 1952: 80)
Thirdly, a communicative expression of the meaning of
deserved treatment. When we talk about the deserved
punishment of a particular criminal, we mean something.
Retributive punishment based on desert is an act of
communicative behaviour. Revenge also fits this
communicative structure, though with a somewhat different
message. What is the message of punishment based on desert,
why is it communicated in that especially forceful and
unwelcome way? As we have seen, punishment has an
expressive function, wherein the punisher condemns the
crime. Moreover, in a punishment based on desert, we may
see punishment as an attempt to demonstrate to the
wrongdoer that his act was wrong, not only to mean the act
is wrong but to show him its wrongness. Furthermore, by
showing this it generates repentance on the criminal's part
and provides him with the opportunity of penance.
Punishment based on desert is supposed to achieve this
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moral improvement of the criminal by bringing home to him
the nature of what he has done, from which he is to realize
its wrongness. Punishment based on desert also conveys some
messages to the other members of community - victims,
families, law officials, and other general public. The
messages are that the state corrects the broken order and
value, the criminal not only repays his debt to victims but
also becomes a new regenerated member of the community
after repentance and penance. These aspects of moral
regeneration of the criminal and reconciliation between
criminal and other members of community, which would be
made possible by punishment based on desert, will enable us
to understand that the criminal is no longer an outsider
from community but a part of it.
II.7. The thesis of dynamic equilibrium and harmony.
In preceding discussions I have examined the principle of
fair equality of opportunity, which combines liberty and
equality as an essential element of the concept of desert
and justice. Also I have argued that the notion of communal
solidarity as well as the principle of fair equality of
opportunity is the justifying ground of the principle of
needs. Here, the discussion of distributive justice or
retributive justice based on desert has taken the idea of
equal liberty of human beings as its initial guiding
principle and the notion of fair play or reciprocity which
is again derived from equality as the implementing
principle. Thus, what we can see so far is that if a man is
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to be treated justly, or he is to be given his own due, he
is first to be given equal liberty with other members of
society to expend his own effort and labour, and then his
own effort and labour is to be reciprocated by commensurate
(or proportional) advantage or disadvantage available in
the goods (or non-goods) scheme of that particular society.
The notion of proportional reciprocation is one of the
intractable issues in the business of justice. This is
because of its essential characteristic of being determined
by the dynamic social context. This implies that, with
regard to our assessment of human desert, the value or
disvalue of human characters and activities as well as the
goods for human life can be completely and meaningfully
understandable only if we are fully informed of the
changing meanings and importances of those values and goods
in the current social context. Why is this? Let us look at
this problem from at least two aspects of the social
phenomena, namely a situation of on-going social evolution
due to technological development and a situation of
pluralizing social values due to diversification of human
interests and activities. In other words, we live in a
society where the meanings and structure of value are
vacillating and even transforming due to our changed style
of life. The underlying contemporary social dynamics which
force us to re-examine conventional life style and value
system are carried out on the one hand by innovative
development of communication and transportation technology
and on the other hand by accelerating division of labour.
Before elaborating further the implications of current
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social transformation in respect of value systems, let us
look at an ordinary but essentially dynamic scene of
proportional reciprocation in our daily social relations.
Imagine a supermarket where many shoppers are forming
queues for payment behind several cashiers. Among shoppers
who queue up, there may be various kinds of people with
different amounts of purchases and ways of payment, a big
purchase or a small purchase, and cash payment or cheque
payment. A common wish for most of ordinary shoppers would
be a quick pay-out by a shortened queue. Persons with more
purchases might claim that they deserve a quicker service
because of their greater contribution to the shop's sales.
On the other hand, persons with less purchases might demand
at least equal manner of quick service since they are
constant customers though their single purchase each day is
small in amount. Persons with cash payments might demand
quicker service than those with cheque payment since paying
by cheque takes more time than instant cash payment. No
single, absolute solution is possible or required for a
proper customer service with quick and fair treatment in
this case. However, at least one way of fair treatment for
all customers would be a proportional service according to
their ways of payment and amounts of purchase. Instead of
formal equality of treatment for all customers by letting
them queue up at any cashier of their choice, we can have
proportional treatment of customers according to their
different characteristics. We can achieve this by dividing
cashiers into two or three groups, for example, one group
for cash payment or small purchases, another group for
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cheque payment or large purchases, and another group for
special customers (the disabled and other needy people).
This kind of differential treatment perhaps better serves
the objective of equally quick and fair treatment. However,
one important point to be made here is that the ideal of
proportional reciprocation may be determined and
implemented in a concrete case according to particular
social circumstances.
Now return to the contemporary scene of dynamic social
transformation which may affect our conventional manner of
valuation of human activities and even our consciousness of
the value system itself. Nowadays it is not surprising that
even a single human being can change and expand his or her
function and the value of his or her work to a remarkable
degree. And this is the case with apparently less effort
than before if he or she is properly equipped with the
latest technological instruments. Consider, for example,
the desert of an individual officer or soldier who was
involved in the accidental friendly sortie in the recent
Gulf War. A moment's failure in decision-making made a
tremendous difference of outcome, as we could see in a
fatal sortie at the last stage of the ground battle. Here
an American bomber mistakenly attacked armoured columns of
allied forces and killed many friendly soldiers. The
difference of outcome was so grave that our concern and
interest in clarifying which part of human effort and
ability, if any, had caused the accident or might have
averted the accident otherwise, seems to be stultified. The
accused officers or soldiers, who up to the moment of the
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accident seemed to have enjoyed a good military career,
could ruin their good desert by a moment of mistake, as
they failed in the operation of a highly advanced
technological equipment which was otherwise of enormous
potential benefit to them. Though the case may be an
extreme example, its lesson may be applicable to another
contemporary technology-dominated context such as the case
of performance evaluation in a big corporate body or other
information-intensive industry where there is a high degree
of competition. A good investment decision may bring an
enormous fortune to a company: a wrong one may bring a
formidable loss to the company. Conventional ways of job-
evaluation might be inappropriate in these situations.
One might argue, nonetheless, that essential modes and
characteristics of human relations and value systems are
not mutable. Human beings, though they face a new challenge
in the current era of technological dominance are still
moral agents who are essentially guided and evaluated in
their behaviour by common moral norms and derivative social
rules. This observation may be true. However, another
observation that the rapidly changing situation of
technological development in contemporary society such as
in the field of medicine, genetic engineering, or
information technology can affect theories of normative
science is hard to deny. We tend to believe that
notwithstanding the scientific development and its ensuing
technological utility, the human being is still master of
human life and that his inalienable human dignity and worth
should be the supreme measure as to the evaluation of human
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relations. Although, the normative theory which puts human
worth and dignity on the apex of the value system is
correct, however, I think that we ought to re-examine the
meanings and manners of our evaluation of human activity in
light of ever-changing social dynamics.
Here, one important idea which we can use in a fresh look
into contemporary social phenomena is the notion of organic
solidarity as an integrating feature of social relations.
Due to technological development, division of labour has
been accelerated. We work at diverse places and perform
varied functions. We do not know properly what our
neighbours do, but we are connected with each other by our
performing social functions. Without relying on a
neighbours's good performance of their work, we cannot
fulfil our own role and function properly and further our
purpose of life. Thus, we live in a society where
diversification and interdependence is inevitable. The
scope and degree of that situation becomes ever deeper than
before. One danger of contemporary society with its
tendency of technological dominance and diversification of
human role is social disintegration. When people become
disintegrated and atomic beings, though being
interdependent in their functions, there may be serious
disorder and malfunction if people do not properly
cooperate with each other. In order to maintain the proper
function of society, the value of communal solidarity and
harmony should be stressed. Solidarity and harmony, in
addition to liberty and equality, as a third generation in
the concept of human right, is another essential element to
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attain the common good in the society. We set before
ourselves a conception of the harmonious fulfilment of
human capacity and role as the substance of flourishing
life, and we have to enquire into the conditions of its
realization. We should consider laws, customs and
institutions in respect of their functions not merely in
maintaining any sort of social life, but in maintaining or
promoting a harmonious life.
II.5. The thesis of institutional natural law.
(1) Rights as institutionalized desert and needs.
In our attempt to clarify the criteria of justice, we
have found that social justice or moral justice essentially
consists of a principle of desert and a principle of needs.
These principles are sources of ideal moral rights and
produce fundamental moral claims to establish just
relationships or just states of affairs. However, these
ideal moral claims to justice, as long as they remain in
the moral realm, can not be securely put into effect though
they may be aspired to by the majority of people. They may
be subject to different or inconsistent interpretations
over time, even to derogations or negations due to
conflicting interests or changes of situation. The moral
rights dependent on these principles need to be firmly
recognized as, or transformed into, social rules of justice
in order to secure their effective enforcement.
Institutionalized rights have thus obvious advantages in
these senses of security and enforceability over moral
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rights. When moral desert and needs are institutionalized
by being introduced into the legal realm, then they are
considered as matters of institutional desert, or more
correctly matters of entitlement or legal rights.
Legal rights (or simply rights), albeit that their point
is to be no more than institutionalized embodiment of the
principles of moral desert or needs, can nevertheless be
regarded as furnishing a separate, a third criterion of
justice. As the legal embodiment of justice, rights are
also regarded as the most stable, reliable, and effective
means to fulfil social justice. This is expressed in the
formula 'to each according to his or her rights'. In order
to put such a conception of justice into practice, it is
necessary to know what each person's rights are. Rights
generally derive from publicly acknowledged rules of law:
they do not necessarily depend upon a person's current
behaviour or other individual qualities. The principle of
legal rights is concerned with the continuity of a social
order over time, and ensuring that the expectations persons
hold of each other in certain important matters are not
disappointed. In this sense we may describe the legal
justice to be secured by means of rights as 'conservative' .
We have now three conflicting interpretations of justice
which can be summarized in the three principles: to each
according to his rights; to each according to his deserts;
to each according to his needs. We may divide these three
principles between conservative legal justice and ideal
moral justice. 'Rights' and 'desert', and 'rights' and
'needs' are contingently in conflict, since we may strive
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for a social order in which each person has a right to that
which he or she deserves, or that which he or she needs. If
such perfectly just societies could be created, the
contrast between conservative and ideal justice would
vanish, since the actual distribution of rights would
correspond to the ideal distribution. However, due to the
innate characteristics of rights tending to preserve the
current positive legal order with continuity and security,
it is apt to diverge from the demands of moral desert or
needs. Judgments about legal justice have, as their object,
consistency of an act with legal rules; they confirm that
a general rule is properly applied to a particular case.
Judgments about social justice have, as their object, the
content of those rules; they confirm that the rule
distributes burdens and benefits justly among the members
of a community. Thus, though one important part of social
justice consists in respecting the positive rights which
people have, there would arise cases in which the
transgression of positive rights is a legal injustice, but
not a social injustice. This kind of conflicting situation
between legal justice and social justice, or legal rights
and moral rights causes dilemmas to the people concerned,
not only the parties to the legal disputes but also the
judges and legal officials. Perhaps, as a way of avoiding
this problem we may say that social justice and legal
justice apply to different phases of the social process:
Social justice applies to work done by legislators, legal
justice to work done by judges (or any other persons acting
authoritatively in applying rules). But, this statement is
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an unacceptable simplification: It assumes a particular
theory of sources of law, namely the theory which makes a
clear distinction between the legislative and the judicial
roles. This view is now widely contested in the Common Law
countries as well as in the Civil Law countries. In the
Common Law countries, particularly concerning 'hard cases'
or 'intractable cases', that is to say, cases where
informed people can reasonably disagree about the bearing
of the law on the facts of the cases, there exist heated
debates whether the clear borderline between law-making
and judicial decision-making can be drawn. Two different
theoretical approaches to ^hard cases' are possible. As to
this issue, we might conclude that a judge 'makes' law in
hard cases, that is, he acts as if he were a legislator.
Then, his decision may be a proper subject of evaluation by
the criteria of social justice. And even in the narrowed
issue of judicial decision-making for the sake of legal
justice, debates continue on the questions such as those
raised by Ronald Dworkin whether there is always one right
answer to the hard case and the judge has a duty to
discover it by resort to the legal standards other than the
rules. In the Civil Law countries, especially those of
Continental Europe and Far-East Asian countries like Japan
and Korea, judicial precedents are not considered as formal
sources of law. This does not mean that the courts in
these countries fail to rely on general principles of
fairness or justice. The use of those nonformal sources of
law has also long been maintained by legal scholars. One
positive example of allowing the application of nonformal
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sources of law is Article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code, which
directs the judge to decide cases unprovided for by statute
or customary law according to the rule 'which he himself
would lay down as legislator'.
However legal disputes are never decreased but aggravated
partly due to the disagreements between legal positivists
and natural lawyers with regard to understandings of the
concept of law and legal obligation. The legal positivists
will deny that the existence of a legal system, of valid
laws and legal obligations requires accordance with any
particular moral standards: they may thus still describe
a positive body of law, whose valid laws impose legal
obligations on its citizens, as a legal system, however
fundamental the moral requirements it breaches. The
traditional natural lawyers will insist that at least some
of those moral principles, which both camps agree to be
morally binding on any legal system, are so in virtue of
their internal relationship to the concept of law itself:
and thus that law or legal system which radically fails to
accord with these principles cannot be allowed the status
of valid law, or be said to impose legal obligations. The
content of their disagreement seems clear. Can we specify
purely factual criteria for the existence of legal
systems, valid laws, and legal obligations - criteria
logically independent of any moral standards by which we
may go on to assess the law? Or does the concept of law it
self include certain moral criteria, by which valid laws
are to be identified as well as assessed? To answer this
question, I think we need not a single-handed approach by
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any legal theory of legal interpretation but an integrative
approach or multi-dimensional theory of law. An integrative
theory of law I shall propose consists of three different
approaches to law, namely, an analytical approach, a
socio-historical approach, and an ideological
approach.(This idea was particularly inspired by the
writings of Jerome Hall, Edgar Bodenheimer, and Harold J.
Berman. See Hall, 1958: 37-47; Bodenheimer, 1974: 163-68;
Berman, 1988: 779-780) A theory of 'institutional natural
law' as a corollary of the integrative jurisprudence will
be formulated to be an appropriate model which can
compromise the differing approaches to law principally by
allowing constant imbuing of the institutional legal
setting with the principles of constitutional morality of
any given society. (Compare with Richards's similar idea of
'methodological natural law theory' which tries to combine
the institutional aspect of law with a natural law
doctrine; however, his theory is more inclined to stressing
the abstract idea of natural law and the role of critical
morality than mine. See David A. J. Richards, 1977: 33-4,
178 and 265)
(2) Institutional Natural Law.
The reason why I prefer an integrative jurisprudence to
a single-handed theory of legal positivism or natural law
is that each of the latter two theories is deficient in the
proper understanding of the meaning of law. Legal
positivists have insisted on the logical separability
between law and morals on the ground that law, though a
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normative system, is at most an institutional fact while
morality is a system of value. Some positivists have argued
that since there are no cognizable objective values in the
moral system, the matter of legal interpretation in cases
of legal adjudication should firmly remain in the realm of
positive legal rules, or at most positive social rules
(e.g. Hart). Because of this separation of law from morals,
they also have argued, legal positivism is superior to
natural law doctrine for the former can facilitate the
moral criticism of legal system. I doubt the merits of
these arguments of legal positivism. There can be at least
two points of criticism against legal positivism. Legal
positivism is apt to allow enforcement of an unjust law
because of its imperative concern for the consistency,
certainty, and predictability of legal order. Furthermore,
in so far as legal positivists insist upon the subjectivity
of value systems, any moral criticism that is directed by
them against the existing law through public opinion or
legislative amendment may involve a long and tedious
procedure to bring about any change in the consensus or the
majority opinion; and they are debarred from asserting any
fundamental grounds of rightness other than consensus or
majority opinion.
Traditional natural law doctrines (notably versions of
Thomism) have not been immune from criticism. For all the
merits of their allowing internal evaluation of legal rules
from the aspects of justice and conscience, they are liable
to blur the separation of power between the legislative
body and the judicial body. Extreme natural law theories
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have been charged with sacrificing the certainty of the
current legal order because of their primary concern for
justice and reasonableness over incumbent state policy or
lawmaker's will.
However, in recent decades legal positivists (e.g.
MacCormick and Raz) and natural lawyers (e.g. Finnis and
Fuller) have begun to accommodate each other's merits in
various forms. Legal positivists acknowledge that a legal
system may expressly include certain moral norms, such as
due process and the equal protection of basic rights, which
govern the application of legal rules. MacCormick, for
example, acknowledges that there are principles and values
which lie behind legal rules and are employed in the
language of justifying rationalizations of the valid legal
rules.(See 1985: 8)
As legal positivists have increasingly taken account of
the effect of morality on law, so natural lawyers have
increasingly taken account of the political elements in
law. Natural lawyers acknowledge that the morality by which
law is to be tested includes the moral duty to preserve the
legal order imposed and enforced by the state. Lon Fuller,
for example, argued that law is compounded of reason and
fiat, of order discovered and order imposed, and to attempt
to eliminate either of these aspects of the law is to
denature and falsify it. (See 1946: 376 and 382) From this
modified viewpoint of the idea of law, the principle of
justice and reasonableness, whose objectivity the legal
positivists tend to doubt, has a limited role while the
competing principles of utility and legal certainty are
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given equal importance to achieve the purpose of law.
Here the important point to be made is that legal
positivism and natural law doctrine are complementary
rather than rival theories of law, and should be taken to
be equally necessary approaches to understanding the
complex phenomenon of legal institutions. Thus, my strategy
to formulate an integrative theory of law is to synthesize
three approaches - an analytical, a socio-historical, and
an ideological one.
Under integrative jurisprudence so conceived, law may be
defined as the institutional enterprise or systemic
activity of subjecting human conduct to the governance of
legal rules by legislating, adjudicating and administering
acts to achieve justice and the common good among the
members of the society. This definition of law as the
institutional enterprise or systemic activity to control or
guide human conduct entails a multi-faceted approach to
understand its true nature.
Any social institution, whether political, religious,
educational, or legal, can be established as a system by
certain habitual practices in conformity to norms for the
realization of human goods. To be a viable institution, it
should carry well-defined components within itself. Three
essential components of the institution as a going-concern
may be pointed out analogous to the organization of the
human being itself. They are normative idea, functional
operation, and factual body. For example, let us see the
institution of education: there are normative reqirements
and goals to educate people toward desirable members of
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society; for this purpose there are essential functions of
education by ways of teaching, research, student
counselling and so on; there are also physical entity to be
designed for and also to be identified as running the
business of education, such as educational codes and
regulations, educational organizations - primary schools,
universities, etc., and their constituents - teachers and
students. Likewise, law as a normative social institution
should be seen essentially carrying these three dimensions:
law should strive for its goal to attain justice and the
common good in social relations; for this purpose law
functions as a guide to the proper administration of human
activities or a means to dispute-settlements; there are
physical entities to be designed and to be identified as
carrying out the business of law, such as legal codes and
precedents, law organizations - legislative body,
administrative body, and judicial tribunal, and their
constituents - law-makers, law officials, and judges.
But traditional schools of legal philosophy - legal
positivism, natural law theory, and the socio-historical
school, have each isolated a single important dimension of
law or legal institutions. The analytical school of legal
positivism treats law essentially as a particular social
reality dependent on political will: a factual body of
rules posited by the state, having its own independent
self-contained character separate and distinct from both
morality and history. The natural law school tends to treat
positive law as rules but they test the rules of positive
law by moral principles, which they consider to be equally
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a part of law. The socio-historical school treats law in
terms of both rules and moral principles. Unlike the
positivists, however, they tend to be more concerned with
the rules of customary law than the rules of enacted law
and, unlike the natural lawyers, they are apt to be
concerned with those specific moral principles that
correspond to the character and traditions of a given
people or a given society rather than with universal moral
principles.
Though varied their focus and understanding of law may
have been among the three competing schools, their eventual
goals of law have tended to converge towards the ideas of
justice and the common good. But what has divided the three
traditional schools most sharply has been the assertion of
priority among three seemingly competing approaches to
justice and the common good, namely legal entitlement and
certainty, fairness, and appropriateness to social context.
Here, what an integrative jurisprudence tries to achieve is
to internalize the moderation of competing claims of legal
purpose or purposes within the business of single judge or
legal official while alleviating the burden of abstract
speculation with regard to employing seemingly diverse
principles of moral justice and conscience. The formulation
of institutional natural law as a corollary of integrative
jurisprudence enables judges or legal officials to grasp
law comprehensively by bridging the law as it is and the
law as it ought to be and furthermore drawing upon the rich
source of value constituted by living custom and tradition
into a contemporary dynamic operation of value within the
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legal institution. It also enables judges or legal
officials to concentrate on the discovery of positive
morality from constitutional principles while it separates
itself from any suggestion that there is a necessary
connection between law and any critical morality.
Thus, law, if it fulfils its institutional functions of
providing order, certainty, and justice properly to serve
the common good, partakes both of the world of empirical
reality and of the realm of normative ideals. The
functional element of law carries two faces, a factual and
an evaluative one: the factual face of legal function lies
in citizens' recognition of law as mere law and its minimum
effectiveness; the evaluative face is the matters of
eufunction of law and citizens's acceptance of law as a
valid law binding in conscience. Because of this functional
element, our approach to law forms a bridge between the is
and the ought, a bridge built to facilitate the transition
from a social condition exhibiting a great deal of conflict
and violence to a state of peace and social well-being in
which exists, in addition to multifarious individual
pursuits of self-interest, a sharing of the common good.
The upshot of above discussions brings forth a clearer
picture of three criteria of the validity of law, namely a
factual test, a functional test, and a
normative-eufunctional test. First, the factual test may be
concerned with authoritative sources and procedures by
reference to which the status of putative law is
determined. Secondly, the functional test may be initially
concerned with the minimum effectiveness of law and its
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being perceived as a law. Thirdly, the
normative-eufunctional test may be concerned with the
reasonableness of law's content and its acceptance by
citizens as a valid law due to its conformity to
ideological purposes of law.
The practical applications of institutional natural law
are to put stress on constitutional principles as the
embodiment of positive common morality at a given time in
a given politically organized society. Thus, the tasks of
a judge in any constitutional adjudication are to draw
right answers in a coherent way from the body of
constitutional principles. I believe that the appropriate
way to interpret constitutional principles is to adopt an
integrative jurisprudence. There may arise many
controversial constitutional issues, such as abortion,
pornography, capital punishment, religious education in
public schools, gender equality and other crucial issues of
conflict between individual liberty and public policy. The
integrative jurisprudence as a synthesized approach of
legal positivism, natural law theory, and socio-historical
theory may enable us to weigh and balance the demands of
positive law, institutional common morality, and
traditional values in a coherent and harmonious way to
achieve justice and the common good.
III. Critique of Rival Theories.
So far I have argued for a theory of justice which is
primarily based on the notion of teleological desert. The
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notion of teleological desert has been interpreted by and
supported from the outlook of a liberal-communitarian value
(or, a republican value) and a perfectionist virtue ethics.
Is this theory tenable? Can this theory give a more
plausible answer than rival theories to the current
perplexing issues of distributive justice and retributive
justice arising in contemporary society? I have argued for
this in terms of my theory positively at various points in
this thesis partly by defending mine and partly by refuting
rival ones. Here, I shall summarize in a comprehensive
manner why my theory is preferable and rival theories
deficient in dealing with the matters of reward and
punishment.
As to the notion of teleological desert there may be
attacks from both sides, both from typical retributivism
and from utilitarianism. The underlying perfectionist telos
in my interpretation of human desert, which entails the
priority of the good over the right, is liable to be
attacked from the right-based liberals and Rawlsian
contractarians. Again my view of liberal-communitarian
value may be refuted by strict communitarianism for being
less thoroughgoing in the commitment to community tradition
and value. However, I have defended my theory by pointing
out the deficiencies of rival theories which are
particularly influential in contemporary debates on
justice. Let us see some salient points in our previous
discussions.
First, my theory starts with the notion of desert on the
same footing as typical retributivism, but diverges from
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the latter in the interpretation of the scope of desert.
Typical retributivists who advocate just deserts as the
criterion of criminal punishment focus on past conducts of
offenders. The core retributivist idea is that those guilty
of certain sorts of acts, whatever they are, which ought to
be criminalized in a society, deserve to be punished; those
innocent of such acts deserve not to be punished. Some
retributivists take this idea as a bedrock intuition,
others as an intuition or an intrinsic feeling that can be
made plausible by rational anaysis. All agree, however,
that it dictates essential requirements to be satisfied by
a criminal justice system.
Essentially right though the demand of just desert theory
is, it stops short of providing us with a complete account
of justified punishment; its backward-looking viewpoint
ignores the ever-changeable, developmental nature of human
beings in regard to the assessment of conduct and character
of a criminal so that it entails unnecessarily a rigid
retributive system of punishment. Furthermore, it does not
offer an answer on the issue of what kind of punishment is
fitting in a particular case within a range of equally
plausible proportional punishments. In this sense, the
mixed theories which combine retributivism with
utilitarianism appear more promising. The various attempts
among mixed theories, particularly the rule-utilitarian
approach espoused by Rawls in his earlier writings, or
Hart's two-tier theory which combines utilitarianism as the
general justifying aim of punishment and the principle of
justice as the distribution of punishment, or another
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similar account such as the permissive desert theory of
punishment espoused by D. D. Raphael, apparently solve the
problem of a single-handed retributivist approach. However,
the problem in the above three mixed theories is that they
take utility as the ultimate justifying reason of
punishment so that there may arise some suspicious cases of
sacrificing justice for the sake of maximum utility in a
society. My teleological desert theory of punishment like
other similar accounts of teleological retributivism does
not want to go so far; it regards punishment in accordance
with desert as the central justifying factor, whilst
requiring a utilitarian justification for the infliction of
punishment in individual cases. My teleological desert
theory particularly stresses the function of moral
communication derivable from a deserved punishment between
punisher and punishee on the one hand, and between
wrongdoer and society as a whole on the other hand.
Secondly, the teleological desert theory with its
forward-looking element of human telos may share a
characteristic with utilitarian consequentialism. However,
the former differs from the latter in a fundamental point.
The self-fulfilment at which teleological desert aims is
founded upon a conception of definite end-states which
people are supposed to achieve by their conducts, whereas
utilitarianism is open-ended in sanctioning whatever
produces the greatest amount of happiness. Utilitarianism
with its emphasis on the maximization of good consequences
is liable to criticism for its tendency to justify that the
ends justify the means or acts are judged to be morally
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right or wrong by their outcomes. One frequent criticism
against utilitarianism is that it can justify the
punishment of an innocent person. If punishing an innocent
person, by torture or execution, say, would produce more
good consequence than any alternative act, it would seem
to be a utilitarian duty to punish that person. We can
argue here that it is not consequences, or at least not
consequences alone, which determine what is right or
wrong.
Thirdly, I argue that Rawls in his later writings, like
all other contract theorists, seems to have a defective
understanding of the relation between the individual and
the political community. Contract theorists suggest that
free, independent, fully formed individuals can deliberate
about the kinds of mutual connections and limitations to
which they should severally agree. They maintain that each
individual, considering personal interest in the context of
a general understanding of the empirical requirements of
physical and material security, comes to regard some form
of political association as advantageous. But if these
empirical requirements happen to be different, there would
be no reason to agree to enter into the political
community.
This understanding of the political community crucially
affects the way Rawls poses the question of justice. He
distinguishes between obligations all of which are
accounted for by the principle of fairness, and natural
duties which, in contrast with obligations, apply to us
without regard to our voluntary acts. (Rawls, 1971: 114) He
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argues that justice is not composed of natural duties,
because the content of the principle of justice is defined
by a specific kind of voluntary act: A group of person must
decide once and for all what is to count among them as just
and unjust. The choice which rational men would make in a
hypothetical situation of equal liberty determines the
principles of justice. (See ibid., 12)
I think that this characterization of justice is
questionable. It seems to rest on a mistaken view of the
political community. Political life has an important
natural component. We are beings so constituted that we can
achieve development and satisfaction only within a
political community. For this reason, it is misleading to
see the political community as entirely produced by choice
or agreement, like in the manner of a business contract.
The error would be in no way mitigated if the contract is
viewed as a theoretical reconstruction rather than as a
historical actuality or practical requirement. This is
because as human beings, our separate existences are linked
in important ways prior to our application of reason and
will to the construction of a common life. If this is so,
then it is necessary to explore the ways in which justice,
one of the cardinal virtues of community, expresses these
links - that is, the extent to which justice must be
conceived of as consisting of natural duties. The basic
principles of justice can be adequately understood in this
manner.
Also Rawls's approach seems to rest on a dubious
epistemological claim about principles of justice. We do
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not seek answers to mathematical puzzles by asking what
various individuals would assent to. Rather, the
independently determined answer would serve as the
criterion of rational assent. Of course, if the answer is
correct we usually assume that a rational individual with
the requisite background knowledge can be led to agree.
Similarly, if a proposed principle is just, we may believe
that a rational individual would assent to it, but there is
no a priori reason to assume that the assent is the source
of justification for the principle. To the extent that
Rawls's argument is contractarian, it seems to assume that
no alternative mode of argument leading to an independent
criterion of justice is possible. But there is no reason to
believe that this is the case, especially in light of
Rawls's assertion that many kinds of moral principles rest
on non-contractarian grounds.
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CHAPTER 9. KOREAN CASE
I. Contemporary Issues of Korean Jurisprudence.
In this chapter I shall consider matters of justice in
the Korean context with particular reference to the
contemporary issues of just reward and criminal punishment.
My aim here is to verify whether the principles of justice
and law vindicated in previous chapters are plausible and
applicable to give guidelines to the vexing problems of
injustice or inequity in contemporary Korean society. As
the decades-long authoritarian rule gradually fades away in
Korea nowadays mainly due to past strenuous efforts by the
people for democratization and humanization of their
political and social system, they now have to find ways to
reach social consensus on urgent reforms of political,
social and economic institutions. The main item on the
current agenda of democratization and humanization is to
achieve sustainable social justice with continuous economic
development. However, on the way to promote that task
another vexing problem ensues: as the control of the
previous authoritarian-type state weakens, politically
tinged violence and brutality seem to be rising. These days
we can observe that not only students but also workers
start to resort to violence to achieve their demands for
radical reform in some parts of the existing inequitable
economic systems and relations. Many intellectuals voice
their sympathy for the main ideas behind the students' and
workers' demands for fundamental reform in the existing
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distributive system, though not for their resort to violent
means. The people's increasing demand for fundamental
economic reform in the income and property distribution
system seems to be justifiable to some extent in the light
of the previous long period of one-sided government policy
in stressing economic growth while neglecting an equitable
distribution of the fruits of that economic growth.
However, this should not mean that the currently
established constitutional order of a liberal welfare state
may be radically changed or overturned abruptly in favour
of the radicals' violent demand for a far-reaching
socialist type of egalitarian system. The end of political
reform in favour of a more egalitarian distributive system,
however strongly arguable or clearly acceptable in relation
to some parts of the economic system, cannot justify any
means whatever for achieving that end: it is doubtful
whether any new just order or good society can be brought
about by recourse to violent means or revolutionary
upheavals. The reason for this view may be drawn from the
past historical experiences that political violence is
liable to bring forth yet further political violence, and
revolution tends to provoke counter-revolution.
Thus, we should aim at building a consensus with least
friction in order that a democratic and peaceful style of
conflict-settlement through compromise and mediation may
emerge and give rise to a patient and enduring struggle for
a long-lasting justice rather than falling for the illusory
temptation of short-run revolutionary justice. The
democratic and peaceful way to rectify past injustices and
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to restore social equity will be only made possible by
developing a shared common sense of justice among the great
majority and applying it ardently to political and legal
practice. Here, the sharing of the common sense of justice
requires that people deliberate about the substantive
criteria of justice and form their opinion by employing
sincerely their three common means of moral knowledge,
namely, sound intuition, impartial spectator's sympathy,
and rational thinking and discussion. I have proposed in
previous chapters that the only tenable criteria of justice
for contemporary democratic capitalist society approachable
by employing the above three means of moral knowledge are
desert, needs, and legal right. Thus, what Korean society
now needs in order to establish a more equitable and fair
political and economic system is first and foremost that
the people should strive to nurture a common sense of
justice and develop a habit of practising it in a
democratic and peaceful manner. It may be worth stressing
again that developing a habit of rational discourse in
dispute-settlement procedure and observing the rule of law
in that matter will be also vital if Korean society is to
realize justice and the common good.
But are these ideas of western style democratic procedure
and the rule of law really plausible in relation to Korean
society or applicable to solve its problems? Are these
ideas viable for a society where traditional morality and
value system of Confucianism and Buddhism still play a
great role in customary matters? Western style political
principles of democracy, the rule of law, and the liberal
304
welfare state seem now to be ideas incorporated into the
positive legal order of Korea according to its
Constitution. It is also, however, the case that
traditional authoritarian ways of dispute settlement and a
community-oriented value system are still living custom.
Let us examine this issue in more detail.
II. Traditional Confucian Ideas of Justice and Law.
II.1. Critical synthesis needed.
In this section, I shall examine the traditional Korean
and Confucian ideas of justice and law. The aims are to
investigate how they have been developed and preserved in
the social milieu, and to explore whether there are any
gaps or discrepancies between traditional ideas and usages
and the Western ideas of justice and law which were
implanted when Korea launched Modernization.
Notwithstanding the fact that so-called 'Westernization'
and 'Modernization' have been proceeding very rapidly
during the past decades in Korea, some tradional mores and
basic moral ideas which had survived several millennia have
proved very sturdy and resistant to change. In spite of our
professed belief in the political ideals of the West and
our eagerness to adopt them as our own, we have not
succeeded in assimilating them into our system or in
creating a well-ordered synthesis. Having made up our mind
in favour of things Western, we have rushed head-long into
the task of building a new political order modelled after
that of the West on top of the existing order. In the
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process we have paid little heed to whether the newly
attempted superstructure was a viable one or whether it
could be made compatible with the indigenous substratum.
We witness daily our politicians and intellectuals
mouthing such phrases as freedom, rights, democracy, the
rule of law, etc. as if these concepts have been the sacred
symbols of our culture from time immemorial. They sound as
if they know what they are talking about. And they, of
course, assume that these symbols are meaningful to their
listeners too. What they fail to realize is the fact that
Korean linguistic equivalents for these concepts are of
recent coinage, and therefore, devoid of the cultural
content that makes their counterparts in the Western
languages meaningful cultural symbols. Furthermore, the
Korean linguistic equivalents assigned to these concepts
are the composites of several words that had been
impregnated with an entirely different cultural content.
These words had acquired a different connotation in the
course of their being used for symbolizing different values
in our culture during past centuries. As a result, these
concepts do not strike the same responsive chord in a
Korean as they do in a Westerner.
As a Korean jurist Pyong-Choon Hahm has observed, the
problem here is not only one of semantics; it is much more
substantial. It is directly concerned with the desiderata
of the Korean political culture itself. Does an average
Korean really want and desire the rule of law as he
understands it? Do the Korean rulers really believe that
'freedom under law' or 'justice according to law' is a
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practical ideal at present? Whatever answers one may give
to these questions, it is of paramount importance for those
who are concerned with the Korean situation to gain a clear
initial understanding of these concepts in the Western
political tradition and then of their significance in the
context of the Korean political tradition.(See Hahm, 1967:
6)
Thus, it seems to me that crucial tasks for contemporary
Korean jurists are to investigate some basic political
ideas and jural terms, such concepts as justice, utility,
freedom and rights, which have been transplanted from the
West to the Far-East in an integrative approach to
jurisprudence, and to critically re-evaluate their
suitability and viability in a syncretic way with the
traditional ideas and values.
II.2. Neo-Confucianism as the state ideology.
Situated as it is on the eastern periphery of the Asian
continent, the Korean peninsula has been placed under the
dominant influence of China from an early period. Although
there is a danger of any student of Korean history taking
the Chinese cultural pattern and symbols in Korean culture
at their face value, nevertheless one cannot but be
impressed by the extremely high degree of Sinification of
Korean political culture.
The single greatest force for Sinification has been
Confucianism. Confucianism was most effective as an agency
of Sinification especially during the Yi dynasty (A.D.
1392-1910) when it was established as the official ideology
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of the state. The particular school of Confucianism that
was adopted as state ideology by the Yi rulers was the
teachings of Chu Hsi (A.D. 1130-1200) and his predecessors
of the Sung period of China (A.D. 960-1279) and this became
the established doctrine. (See Youn, 1986: 570)
Korean Confucianists believed that the most important
attribute a ruler had to possess was virtue and virtue was
thought attainable through rational knowledge. What
distinguishes man from beasts is that he has reason (li).
Through this faculty man is able to comprehend the Way of
the Universe. By knowing the Way he can distinguish right
from wrong. Since there was only one Universal Way, the
correct knowledge of which constituted virtue, namely,
humanity(jen) , righteousness (i) , propriety (li), and
wisdom (chih).(See Chiu Hansheng, 1986: 130)
The law of nature and the moral law were one and the
same. According to Chu Hsi's theory of the operation of the
Principle of Heaven (Way of Nature), human ethics and
practice cannot depart from the operation of the Principle
of Heaven. In other words, man must practice introspection
and self-scrutiny in his daily practice and relationships
with his fellow men to eradicate completely mundane
desires so that the Principle of Heaven will operate within
him.(See ibid., 125)
Also no distinction was made between family ethics and
state (or political) ethics. As in the universe where
heaven and earth are the bases, so in the society, husband
and wife are the bases. The family, therefore, is the
foundation of social organization. Since the state is a
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part of society, so the family should also be the
foundation of the state. (See Hsti, 1932: 87)
Having posited that an accurate and complete apprehension
of the idea of good (or, the Way) was the basis of
politics, there was little need for positive law as against
public opinion or custom. According to Neo-Confucianism,
just as in Chinese legal history, the rule of virtue is
above the rule of law. Dispute settlements were made
primarily according to the concepts of 'human
sentiment' (ch'ing) and 'human reason' (li; note a word 'li'
below with a same phonation and a spelling but different
meaning, 'propriety'). Hence, the rule of noble conduct
derived from the Confucian teachings and practices became
a universal system of ethics for all people, irrespective
of rank and class.
The rule of law advocated by the Legalist administrators
and the law-makers, which was little different from a rule
of punishment or a rule by autocratic decree, has never
been considered as a desirable goal of politics in Korea.
In fact, it is a direct antithesis of what the rule of law
means in the West today. It had also been an antithesis of
what a good politics should be in the Korean political
tradition. It is because that law was considered as an
instrument of chastising the vicious and the depraved. It
is little wonder that the ruling elite considered law to be
beneath its dignity. The concept that law may apply only to
barbarians or to ignorant masses, and never to properly
learned persons or to rulers was strongly rooted in the
Korean thought, owing to the influence of the Confucian
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teachings and practices. A noble person has better things
to contemplate. Though he knows no specific provisions of
the code, his actions are never to be in violation of the
law, not because he fears punitive sanctions imposed by the
state but because he regulates his conduct by a higher
principle of life. Due to this belief, the rulers regarded
themselves as not only being above the law but also that
they ought to be above the law.(See Hahm, 1967: 19-21)
However, it was originally in China that while the
Confucian ethics was considered by most rulers as the ideal
system of norms to guide the life-style and the conducts of
people, penal laws, formally applied only to serfs, came to
gain general acceptance among the Legalist intellectuals as
an effective means of crime prevention. In view of the fact
that many people, noble or humble, had grown so corrupt and
unruly that they were no longer able to be restrained by
the gentle code of the Confucian teachings and rituals, it
was natural that some administrators influenced by the
Legalist thinkers came to maintain that strict and equal
punishments should be meted out to all transgressors of
law. (Liu, 1955: 105) I shall examine this Legalist ideas
and tradition in more detail shortly.
Here, what may be thought to come closer to the Western
concept of law in a broader sense is the Chinese concept of
' li' (propriety or, rites) . 'Li' is broad enough to
encompass all the usages and conventions of the Chinese
civilization tried by the Confucian rationality.(See Fung,
1952: 68)
In a narrower sense, it means etiquette and manners. In
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a broader sense, it means an understanding of the Cosmic
Reason. It is a moral expression of the Way of the
Universe. When both the ruler and the ruled act according
to 'li', harmony prevails. The virtuous live by it. When a
society is ordered by law or by the threat of punitive
sanctions, its members evade it with impunity and feel no
shame. But when a society is ordered by 'li', its members
not only behave properly but also know shame. The rule of
'li' not 'fa' (law) was the ideal to be pursued in the
Korean political tradition.(See Hahm, 1967: 22)
However, we may recall that while Korea experienced a
far-flung Sinification since fifteenth century in which
Neo-Confucianism was moving into a position of dominance
intellectually and (somewhat more slowly) socially, at the
same time a highly developed set of Chinese legal norms was
being received and adopted in the institutional arena.
During this period Korea experienced the simultaneous
adoption of perhaps the most rigorous Confucian
formulations on law - those of Chu Hsi - and the
comprehensive incorporation of developed Chinese legal
practice, the Ming Code. In a sense, the Ming Code was also
the most 'Confucian' of the Chinese Law codes to date,
representing the culmination of several centuries in which
the social values of the Southern Sung thinkers had become
increasingly embodied in the sanctions of penal law. Here
the situation in Korea from the beginning of the Yi
dynasty has implications for the question of the so-called
'Confucianization of law' discussed by scholars of Chinese
thought and institutions. Thus, it is worthwhile examining
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some salient ideas of justice and law in traditional
Chinese legal history to understand the background of legal
thought in Korea.
II.3. Justice and law in Confucian philosophy.
There are two trends of thought in the traditional
Chinese legal history. One is legal positivism envisaging
written law as a primary source of rules and the other is
a view giving priority to customary laws. The former
advocated the absolute supremacy of written laws and the
strict observation of statute. Hence, legal decisions were
supposed to be strictly based on the codified written
laws, crimes were determined and punishments were meted out
according to statutory provisions.
In legal positivism as advocated by the Legalists in
ancient China the idea of equitable judgment was that it
had to be based on 'Lu' (statutes) and 'Ling' (ordinances) .
That is to say, by equity and justice was meant that the
punishment had exactly to fit the degrees of crime
committed by the criminal and his status at the time of the
crime according to the specific provisions of the code.
The other, which was favoured by Confucianists in ancient
times, advocated that adjudications were or ought to be
made by judges according to ethical or moral principles.
Not unlike the natural law school of thought in the West,
equitable judgment was based on "ch'ing"(human sentiment)
and "li"(human reason), which are the basic attributes of
human nature as the Heaven-made law with which humans
ought to conform. (See Tsao, 1962: 32-42) Confucian classics
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at times served as the norm of reference for judicial
decisions in ancient China.
Thus it may be said that the Legalists favoured the
written law, whereas the Confucianists favoured the
unwritten law. Hstin-tzu (c. 298-238 B.C.) who can be viewed
as the bridge between these two trends, recognized the need
of both written and unwritten laws. Hsttn-tzu, though he was
a Confucian, shows the influence of Legalist thought most
clearly in his acceptance of law as a necessary part of
government. On the other hand he differed from the
Legalists in refusing to treat moral example as irrelevant
to government. For him the best solution was to combine the
two techniques, moral example and law. (See MacCormack,
1986: 247) The ruler himself should be virtuous and should
see that the laws enshrined and enforced moral principle.
With respect to the use of punishment Hsttn-tzu advocated
a doctrine that again seems to combine Legalist and
Confucian elements. Hstln-tzu not only emphasised the
retributive function of punishment but also its deterrent
ru
fuction. But his general idea of punishment was that the
punishment should be in proportion to the degree of
wickedness exhibited. Hstln-tzu's thinking about law and
punishment represents what was portrayed as the ideal
system of government virtually throughout the whole of
Chinese imperial history.(See MacCormack, 1990: 37-8)
The important conclusion to draw here is that the
principle of equity in this view brings together the two
trends interwoven in the life of the legal system in
traditional China, namely, the positivistic tendency
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according to which the standard of equity is in the statute
law, and the customary tendency according to which the
norms of case interpretation are based on "ch' ing"(human
sentiment) and "li"(human reason).
The idea of equity and its main features are expressed in
the following three words: Kung Cheng(public righteousness)
or Kung P'ing(public equity); P'ing Heng(balance) or Chun
Teng(equality); and Cheng Tang(right due) or Ying
Tang(according to one's oughtness).(See Kim, 1981: 83-5)
First, the word 'Kung Cheng' or 'Kung P'ing' is
equivalent to the English word 'justice' not in the sense
of abstract principle so much as in the sense of law as the
public standard of measurement for social conduct. In order
to have an equitable decision we have to have some public
standard which should not be corrupted by private desires
or feelings whether this standard be the written law or the
unwritten morality based on "ch'ing" and "li". What the
Legalists advocated was to establish such an objective
standard concretized in the written body of laws. And what
the Confucian-influenced courts did was to resort to the
objective standard of "ch'ing" and "li" where the case
required and when the written statutes did not adequately
cover the circumstances.
Secondly, the word 'P'ing Heng' or 'Chun Teng' denotes
the idea of balance on the scale or measurement, and has
the meaning of the English word 'equitable'. The principle
latent in the concept of equity in Chinese traditional law
is the balance of interests or balance between the offence
and penalty in their like degrees and their like
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relationships.
Thirdly, the word 'Cheng Tang' or 'Ying Tang' has a sense
of distributive justice, that is, the literal meaning
'right due' or 'according to one's due' expresses a notion
of oughtness (or matter of course) in reward or in
punishment according to the degree of meritorious desert or
the degree of offence. Both morality and law had their
basis in Heaven. It is morally right to punish criminals
and in fact criminals ought to be punished because the
punishment is what is due to them.
In Chinese traditional thought, everything and everyone
has what is due according to one's status and function. (See
Kim, 1981: 128 and 131) To act in due degree is the maxim
of propriety or the rule for proper conduct. To adjudge in
due degree seems to be the maxim of law. When one's dues
are properly met, in punishment as well as in reward,
equity is maintained and social harmony will prevail. Thus,
to find what punishment is the one exactly due to the
offence in various circumstances and with regard to the
relationships of the persons involved is to render an
equitable decision.
Thus, law has its origin in social justice. Social
justice has its origin in what is fitting for the many.
What is fitting for the many is what accords with the minds
of human beings. Herein is the essence of good
government.(See Bodde, 1963: 381)
Also the ideal images of human being and society are
embodied in the Doctrine of the Mean (Chung Yung): "It is
only the person, being most trustful and sincere in all the
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world, who can completely fulfil his life. Being able to
fulfil his own life in a perfect way, he can also
completely fulfil the life of other persons. Being able to
completely fulfil the life of other persons, he can,
furthermore, completely fulfil the life of all creatures
and things..."(Chung Yung, ch. xxii) Thus, from the above
passage, when a person is elevated into the plane of ideal
perfection through his own creative efforts, he may become
godlike in this world. The person so depicted is the man of
ideal perfection. Confucius called him a sage in whom all
excellences and values are accumulated and realized in
fulness.
Based on the above discussions, we may summarize the
general characteristics of the traditional Chinese idea of
justice and law as follows: it is more the rule by moral
principle of Confucian li than the rule by positive law of
the Legalists, more the customary law than the written
statutory law, more paternalistic than individualistic, and
more autocratic communitarian (Gemeinschaft) than
democratic liberal (Gesellschaft). Thus, there is a danger
of authoritarian rule in traditional political morality if
we stick to extreme Confucian moralism. Ruling elites who
monopolise learning and power have tended to take for
granted the absolute rightness and superiority of their
moral view because of their learned background in Confucian
ethics and have shunned to concede to their opponents any
scope for compromise or negotiation. By contrast any sudden
switch to a western type of liberal democracy, especially
one committed to hyper-individualism, and an extreme stress
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on individualistic liberal rights, will clearly involve a
profound conflict between the traditional and the adopted
ideology. Hence there would be a grave risk of political
disorder and social disintegration. My arguments so far
have thus tried to avoid any absolute claim of superiority
on behalf of either Western-style political morality or
Eastern-style traditional morality. The present thesis
argues for compromising ideas, namely liberal-communitarian
values, institutional natural law, and desert-based justice
as explained in the preceding chapters.
III. Constitutional Adjudication as to the Crime of
Adultery.
III.l. Overview.
In this final section, I shall consider the issue of the
constitutionality of the crime of adultery in the Korean
context. The reasons why I select particularly this issue
as a test case for the plausibility of my thesis are as
follows. Firstly, the issue of adultery seems to raise one
of the most acute problems of moral clash between an
individual's autonomy and right to pursue happiness in sex
life on the one hand and a person's communal responsibility
toward his or her marriage partner and children, if any, on
the other hand; here arises a potentially intractable issue
of moderation of those conflicting values. Secondly, the
question of whether adultery should be regarded as a crime
which is subject to legal punishment seems to be one of the
demarcating points between a Western-style liberal criminal
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policy and an Eastern-style traditional community-oriented
one. Thirdly, the current Korean Criminal Code with a
provision punishing adultery with up to 2 years
imprisonment seems to provide for us a useful case for
examining the aim of punishment by criminal law and the
measure of just and appropriate punishment in comparison to
other sexual offences, such as incest, homosexuality,
sodomy, or bestiality.
The issue of the constitutionality of the crime of
adultery has recently been a focal point of debate in Korea
not only in judicial tribunals but also among the general
public in relation to interpreting and identifying the
relative meaning and importance of various provisions
concerning fundamental human rights in the Korean
Constitution and its underlying moral principles; and in
relation to considering the significance of these for the
provision of the Korean Criminal Code concerning the crime
K
of adultery. The Criminal Code stipulates crime of adultery
as follows: (1) Any person who has a spouse and who commits
adultery is to be punished with up to 2 years imprisonment.
The paramour is also punishable in the same way. (2) This
crime may be prosecuted only when the offender is under an
accusation brought by his or her spouse.(Article 241) The
relevant Korean constitutional principles with respect to
the issue of the constitutionality of the crime of adultery
mainly involve the following: First, the principle of human
dignity and worth and the right to pursue happiness.
(Constitution, Article 10) Secondly, the principle of the
protection of privacy. (Constitution, Article 17) Thirdly,
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gender equality and the dignity of the individual person in
marriage and family life.(Constitution, Articles 11 and
36:1)
There has been a strong challenge by the liberals against
the current provision for the crime of adultery in the
Criminal Code on the ground that adultery is not such a
grave moral wrong worthwhile attracting public concern.
Alternatively, although it is conceded to be a wrong, it is
argued to be at most a kind of wrong which is better dealt
with by civil action or moral sanction, unsuitable to legal
punishment. In either case, the criminalization of adultery
is open to attack as unconstitutional. Liberals argue that
the regulation of adultery by criminal law becomes
increasinly anachronistic in light of contemporary
development of liberal sexual morality around the world and
thus is inappropriate to keeping pace with the current
liberalising trend of the criminal justice system in
developed countries.
I shall discuss this issue in following order. First, is
the act of adultery morally reprehensible wrongdoing at all
as many people deem it to be? If the above question can be
answered affirmatively, then, is that wrongfulness of
adultery a private matter to be dealt with only in a civil
action, or a wrongdoing involved with the public interest?
Secondly, if adultery is a wrongdoing not only of private
but also of public concern, then does the state have a
legitimate interest to impose a penal sanction on the party
or parties of adultery? And further, if the above question
can be answered affirmatively, what kind of punishment is
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fitting to the wrongdoer? Here, my position is to defend
the constitutionality of crime of adultery according to a
sound interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
Korean constitution. This interpretation is made possible,
I believe, by the principles of justice advocated
previously in this thesis.
III. 2. Morality of adultery.
First, as to morality of adultery. Here, adultery refers
to the voluntary engaging in sexual intercourse with
someone other than one's marriage partner. It involves
infidelity or unfaithfulness in the marriage relationship,
especially in its sexual aspects. Adultery may be generally
considered immoral by both the Western and the Eastern
society. However, the question here is on what grounds
society thinks of adultery as immoral.
The main argument against adultery may begin from the
fact that it is a direct violation of the most personal and
intimate human contractual relation into which two people
can enter. When people get married, they usually contract
to live together as husband and wife and to be faithful to
one another - this especially means sexually faithful.
Committing adultery usually involves lying, cheating, and
infidelity on the part of one marriage partner or both, and
these actions altogether are apt to constitute a violation
of the sound moral sense of community. Adultery is also
destructive of the marriage relationship; it corrupts the
family line and the unity of the family, it can lead to
separation or divorce and to the injuring of innocent
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children.
However, it is foolish not to recognize that many
marriages are not ideal, that one or both of the partners
may not relate well to the other at any level, including
the sexual. This means that dissatisfied partners often
look for other human relationships which will fulfil them
in ways their own marriage relationship will not, and when
their marriage relationship is an unhappy one, people are
often tempted to engage in adultery with a person who they
feel would make them happy or give them pleasure, even if
only for a brief period of time.
Here, the argument for condoning adultery or for even
justifying it is that individuals ought to be free to do
what they want to do in terms of their own pursuit of
happiness in private sex lives, and whether they lie,
cheat, or are unfaithful to their spouses is their business
and no one else's - certainly not society's. Some people
who condone adultery would say that the basic ethical
assumption here is that "what they don't know won't hurt
them"; bad results only occur when adultery is discovered.
They defend this position by saying that if adulterers are
discreet and can avoid breaking up their families, then
nothing is wrong with adultery. Furthermore, some argue
that families will not be broken up under above
circumstances because, according to this argument,
adultery provides a means by which unsatisfied spouses
enjoy a satisfying sex life and their families continue to
have economic security and social status. They maintain
that as long as these affairs can be conducted smoothly and
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no harm is done, then nothing will be wrong with adultery.
These are, after all, private sexual matters, and society
should not interfere in any way.
However, these arguments for condoning adultery are
deficient and refutable in the views expressed previously
in our principles of justice and the common good in this
thesis.
First, adultery cannot be a genuine autonomous action
which free moral agents are allowed to enjoy according to
their right to pursue happiness but an action of
self-indulgence beyond the confines they once voluntarily
delimit by the marriage contract; they can exercise their
right of self-determination in sex life before their
marriage is contracted and after their marriage is
dissolved.
Secondly, marriage as an institution is regarded as
necessary to signify the maturity of the union between a
man and a woman and to testify that its essential is a love
on which a lasting union and a basic community can be
based. Where free love or adultery is accepted, the
institution of marriage plays a minor or inessential part.
The sound social structure and ethical lives of people
trustfully built and maintained by a monogamous family
system as a basic unit of society will be put into danger
of collapse. Without the healthy maintenance of the
institution of monogamous marriage between couples, an
adulterous person is necessarily degraded in the sexual
relationship to the status of an object of pleasure for
another person, and this is incompatible with the demands
322
of the human good of self-fulfilment and excellence.
III. Criminality of adultery and its punishment.
According to the previous discussion, we are justified to
claim that adultery is immoral, blameworthy, and
furthermore adulterers are in most cases deserving of a
sanction since the act of adultery commonly involves a
harmful disruption of the basic fabric of the social
institutions of marriage and the family. However, this
moral evaluation does not always necessarily lead us to
regard the act of adultery as a crime and to justify its
punishment by a penal sanction. As there are diverse shapes
of love and of life in marriage between two partners over
the length of their relationship even within the ambit of
the normal marriage form, there may be various reasons,
simple or delicate, straightforward or complicated, which
can justify a married person's committing adultery.
Adultery may be caused not by the fault of one spouse
alone, but of both; adultery committed by one or both
partner may be a reflection of their unhappy married life
for which both parties are to blame, though the degree of
their blame may differ. Anyhow, in those cases, it would be
extremely difficult to detect precisely who is at fault and
to what degree in relation to one or both partners
committing adultery. In this seemingly shadowy and volatile
affair in the married life of individuals, it would be
doubtful in what if any way the state should intervene with
the criminal law. Given all these, what can be the
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underlying values that justify the state's criminalization
of adultery?
The criminalization of adultery may involve the following
positive effects: the society formally condemns and
disapproves the act of adultery as a crime and stigmatizes
the adulterer as a criminal. Is it worthwhile legal policy
to establish a crime of adultery? Is this legal policy, if
adopted, acceptable by the general public? As I have argued
in my account of the system of justice, legal desert or
institutional desert is not identical with moral desert
though the former derives originally its legitimacy and
validity from the latter. However, the law's business is
concerned with not only realizing moral desert and justice
but also maintaining positive order and security by
implementing legal mandates.
Of course, realizing moral desert and justice is not
necessarily distinct and separable from maintaining
positive order and security. On the contrary, there is
often overlap between them, though such an overlap would
occur most certainly in the ideal state of legal
administration. Protecting the common good and order of the
society from disruptive immoral practices or subversive
rebellion is not only a matter of justice but also a matter
of legal security and social utility. However, these two
matters are liable to diverge when the state sticks to
preserving the positive order and vested interests for the
sake of social security and continuance of established
utility while it neglects to follow the progressive norm of
corrective justice which reflects the changed circumstances
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of reciprocal social relations of the persons concerned.
Then, the question is on what ground the state can
plausibly justify its use of criminal law to punish the
adulterer. It may involve a justification based not only on
justice but also on social utility. Now, the task before us
is to discern by which form of combination between two
seemingly competing principles of justice and utility we
can account for the particular application of criminal law
to the act of adultery. However, I have argued that in
order to achieve the common good of society the principle
of justice should take priority over the principle of
utility in their application. And the principle of justice
essentially should take the notion of teleological desert.
I suppose that most western countries have abolished the
crime of adultery not because they think that adultery is
not immoral and not unfair to the marriage partner and the
children through violation of reciprocal trust and
fidelity, but because they believe that its criminal
punishment may entail a grave risk of curtailing individual
freedom and encroaching on private life beyond the limit of
the reasonable exercise of law. The western policy of non¬
intervention by the state into private sex life by
eliminating the crime of adultery from the criminal code
after World War II seems to reflect the currently
influential political morality in the West - namely, the
principle of the neutrality of the state, the principle of
liberal individualism, and the moral disestablishment of
law. Accordingly, it may be argued by the liberal theorists
who advocate the above principles that since there is a
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plurality of values and diverse ways of human life, the
definition of human good and particularly the way to pursue
happiness in married life is a matter of each individual
persons's concern not suitable for state intervention with
legal regulation. It would be their contention that the way
of permitting individuals to pursue happiness and the human
good in their own manner with a liberal contour of law may
enhance happiness more than does the way of the state's
paternalistic intervention with a law charged with public
morality. Thus in this sense, the western system of
criminal law, influenced by the above principles, with
particular reference to sex offences, seems to be a
reflection of the political philosophy of liberalism and
utilitarianism. However, I suppose that those ideas of
liberal and utilitarian political morality, though they may
be very plausible in enhancing the individual person's
freedom and his or her (liberal) right to privacy, are not
likely to be suitable entirely to people living in Korean
society, where the deep-rooted tradition of communitarian
value and perfectionist virtue ethics still persists. The
Korean Constitution stipulates a provision about the value
of marriage and family life based on and maintained by the
individual person's dignity and gender equality.(Article
36:1) This may be interpreted as a reflection of the
traditional value of stressing the integrity of the family
system, though it is expressed in the contemporary rights-
based language of human dignity and equality. The provision
of the crime of adultery in the Korean criminal code may be
interpreted as a reflection of the public aspiration and
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the common morality for preserving the integrity of family
life. It may be also interpreted as a societal mandate to
punish the adulterer's self-indulgence in pursuing
individual freedom and happiness in a manner considered to
be incompatible with harmonious common happiness shared
with other members of the family.
However, the above account should not be interpreted as
giving whole-hearted support to the present provision of
the crime of adultery in the criminal code and the current
practices of its enforcement. Although it may be supported
by the consensus of contemporary Korean people to maintain
the provision of the crime of adultery for the sake of fair
relations between married couples and the common good of
the members of a family, it should not be applied to an
attempt to encroach beyond the reasonable limit of police
power exercisable in relation to the private lives of
married persons in its enforcement and furthermore the
degree of punishment should not exceed that for other
similar sexual offences. The present provision of the crime
of adultery which stipulates a single way of punishment
with up to 2 years imprisonment may be considered too harsh
and repressive compared to the crime of procreating
prostitution which is punishable by either imprisonment or
a pecuniary penalty. Also, it may be considered excessive
compared to the non-provision of criminal punishment in the
criminal code for other sexual offences considered to be
violations of traditional morality such as incest,
homosexuality, and bestiality. The harsh and excessive
provision of sanctions for the crime of adultery has been
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strongly attacked by criminal lawyers as well as the
general public on the grounds that it has been liable to be
abused by spouses with intent to blackmail, and the use of
police power in this case has tended to encroach
excessively into the private affairs of the persons
concerned.
Thus, the suggestions we can make to improve the present
provision of the crime of adultery and the current
practices of its enforcement are at least three: firstly,
it is desirable to revise the present provision of single
way of punishment to multiple choices of punishment either
imprisonment or pecuniary penalty which are applicable
according to the circumstance of cases; secondly, the
degree of punishment should be adjusted in a lenient way in
proportion to other sexual offences and in the light of
current penal policy of non-intervention into other
similarly blameworthy sexual offences such as incest,
homosexuality, and bestiality; and thirdly, the police
investigation and the state prosecution of the crime of
adultery should strictly observe due process of law to




So far I have tried to establish a theory of justice
which would be plausible and acceptable in contemporary
Korean society. The basic idea of justice in this thesis is
based on the notion of teleological desert. The
teleological desert theory employs the concept of desert as
a primary justifying rationale and the function of moral
communication, rather than the traditional utilitarian
purposes, as an inherent but subordinate element in the
justifying rationale of reward and punishment. Here the
idea of desert-based justice involves maintaining an
equilibrium between benefits and burdens. The desert-based
theory holds that a society is just when the distribution
of benefits and burdens is in accordance with good and ill
desert. The notion of due desert has the advantage of
explaining the centrality of human agency in the idea of
justice. This is because the general underlying aim of this
conception of desert is to screen out all those factors
that are unearned, that are beyond human control.
However, in this thesis I have proposed a two-stage
theory as to the complete justification of reward and
punishment; the first stage deploys the principle of
justice based on desert, and the second stage deploys the
principle of the common good. Since justice is not the
whole, though it is central and a particularly important
element of social morality, a justification of reward and
punishment based on justice is not sufficient for a
complete justification of those kinds of treatment. The
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complete justification which must be based on the common
good needs an extra consideration of utility in the
individual case in addition to the primary test of justice.
For establishing the above premise I have employed seven
supporting principles. Firstly, while there are diverse
basic human goods and values of life in society, namely,
self-preservation, self-development, happiness and harmony,
and practical reasonableness, the ultimate end to which the
rational human pursuit or possession of such goods is
directed is self-fulfilment and flourishing (the thesis of
self-fulfilment). Secondly, In making progress toward self-
fulfilment, the human being, though he is in his thought
and conduct influenced by his social, psychological, and
physiological conditions, is by his fundamental nature
regarded as possessing and exercising free-will. As to the
principle of responsibility of a free and rational moral
agent, autonomous action, personal choice, and one's desert
on account of one's acts and choices will be a proper basis
for rendering one's due reward and punishment (the thesis
of free-will and autonomous action). Thirdly, any
distributive inequality in reward and punishment according
to desert is only justified if in regard to the matter of
distribution everyone has been given an equal opportunity
to participate and exert effort (the thesis of equal
opportunity for desert). Fourthly, any distributive
inequality in reward according to desert is only justified
after each member of society has given an equal
satisfaction of basic needs according to the principle of
needs (the thesis of equal satisfaction of basic needs).
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Fifthly, desert discourse and thus justice discourse are in
their nature teleological since invoking or administering
justice requires a communication and sharing of a common
sense of justice among the members of a community or
society, and this development and sharing of a common sense
of justice is of value since it creates the conditions for
nurturing the other human virtues in society (the thesis of
desert and justice discourse as teleological
communication) . Sixthly, since human nature and the idea of
justice are essentially teleological, the concept of
justice as a static equilibrium, or as formal reciprocity,
requires to be transformed into a dynamic equilibrium,
equitable reciprocity with due regard for the common good
where the seemingly conflicting ideas of liberty, equality,
and solidarity are fully intertwined and harmonized as a
condition of social homeostasis (the thesis of dynamic
equilibrium and harmony) And seventhly, where rewards or
punishments are apportioned by public institutions, the
proper criterion for a person's reward or punishment is not
abstract moral desert but institutional desert, determined
according to whether or not the person succeeds or fails in
fulfilling the requirements of institutional rules or laws
which have themselves to be justified by their tendency to
secure abstract desert and the common good (the thesis of
institutional natural law).
I have argued that the above framework and principles of
justification for reward and punishment are plausible as a
basis for better understanding of and better solutions to
concrete problems. This is because my theory has intended
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to derive its moral justification from the desiderata of
contemporary Korean political culture, that is, a liberal-
communitarian conception of justice which is a amalgam
between liberal individualism and traditional communitarian
values. Although the achievement of this kind of synthesis
between two seemingly inconsistent and incompatible
principles appears to be uneasy, I have argued that it can
be made possible through the approach of a liberal
perfectionist virtue ethics: for each member of society to
become a more excellent human being in an autonomous way is
a most viable way of realizing justice not only in personal
relations but also in society at large. In order to nurture
perfectionist virtue I have advocated a creative
reconstruction of traditional Confucian ethics in a way
that can suit any contemporary industrialized and
capitalist society. The essential elements worth drawing
from traditional Confucian philosophy seem to be a kind of
work-ethic that stresses self-fulfilment and human
perfection through hard work and the nurturing of virtue,
rendering a person due reward and punishment according to
his or her desert, and the priority of righteousness and
harmonious common good over social utility understood in
purely hedonistic terms.
However, here again equal stress should be put on the
right to individual autonomy and self-determination which
is an essential element to establish and identify a
person's desert and responsibility. The notions of human
dignity and worth and the individual right to freedom and
equality which were transplanted to the East from the West
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have under rigorous pressure taken root in the Korean
political culture as can be seen in the Korean
constitutional history of the recent past. I suppose that
the protection of the individual right to autonomy and
privacy is an inviolable principle in Korean political
morality. I believe that the theory of justice I have
espoused in this thesis which comprises the three
principles of desert, needs, and legal rights may find its
justification in the prevailing political morality of the
great majority of contemporary Korean people. This is also
reflected in the principle of the liberal welfare state to
be drawn from the present Korean Constitution.
Finally, it is to be stressed again that although the
principle of justice is essential and pivotal to building
and maintaining a good society, it should not be regarded
as an absolutely superior or all-encompassing notion to be
applied to resolve any social issues. The principle of
utility has a complementary or auxiliary part to play, and
sometimes qualifies justice in a way which is necessary for
securing the common good.
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